Javier vs. Javier

A judicial administrator has standing to maintain an action for the recovery of possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased, and a party who admits knowing that the land belongs to another estate is not a possessor in good faith and therefore cannot claim reimbursement for improvements or exemption from rental liability under the Civil Code.

Manuel Javier was the patriarch of the Javier family and, at his death, his estate became the subject of judicial administration. His son Longinos Javier was appointed judicial administrator of the estate. Another son, Segundo Javier, together with Segundo's wife Isabel Hernandez and their son Manuel Ramon Javier, occupied a portion of the family land at No. 521 Calle Real, Malate, Manila, upon which they constructed a house. The land had been in the possession of Manuel Javier since at least 1860 and had thereafter been occupied by his children, none of whom had ever claimed individual ownership or occupied the property as owner. The dispute arose from the conflicting claims over the lot and the house standing thereon, with the administrator seeking to recover possession of the property for the estate.

The property in dispute consists of a lot and the house standing thereon at No. 521 Calle Real, Malate, Manila. The lot formed part of the estate of Manuel Javier, who had been in possession of the land since at least 1860. After his death, his son Longinos Javier was appointed judicial administrator of his estate. The land had thereafter been occupied by Manuel Javier's children, none of whom had ever made any claim to individual ownership or occupied the property as owner. Segundo Javier, one of Manuel Javier's sons, together with his wife Isabel Hernandez and their son Manuel Ramon Javier, resided on the property and constructed a house thereon.

On April 24, 1904, a demand was made upon the defendants for the possession of the property. When they refused to yield possession, Longinos Javier, in his capacity as judicial administrator, filed an action in the Court of First Instance to recover possession of the lot. The defendants contested the action, asserting claims to the land and to reimbursement for the house they had built.

Manuel Ramon Javier, testifying as a witness, made no claim to the ownership of the land, stating only that his investigations into the question of ownership revealed "a great confusion in regard thereto." The Court of First Instance found that the land belonged to the estate represented by the plaintiff, while the house belonged to the defendants Isabel Hernandez and Manuel Ramon Javier. Judgment was rendered awarding possession of the property to the plaintiff, with the defendants given a reasonable opportunity to remove the house, and rent for the use of the land limited to the period from April 24, 1904 onward. The defendants appealed.

• Standing of the Administrator: Appellants claimed that the action could not be maintained by the judicial administrator of the estate of Manuel Javier, but should instead be maintained by all the heirs of the deceased.
• Possession in Good Faith: Appellants argued that they were possessors in good faith and, by reason thereof and the provisions of Article 451 of the Civil Code, could not be compelled to pay rent.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Appellants claimed entitlement under Article 453 of the Civil Code to be reimbursed for the expenses of constructing the house on the lot.
• Community of Property: Appellants contended that the principles of community of property should apply because the house was owned by the appellants and the land by the plaintiff, asserting that this condition created a community of property within the meaning of Title 3, Book 2 of the Civil Code.

• Standing of Judicial Administrator: Whether a judicial administrator may maintain an action to recover possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased.
• Possession in Good Faith: Whether the appellants qualify as possessors in good faith under Article 433 of the Civil Code, such that they are exempt from paying rent under Article 451.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Whether the appellants are entitled to reimbursement for the expenses of constructing the house under Article 453 of the Civil Code.
• Community of Property: Whether separate ownership of the house (by appellants) and the land (by the estate) creates a community of property under Title 3, Book 2 of the Civil Code, or whether Article 397 governing improvements by a co-owner on common property applies.

• Standing of Judicial Administrator: Yes. The right of a judicial administrator to recover possession of real property belonging to the estate was recognized in Alfonso vs. Natividad and under sections 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Possession in Good Faith: No. The appellants do not come within the definition of a possessor in good faith under Article 433 of the Civil Code, as they themselves admitted they always believed the land did not belong to them but belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: No. Reimbursement for construction expenses under Article 453 is available only to a possessor in good faith, and the appellants were not such possessors.
• Community of Property: No. Separate ownership of the house and the land does not create a community of property within the meaning of Title 3, Book 2 of the Civil Code. If the house itself belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and two of the defendants were such heirs, the lower court's decision was already as favorable to the appellants as it could be. Under Article 397, the burden of proof was on the appellants to show the house was built with the consent of their cotenants, and even tacit consent would not require cotenants to pay for the house.

• Standing of Judicial Administrator: The Court applied the rule recognized in Alfonso vs. Natividad (4 Off. Gaz., 461) and sections 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which vest in a judicial administrator the right to recover possession of real property belonging to the estate. The administrator, not the heirs collectively, is the proper party to bring such an action. The appellants' contention that all heirs must join was therefore without merit.
• Possession in Good Faith: Article 433 of the Civil Code defines a possessor in good faith as one who believes himself to be the owner. The appellants' own brief conceded that Segundo Javier and Isabel Hernandez "always believed that the land did not belong to them but belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier." By their own admission, they lacked the subjective belief in ownership required by Article 433. Consequently, they could not invoke Article 451 to avoid liability for rent. Moreover, the lower court's judgment did not allow recovery for the use or occupation of the house, and rent for the land was limited to the period after the April 24, 1904 demand.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Article 453 of the Civil Code allows reimbursement for construction expenses only to a possessor in good faith. Having established that the appellants were not possessors in good faith, the Court held that they were not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses of constructing the house.
• Community of Property: The Court rejected the appellants' contention that separate ownership of the house and the land created a community of property under Title 3, Book 2 of the Civil Code. Such a condition of affairs does not constitute community of property as that term is used in the Code. Alternatively, if the house belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier and two defendants were such heirs, then Article 397 — which governs improvements made upon common property by one of the co-owners — would apply. Under that article, the burden of proof was on the appellants to show that the house was built with the consent of their cotenants. Even if tacit consent were shown, it would not require the cotenants to pay for the house, as supported by Manresa's Commentaries on the Civil Code (8 Manresa, p. 396). In either scenario, the lower court's decision — allowing the appellants to remove the house — was favorable to them.

• Right of Judicial Administrator to Sue for Recovery of Estate Property — A judicial administrator has the standing to maintain an action for the recovery of possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased, without the need for all heirs to join as parties. This right is recognized under sections 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was affirmed in Alfonso vs. Natividad.
• Possession in Good Faith Under Article 433 of the Civil Code — A possessor in good faith is one who believes himself to be the owner of the property possessed. A party who admits knowing that the land belongs to another estate cannot qualify as a possessor in good faith and therefore cannot claim the protections afforded to such possessors, including exemption from rental liability under Article 451 and reimbursement for improvements under Article 453.
• Improvements by a Co-Owner on Common Property (Article 397) — Where a co-owner builds upon common property, the burden of proof is on that co-owner to show the improvement was made with the consent of the other cotenants. Even if tacit consent is shown, it does not require the cotenants to pay for the improvement.

• "The right of judicial administrator to recover the possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased was recognized in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad (4 Off. Gaz., 461; secs. 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure)." — This passage establishes the doctrine that a judicial administrator has standing to sue for recovery of estate property, a foundational principle of estate administration.
• "As said by the appellants themselves in that brief, the two defendants, Segundo Javier and his wife, Isabel Hernandez, always believed that the land did not belong to them but belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier." — The Court uses the appellants' own admission to defeat their claim of good-faith possession, illustrating that the subjective belief requirement of Article 433 is tested against the possessor's own statements.
• "The burden of proof was on the appellants to show that the house was built with the consent of their cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown this would not require such cotenants to pay for the house." — This articulates the rule under Article 397 regarding improvements made by a co-owner on common property, placing the burden of proof on the building co-owner and limiting the financial obligation of non-consenting cotenants.

• Alfonso vs. Natividad, 4 Off. Gaz., 461 — Controlling precedent followed by the Court for the proposition that a judicial administrator has the right to recover possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased, pursuant to sections 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Article 433, Civil Code (Spain) — Defines a possessor in good faith as one who believes himself to be the owner. Applied to determine that the appellants, who admitted the land belonged to the estate, were not possessors in good faith.
• Article 451, Civil Code (Spain) — Provides that a possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rent. Held inapplicable because the appellants were not possessors in good faith.
• Article 453, Civil Code (Spain) — Allows reimbursement for expenses of useful improvements to a possessor in good faith. Held inapplicable for the same reason.
• Article 397, Civil Code (Spain) — Governs improvements made upon common property by one of the co-owners. Applied to hold that the burden of proof was on the appellants to show the house was built with the consent of their cotenants, and that even tacit consent would not require cotenants to pay.
• Sections 702, 703, and 704, Code of Civil Procedure — Vest in a judicial administrator the right to recover possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concurred.