Javier vs. Veridiano II

A final judgment in a forcible entry case (accion interdictal), which conclusively determines only the right to prior physical possession (possession de facto), does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent action for recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria), as the two actions do not share an identity of causes of action.

Petitioner Felicidad Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for a parcel of land in 1963. In 1970, she filed a forcible entry complaint (Civil Case No. 926) against Ben Babol, alleging she was dispossessed of a portion of the land. The city court dismissed the complaint, finding the disputed area was outside the lot described in her application. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal and became final. Subsequently, in 1973, Javier was granted a sales patent and an Original Certificate of Title for the lot. Ben Babol sold the disputed portion to private respondent Reino Rosete. In 1977, Javier filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession (Civil Case No. 2203-0) against Babol and Rosete, asserting absolute ownership. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, which the trial court granted.

• Nature: The dispute involves two successive actions filed by petitioner Felicidad Javier concerning a 200-square-meter portion of Lot No. 1641 in Olongapo City.
• The Forcible Entry Case (Civil Case No. 926): Filed in 1970 against Ben Babol, petitioner alleged she was in prior physical possession of the lot and was forcibly dispossessed. The City Court dismissed the complaint, finding the disputed area was outside the boundaries of petitioner's claimed lot. This dismissal was affirmed on appeal and became final in 1973.
• Acquisition of Title and Sale to Rosete: In 1973, petitioner was granted a sales patent and issued an Original Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1641. Ben Babol sold the property he occupied, including the disputed portion, to private respondent Reino Rosete.
• The Quieting of Title Case (Civil Case No. 2203-0): Filed in 1977, petitioner alleged she was the "absolute owner in fee simple" of the lot covered by her title and that defendants (Babol and Rosete) were illegally occupying the southwestern portion. She prayed to be declared owner and for recovery of possession.
• Dismissal on Res Judicata: Respondent Rosete moved to dismiss, invoking res judicata based on the final judgment in the forcible entry case. The trial court granted the motion, leading to this petition.

• Lack of Identity of Parties: Petitioner argued that private respondent Rosete was not a party to the forcible entry case, which is an action in personam, and was not a purchaser pendente lite who could invoke res judicata.
• Lack of Identity of Causes of Action: Petitioner maintained that the forcible entry case concerned only physical possession (possession de facto), while the subsequent case for quieting of title concerned ownership (possession de jure), thus presenting distinct causes of action.

• Substantial Identity of Parties: Respondent countered that he is a successor-in-interest by title of the defendant (Ben Babol) in the first action, satisfying the requirement of substantial identity of parties under the Rules of Court.
• Failure to State a Cause of Action: Respondent argued that neither the forcible entry complaint nor the quieting of title complaint stated a valid cause of action, warranting dismissal of both.

• Identity of Parties: Whether there is identity of parties between the forcible entry case and the subsequent quieting of title case for purposes of res judicata.
• Identity of Causes of Action: Whether there is identity of causes of action between a forcible entry case (accion interdictal) and a subsequent action for quieting of title/recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria).

• Identity of Parties: The requirement of identity of parties was met. For res judicata to apply, only substantial, not absolute, identity of parties is required. Private respondent Rosete, as successor-in-interest of the original defendant Ben Babol by title subsequent to the first action, is considered in substantial privity with him, satisfying Section 49(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
• Identity of Causes of Action: The requirement of identity of causes of action was not met. The first case was an accion interdictal (forcible entry), which is solely concerned with prior physical possession (possession de facto). The second case, though captioned as "Quieting of Title," was in substance an accion reivindicatoria, as the petitioner expressly alleged absolute ownership and prayed for recovery of possession based on that title. A judgment in a forcible entry case conclusively determines only the right to physical possession and does not bar a subsequent action to resolve ownership.

• Res Judicata — For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following must concur: (1) a final judgment; (2) jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (3) judgment on the merits; and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and second actions. The Court applied this doctrine but found the fourth requisite lacking due to the different causes of action.
• Accion Interdictal vs. Accion Reivindicatoria — The Court distinguished the three possessory actions: Accion interdictal is a summary action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer brought within one year in the proper inferior court to recover physical possession. Accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC to recover the right to possess when dispossession has lasted over one year. Accion reivindicatoria is an action in the RTC to recover ownership, which includes the right to possess (jus utendi and jus fruendi). A judgment in the first type does not bar the third.

• "The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." — This passage defines the limited scope of a forcible entry action.
• "Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title." — This passage clearly delineates the nature of the ownership recovery action from the possessory actions.

• Emilia v. Bado, G.R. No. L-23685, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 183 — Cited as the controlling authority that preserved the distinction between the age-old remedies of accion interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria.
• Quimpo v. De la Victoria, G.R. No. L-31822, July 31, 1972, 46 SCRA 139 — Applied to hold that even if the second case were treated as a petition to quiet title, its cause of action remains different from that of an ejectment case.
• Bautista v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-24062, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 548 — Cited for the rule that a judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case is not a bar to an action for determination of title or ownership.

• Article 434, Civil Code — Provides that in an action to recover property, the plaintiff must identify the property and rely on the strength of his title. The Court used this to characterize Civil Case No. 2203-0 as an accion reivindicatoria.
• Section 49(b), Rule 39, Rules of Court (1964) — States that a judgment is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. The Court applied this to find substantial identity of parties with the private respondent.

• Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
• Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr.
• Justice Jose A. R. Melo (No separate opinion noted)