Javier vs. Lumontad

The nature of an action and the court's jurisdiction over it are determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by the defendant's defenses or the court's findings on the merits. In forcible entry cases, the complaint must allege prior physical possession by the plaintiff and deprivation of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; however, the complaint need not expressly employ the language of the law if the facts set up show that dispossession took place under such conditions. Nevertheless, a forcible entry complaint fails on the merits where the plaintiff cannot prove his right to de facto possession of the disputed premises.

Petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia, is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier, who owned a 360-square meter parcel of land located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Respondent Susan Lumontad claimed ownership of a portion of the same land, which she allegedly acquired through sale from Anthony de la Paz Javier, another son of Vicente from a previous marriage. The dispute involves the proper characterization of the action filed by petitioner—whether it was one for forcible entry cognizable by the first-level courts, or an action for recovery of ownership and possession cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia, filed a forcible entry complaint dated July 3, 2007 before the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, against respondent Susan Lumontad. Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier, who owned a 360-square meter parcel of land located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00-TY-002-11458. Since his birth, petitioner's family lived in the residential house erected thereon, and upon Vicente's death, petitioner and his mother continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a two-storey building on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof, despite petitioner's vigorous objections and protests. The dispute was submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached, prompting petitioner to file the forcible entry complaint, averring that reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the portion may be fixed at ₱5,000.00 per month.

In her Answer dated July 30, 2007, respondent admitted that during Vicente's lifetime, he was indeed the owner and in physical possession of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name. Hence, she took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.

The MTC found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building was erected, was given to Anthony de la Paz Javier, son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through sale. The MTC also observed that petitioner's complaint failed to aver the required jurisdictional facts, as it merely contained a general allegation that respondent's entry was made by means of force and intimidation without specifically stating how, when, and where such means were employed.

The RTC reversed the MTC, ruling that the facts averred in petitioner's complaint showed that his cause of action was indeed one of forcible entry within the MTC's jurisdiction, and that respondent forcibly and unlawfully deprived petitioner of possession. The CA, however, set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits, holding that the issue of possession was intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. The CA found that TD No. 00-TY-002-11458 only covered petitioner's family house and not the subject land, and that the subject land was separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-9660, which was cancelled when the land was subdivided into two lots: the 187.20 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12825 given by Vicente to petitioner, and the 172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12824 given by Vicente to Anthony, which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name. The CA further stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that respondent employed force and intimidation in entering the disputed portion.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner argued that his complaint was properly one for forcible entry, as it alleged prior physical possession of the subject land and dispossession by respondent through force and intimidation on March 26, 2007, when respondent entered the property and constructed a building thereon.
• Error in Remand: Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and possession, since the complaint's allegations clearly demonstrated a cause of action for forcible entry within the MTC's exclusive original jurisdiction.

• Ownership of the Disputed Portion: Respondent claimed to be the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion where the subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name, and thus took possession not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.
• Lack of Jurisdictional Facts: Respondent argued that petitioner's complaint failed to aver the required jurisdictional facts, as it merely contained a general allegation of force and intimidation without specifically stating how, when, and where such means were employed, making the proper remedy either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria before the proper forum.

• Nature of the Action: Whether the complaint filed by petitioner was one for forcible entry cognizable by the MTC, or an action for recovery of ownership and possession cognizable by the RTC.
• Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint: Whether petitioner was able to justify his right to de facto possession of the disputed 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject land.

• Nature of the Action: Yes, the complaint was properly one for forcible entry. The allegations in the complaint—prior physical possession by petitioner, dispossession on March 26, 2007, and entry by force and intimidation through the construction of a building—were sufficient jurisdictional averments under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in remanding the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and possession.
• Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint: No, petitioner failed to justify his right to de facto possession of the disputed premises. The tax declaration petitioner relied upon covered only his house, not the land itself, while respondent's tax declaration covered the disputed 172.80 sq. m. portion, showing respondent's right to de facto possession as its ostensible owner.

• Nature of the Action: The Court applied the invariable rule from Pagadora vs. Ilao that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In forcible entry cases, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is not essential that the complaint expressly employ the language of the law; it suffices that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and this requirement is jurisdictional. A plain reading of petitioner's complaint showed that all required jurisdictional averments were complied with: the "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the dispossession all appeared on the face of the complaint. Citing Arbizo vs. Sps. Santillan, the Court held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. Ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first-level courts by express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Even where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first-level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. Such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
• Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint: Notwithstanding the proper classification of the action, the forcible entry complaint could not be granted on its merits because petitioner failed to justify his right to the de facto possession of the disputed premises. As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, the supposed document from which petitioner hinged his right to de facto possession, only covered his house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appeared on record to show that he had the right to de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion, which, on the contrary, appeared consistent with respondent's claim of ownership in view of TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her name. With no evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing respondent's right to de facto possession of the disputed portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible entry complaint necessarily failed.

• Determination of jurisdiction by allegations in the complaint — What determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint, not the defendant's defenses or the court's findings on the merits. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's complaint, which alleged prior physical possession and dispossession through force and intimidation, was properly one for forcible entry within the MTC's jurisdiction.
• Jurisdictional averments in forcible entry complaints — In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is not essential that the complaint expressly employ the language of the law; it suffices that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and this requirement is jurisdictional. The Court found that the "how," "when," and "where" of the dispossession all appeared on the face of petitioner's complaint.
• First-level court jurisdiction over ejectment cases — Ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first-level courts by express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Even where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first-level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. Such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
• De facto possession requirement in forcible entry — A forcible entry complaint fails on the merits where the plaintiff cannot prove his right to de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the disputed premises. The Court applied this principle to dismiss petitioner's complaint, as his tax declaration covered only his house and not the land itself, while respondent's tax declaration covered the disputed portion.

• "The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence." — This passage from Pagadora vs. Ilao, quoted by the Court, states the controlling doctrine on how jurisdiction over ejectment cases is determined, which is central to the Court's ruling that the complaint was properly one for forcible entry.
• "It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant's act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter." — This passage articulates the jurisdictional requirements for forcible entry complaints and was applied by the Court to find that petitioner's complaint satisfied all such requirements.
• "Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property." — This passage clarifies the scope of first-level court jurisdiction in ejectment cases where ownership is also put in issue, and explains why the CA erred in remanding the case to the RTC.

• Pagadora vs. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14 — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that the nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction are determined by the allegations in the complaint, and for the jurisdictional requirements of forcible entry complaints.
• Arbizo vs. Sps. Santillan, 570 Phil. 200 (2008) — Cited for the proposition that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force.
• Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134 — Cited for the proposition that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first-level courts.
• Heirs of Basilisa Hernandez vs. Vergara, Jr., 533 Phil. 458 (2006) — Cited for the proposition that first-level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases even where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with ownership.
• Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59 (2009) — Cited for the proposition that first-level courts are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, and that such adjudication is merely provisional.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that a person deprived of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court within one year after such unlawful deprivation. The Court applied this provision to determine that petitioner's complaint was properly one for forcible entry.
• Section 33(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Grants Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, with the proviso that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The Court applied this provision to affirm the MTC's jurisdiction over the case.
• Section 8(2), Rule 40, Rules of Court — Provides that if a case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section. The Court held that the CA erred in applying this provision because the MTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concurred in the decision.