Javier vs. Commission on Elections

A provision of law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective, and cannot serve as a basis for administrative disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code even if the repealing law penalizes the same act under a different statute.

Governor Exequiel Javier of Antique issued Executive Order No. 003 on January 23, 2013, preventively suspending Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce Roquero for thirty days. The suspension occurred during the election period for the May 2013 elections, which COMELEC had fixed from January 13, 2013 to June 12, 2013 pursuant to Resolution No. 9385. Mayor Roquero had been the subject of administrative complaints filed by the municipal vice-mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had earlier recommended her preventive suspension. The suspension was implemented despite a temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals and a judgment by the Regional Trial Court ordering the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to cease proceedings and Javier to refrain from suspending the mayor.

• The Preventive Suspension: On January 23, 2013, during the election period for the May 2013 elections, Governor Exequiel Javier issued Executive Order No. 003 preventively suspending Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce Roquero for thirty days. The suspension followed a recommendation by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan based on administrative complaints filed against the mayor.
• Judicial Interventions: Prior to the suspension, the Court of Appeals had issued a temporary restraining order on January 15, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP-07307, enjoining proceedings in the administrative case. On January 16, 2013, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, promulgated a judgment granting certiorari and prohibition, ordering the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to cease proceedings and Javier to refrain from implementing the suspension.
• Election Offense Complaint: Mayor Roquero filed an election offense complaint (EOC No. 13-025) against Javier for violating Section 261(x) of the Election Code, which prohibits suspension of elective officials during the election period without COMELEC approval.
• Disqualification Petition: On March 22, 2013, Cornelio Aldon (Javier's opponent for governor) and Raymundo Roquero (the suspended mayor's husband and a congressional candidate) filed SPA No. 13-254 seeking Javier's disqualification for alleged coercion under Sections 261(d) and 261(e) of the Election Code.
• COMELEC Second Division Ruling: On October 3, 2014, the Second Division disqualified Javier, ruling that his preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero constituted coercion under Section 261(d) and was a ground for disqualification under Section 68. The division treated the repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No. 7890 as merely implied, holding that coercion remained a disqualification ground despite the repeal.
• En Banc Proceedings: Following a tie vote in the Second Division, the case was elevated to the en banc. The Commission adopted an "internal arrangement" whereby commissioners submitted opinions concurring with either Commissioner Yusoph (disqualification) or Commissioner Guia (no disqualification). The en banc voted 4-2-1 to disqualify Javier.

• Express Repeal: Petitioner argued that R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d) of the Election Code, thereby removing coercion as a ground for administrative disqualification under Section 68. The express repeal in Section 2 of R.A. 7890 rendered the provision inoperative and incapable of serving as a basis for disqualification.
• Procedural Defects in COMELEC Proceedings: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion by resolving the case through an "internal arrangement" rather than following the standard procedure of assigning a ponente to write a draft opinion. Petitioner also argued that Commissioner Arthur Lim should have been barred from participating in the en banc vote because he had taken no part in the Second Division proceedings, citing Estrella v. COMELEC.
• Invalidity of Extended Election Period: Petitioner asserted that COMELEC Resolution No. 9581, which fixed the election period from January 13 to June 12, 2013, was unconstitutional because it extended the period for incurring criminal liability beyond the constitutional 90-day period, encroaching on legislative power.

• Implied Repeal Theory: Respondent COMELEC countered that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261(d), and that the repeal did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68. It argued that Section 68 and Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. 7890) could coexist, with the former governing administrative disqualification and the latter criminal prosecution.
• Validity of Internal Arrangement: The Commission defended its internal arrangement as a valid exercise of its authority under Rule 1, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which allows suspension of rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition. It argued that the essence of Rule 18—consultation and statement of factual and legal bases—was satisfied.
• Commissioner Lim's Participation: The Commission maintained that Commissioner Arthur Lim did not inhibit himself but merely abstained from voting in the Second Division, creating no legal or ethical impediment to his participation in the en banc deliberations.
• Constitutional Authority to Fix Election Period: The Commission asserted that Article IX-C, Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Election Code expressly authorize it to fix the election period, and that the fixed period applies uniformly to all election offenses.

• Statutory Repeal: Whether R.A. No. 7890 removed Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code as a ground for disqualification under Section 68.
• COMELEC Procedure: Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its January 12, 2015 order through an "internal arrangement" and by allowing Commissioner Arthur Lim to participate.
• Election Period Fixation: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in fixing the 2013 election period from January 13 to June 12, 2013.

• Statutory Repeal: Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code having been expressly repealed by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7890, the provision ceased to exist and became inoperative from the effective date of the repealing law. The COMELEC's reliance on an implied repeal theory was erroneous; where a statute expressly repeals a provision, discussions of implied repeal and harmonization of laws are misplaced. Consequently, coercion under Section 261(d) could no longer serve as a ground for administrative disqualification under Section 68.
• COMELEC Procedure: No grave abuse of discretion attended the COMELEC's internal arrangement or Commissioner Lim's participation. The internal arrangement satisfied the essence of Rule 18, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules—consultation and statement of factual and legal bases—particularly where the Commission was facing impending retirements that would cause further delay. Commissioner Lim merely abstained from voting in the Second Division without inhibiting himself, distinguishing this case from Estrella v. COMELEC where the commissioner had voluntarily inhibited himself and was later substituted.
• Election Period Fixation: The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in fixing the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9 of the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the election period in special cases, and the 120-day period is merely the default. Fixing the election period does not encroach on legislative power because the Commission does not define the elements of election offenses; it merely sets the temporal scope within which offenses defined by Congress may be committed.

• Express vs. Implied Repeal — A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal occurs when a statute declares that a particular law is repealed. An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between new and prior laws. In the absence of express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless irreconcilable inconsistency exists. Where a law is expressly repealed, it ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Section 261(d) of the Election Code, having been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7890, could not serve as a basis for disqualification.
• Scope of COMELEC's Authority to Fix Election Period — The Commission is constitutionally authorized to fix the dates of the election period, and the 120-day period (90 days before and 30 days after election) is merely the default. This power does not constitute encroachment on legislative prerogative because the Commission does not prescribe or define the elements of election offenses; it merely establishes the variable temporal element of offenses already defined by Congress.
• Administrative Due Process in Disqualification Cases — Disqualification cases are summary in nature and governed by Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, not by the preliminary investigation requirements of Section 265 of the Election Code which applies only to criminal prosecutions. Administrative due process requires only that both sides be heard and given an opportunity to explain their positions; formal hearings and strict observance of technical rules are not always necessary.

• "A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective." — Articulating the decisive principle regarding the effect of R.A. No. 7890 on Section 261(d) of the Election Code.
• "The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express, as in this case." — Clarifying that the doctrine of harmonization applies only to implied repeals, not express repeals.
• "The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election period... The 120-day period is merely the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." — Establishing the constitutional scope of COMELEC's authority over election periods.
• "Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules of procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings." — Defining the standard of due process applicable to administrative disqualification proceedings.

• Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, April 28, 2004 — Distinguished by the Court; involved a commissioner who had voluntarily inhibited himself and was substituted, unlike the present case where Commissioner Lim merely abstained without inhibiting.
• Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012 — Cited for the principle that COMELEC's jurisdiction to disqualify candidates is limited to grounds enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code; all other election offenses are criminal, not administrative, in nature.
• Lanot v. Commission on Elections, 537 Phil. 332 (2006) — Applied for the distinction between the electoral aspect (administrative disqualification) and criminal aspect of election offenses, and the standard of proof applicable to each.
• Lindo v. COMELEC, 271 Phil. 844 (1991) and Pimping v. COMELEC, 224 Phil. 326 (1985) — Cited for the rule that failure to serve advance copies of decisions does not affect validity absent grave abuse of discretion prejudicing rights.

• Article IX-C, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution — Grants the COMELEC authority to fix the election period in special cases, with the default period being 90 days before and 30 days after the election.
• Section 261(d) and (e), Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Defined coercion of subordinates and threats/intimidation as election offenses; Section 261(d) was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7890.
• Section 68, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 — Provides for disqualification of candidates who violate Section 261(d) or (e); held inoperative as to Section 261(d) following the repeal.
• Republic Act No. 7890, Section 2 — Expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Rule 18, Section 1 and Rule 1, Sections 3-4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Govern the procedure for making decisions and the liberal construction/suspension of rules.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Francis H. Jardeleza.