Javier vs. Gonzales

A judgment of conviction promulgated in absentia is valid if the accused was properly notified of the date of promulgation and the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket with a copy served upon the accused or counsel. An acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is void and does not place the accused in jeopardy; the original conviction may be reinstated.

On Christmas night in 1997, an assailant threw a grenade into the house of Leonardo Hermenigildo in Dipaculao, Aurora, killing Rufino Concepcion, inflicting fatal injuries on Hermenigildo, and wounding Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal, and Jesus Macatiag. Pepito Gonzales was charged with the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder. The victim’s sister, Carmen Macatiag, acted as private complainant. The case was initially filed in Baler, Aurora, but the Supreme Court granted a transfer of venue to Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, where trial proceeded before Judge Erlinda P. Buted.

• The Crime and Charges: On 25 December 1997, around 11:30 p.m., respondent Pepito Gonzales allegedly threw a grenade into the house of Leonardo Hermenigildo in Barangay Diarabasin, Dipaculao, Aurora. The explosion killed Rufino Concepcion, caused fatal injuries to Hermenigildo, and wounded Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal, and Jesus Macatiag. Gonzales was charged with murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder.
• Bail and Transfer of Venue: The RTC of Baler granted bail. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag (sister of the deceased Concepcion) sought a transfer of venue, which the Supreme Court granted on 17 August 1999. The case was reassigned to the RTC of Palayan City, Branch 40, presided by Judge Erlinda P. Buted.
• Trial and Demurrer: After the prosecution rested, Gonzales filed an urgent motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, attaching the demurrer. The RTC denied the motion. Gonzales then presented his own evidence and formally offered it.
• Promulgation of Judge Buted’s Conviction: The RTC set promulgation on 15 December 2005. Notice was sent to Gonzales; the return of service indicated his sister received it but refused to sign. On that date, Gonzales did not appear. His counsel, Atty. Mario Benitez, filed a Withdrawal of Counsel with Gonzales’s conformity. The RTC rescheduled promulgation to 22 December 2005, issued a warrant of arrest, and forfeited the bond. On 22 December 2005, Gonzales again failed to appear. Judge Buted appointed a counsel de oficio and proceeded with promulgation in absentia. The dispositive portion was read, the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket, and copies were ordered served on the accused and counsel. The Decision convicted Gonzales and imposed the penalty of death. The records were ordered forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review.
• Omnibus Motion and Judge Soluren’s Acquittal: On 6 January 2006, Gonzales, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the conviction, alleging lack of notice and denial of counsel. By this time, Judge Soluren had taken over the branch. She granted the motion on 18 April 2006, set aside the conviction, and reinstated bail. Subsequently, on 31 October 2006, she rendered a Decision acquitting Gonzales of all charges.
• Petitioner’s Challenge: Petitioner Loida M. Javier, daughter of the now-deceased private complainant Carmen Macatiag (who was killed on 14 December 2005, with Gonzales also an accused in that killing), discovered the acquittal and filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supported the acquittal, arguing no grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition, sustaining the OSG’s position and holding that the promulgation in absentia was void because Gonzales had not been personally notified and his former counsel had withdrawn.

• Validity of Promulgation in Absentia: Petitioner argued that the promulgation of Judge Buted’s judgment of conviction was valid because Gonzales was properly notified through his counsel and at his last known address, and the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 were satisfied. The failure of the accused to appear without justification warranted the promulgation in absentia.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by Second Judge: Petitioner maintained that Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Omnibus Motion and acquitting Gonzales, because the judgment of conviction was already final and subject to automatic review before the Court of Appeals. The second judge had no authority to set aside a final judgment and effectively overrule a co-equal court.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that double jeopardy could not attach because the acquittal was void, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

• Invalid Notice and Void Promulgation: Respondent Gonzales argued that he was not personally notified of the rescheduled promulgation on 22 December 2005, and that his former counsel, Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn; thus, he had no knowledge of the proceedings, and the promulgation in absentia was void.
• Validity of Acquittal and Double Jeopardy: Respondent contended that Judge Soluren’s acquittal was valid and final, and any further review would place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

• Promulgation in Absentia: Whether the promulgation of Judge Buted’s judgment of conviction in absentia on 22 December 2005 was valid.
• Validity of the Acquittal: Whether Judge Soluren’s subsequent decision acquitting the accused was valid or rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to question the acquittal and whether petitioner was required to first file a motion for reconsideration.

• Promulgation in Absentia: The promulgation was valid. The records showed that notice of the initial 15 December 2005 promulgation was sent to respondent’s address and received by his sister; his counsel was present in court when the date was set. Notice to counsel is notice to client. When respondent failed to appear without justification, the trial court properly rescheduled and then proceeded with promulgation in absentia on 22 December 2005. Judge Buted’s Order satisfied the Rule 120, Section 6 requirements: the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket and copies were ordered served upon the accused and his counsel. The absence of personal notice of the rescheduled date did not invalidate the promulgation because the accused’s unjustified non-appearance on the first date and his act of jumping bail operated to forfeit his right to personal notice; the court complied with the mandatory rule on recording and service.
• Validity of the Acquittal: Judge Soluren’s acquittal was void. She acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By the time the Omnibus Motion was filed, the conviction had already been validly promulgated and was subject to automatic review by the Court of Appeals under Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 and OCA Circular No. 57-2005, as the penalty imposed was death. Judge Soluren had no jurisdiction to disturb the final judgment; her failure to dismiss the motion outright and her reversal of the conviction constituted a capricious, patent, and abusive exercise of authority. The acquittal was a nullity.
• Propriety of Certiorari: The petition for certiorari was an appropriate remedy. A void judgment of acquittal — one rendered with grave abuse of discretion — does not trigger double jeopardy and may be challenged via certiorari under Rule 65. The requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration was dispensed with because the assailed orders were patently void, falling under established exceptions to the exhaustion rule.

• Promulgation in Absentia (Rule 120, Section 6): The rule is mandatory once the accused fails to appear despite notice. The essential requisites for a valid promulgation in absentia are: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or counsel. The purpose is to prevent the accused from subverting the judicial process by jumping bail.
• Notice to Counsel is Notice to Client: Service of notices and orders upon counsel of record constitutes service upon the party, unless the Rules require personal service on the party. A withdrawing counsel’s acts before the withdrawal is formally approved by the court generally remain binding.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack of Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy: An acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is void ab initio. Such a void acquittal does not terminate the case, and double jeopardy does not attach. There can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment or a void judgment. (People v. Hernandez; Villareal v. People)
• Personality of Private Offended Party to File Certiorari: The offended party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality as a “person aggrieved” to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, applying the liberal construction of the Rules of Court. (Paredes v. Gopengco; Almero v. People)

• “The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.” — The Court distilled the mandatory requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia under Section 6, Rule 120.
• “Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching. … ‘an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really ‘acquit’ and therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.’” — The Court applied the rule that a void acquittal does not bar further proceedings or a reinstatement of a prior valid conviction.
• “Notice to counsel is notice to client.” — Reiterated from Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., this principle underpinned the finding that respondent could not claim ignorance of the promulgation date.

• Almuete v. People, G.R. No. 179611, 12 March 2013, 693 SCRA 167 — Followed; upheld the validity of a promulgation in absentia where the accused’s absence was inexcusable and the judgment was recorded with copies served.
• Estrada v. People, 505 Phil. 339 (2005) — Followed; affirmed validity of promulgation in absentia upon satisfaction of the essential elements.
• People v. Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289 (2006) — Followed; the source of the doctrine that an acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not place the accused in jeopardy.
• Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2012) — Cited; applied the rule that grave abuse of discretion deprives the court of jurisdiction, preventing double jeopardy from attaching.
• Paredes v. Gopengco, 140 Phil. 81 (1969) — Followed; established the offended party’s personality to file certiorari in criminal cases.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the promulgation of judgment, including the mandatory procedure for promulgation in absentia and the remedies available to an accused who fails to appear. Applied to uphold the first judgment and to reject the Omnibus Motion as the wrong remedy.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 (15 April 2005) and OCA Circular No. 57-2005 (12 May 2005) — Direct RTCs to forward records of death penalty cases directly to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. These circulars were cited to show that Judge Soluren capriciously disregarded the directive that the case was already subject to automatic review and beyond her jurisdiction to disturb.

Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred. Justice Caguioa wrote a separate concurring opinion.