Javier and Tumamao vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

A delay of five years in concluding a preliminary investigation, without more than bare assertions from the prosecution regarding voluminous records and institutional backlog, violates the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and compels dismissal of the criminal information, particularly where the accused timely asserted the right at the earliest opportunity and the trial court improperly supplied its own justifications for the delay rather than requiring the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof.

In 2004, the Province of Isabela procured 15,333 bottles of liquid organic fertilizer through direct contracting. The Commission on Audit, in Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2004-14 dated October 12, 2004, found that the procurement was conducted without open competitive bidding and that the items were overpriced. On July 4, 2011, the Task Force Abono of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against the public officers involved in the transaction, including Javier, then Provincial Accountant, and Tumamao, then Provincial Agriculturist.

• The Procurement and Audit Findings: In 2004, the Province of Isabela procured 15,333 bottles of liquid organic fertilizer by direct contracting. The Commission on Audit (COA), in Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2004-14 dated October 12, 2004, found that the procurement was done without open competitive bidding and that the procured items were overpriced.
• The Ombudsman Complaint: On July 4, 2011, the Task Force Abono of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against the public officers involved in the subject transaction, including petitioners Javier and Tumamao, who were the Provincial Accountant and Provincial Agriculturist of Isabela, respectively.
• Preliminary Investigation: On August 5, 2011, the Ombudsman directed the public officers to file their respective counter-affidavits. Javier filed his counter-affidavit on November 14, 2011, while Tumamao filed his on November 23, 2011. After almost five years, or on September 19, 2016, the Special Panel on Fertilizer Fund Scam of the Ombudsman issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict Javier and Tumamao, along with Provincial Vice-Governor Santiago P. Respicio, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the Resolution on November 22, 2016.
• The Information: On October 3, 2017, an Information dated June 14, 2017 was filed against Javier and Tumamao for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, accusing them of causing undue injury to the government in the amount of P9,475,794.00 representing the overpriced amount in the purchase of the fertilizer, despite the absence of public bidding and the supplier's failure to meet licensing requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1144.
• Motion to Quash: The Sandiganbayan set the date for arraignment. Javier and Tumamao, however, manifested that they were not ready for arraignment as they intended to file a motion to quash on the ground of inordinate delay. They filed the Motion to Quash on November 24, 2017, arguing that the period constituting five years and four months from the filing of the complaint to the approval of the resolution finding probable cause constituted delay which violated their right to speedy disposition of cases. They cited jurisprudence wherein cases were dismissed for delays ranging from three years to five years and five months.
• Opposition and Sandiganbayan Ruling: The Ombudsman filed its Comment on November 29, 2017, praying for the dismissal of the motion, arguing that the case had voluminous records and that there were an endless number of cases being filed in their office. In its Resolution dated January 25, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash, adopting the Ombudsman's justifications despite the latter's failure to substantiate its claims. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 1, 2018.

• Inordinate Delay: Petitioners argued that the five-year and four-month delay from the filing of the complaint to the approval of the resolution finding probable cause violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, and People v. Sandiganbayan where similar or shorter delays resulted in dismissal.
• Burden of Proof: Petitioners maintained that because the delay exceeded the 10-day period provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the burden shifted to the prosecution to justify the delay, which it failed to discharge through mere unsubstantiated claims.
• Timely Assertion: Petitioners argued that they timely asserted their right by filing the Motion to Quash before arraignment at the earliest opportunity, and that their failure to follow up during the preliminary investigation could not be construed as acquiescence or waiver, citing Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan that respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings have no duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.

• Voluminous Records: The Ombudsman countered that the delay was justified because the case had voluminous records requiring careful scrutiny to ensure justice was fairly served, and that each document demanded evaluation.
• Institutional Backlog: The Ombudsman argued that the Office of the Ombudsman handles an endless stream of cases, citing Dansal v. Judge Fernandez, Sr. where the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman, thereby justifying the delay inherent in processing such volume.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Quash on the ground of inordinate delay.
• Violation of Speedy Disposition: Whether the five-year delay in the preliminary investigation violated petitioners' constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash. The Sandiganbayan erred in giving credence to the Ombudsman's bare assertions regarding voluminous records and heavy caseload without requiring substantiation, and further erred by offering its own justifications for the delay (the number of respondents and charges) which the Ombudsman itself had not claimed as causes for delay.
• Violation of Speedy Disposition: The right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. The case was deemed initiated on July 4, 2011, and the preliminary investigation concluded on November 22, 2016, resulting in an unexplained delay of five years from the filing of counter-affidavits. Because this exceeded the 10-day period under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that it followed prescribed procedure, that complexity made delay inevitable, and that no prejudice was suffered. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden, offering only unsubstantiated claims of voluminous records and institutional backlog, which cannot justify extraordinary delay.
• Timely Assertion: Petitioners timely asserted their right to speedy disposition by filing the Motion to Quash before arraignment at the earliest opportunity. Their failure to follow up during the preliminary investigation did not constitute acquiescence or waiver, as respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings have no duty to follow up on their cases, and the Ombudsman's Rules prohibit motions to dismiss during preliminary investigation.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases is distinct from the right to speedy trial and may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, once the accused may be prejudiced by the proceeding. The right requires that courts consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to the simplicity or complexity of issues, and is not subject to mechanical computation of time periods.
• Burden of Proof in Delay Cases — Where delay exceeds the time periods provided in rules or circulars, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove: (1) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and prosecution; (2) that the complexity of the issues and volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and (3) that no prejudice was suffered by the accused. Bare assertions of voluminous records or heavy caseload, without substantiation or specification, are insufficient to discharge this burden.
• Duty to Follow Up During Preliminary Investigation — Respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings have no duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case; conversely, it is the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within reasonable timeliness. The failure to follow up cannot be construed as acquiescence to delay, particularly where the Ombudsman's own Rules prohibit motions to dismiss during preliminary investigation.

• "The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial." — Distinguishing the two constitutional rights and expanding the scope of speedy disposition to quasi-judicial bodies.
• "'Steady stream of cases' and 'clogged dockets' are not talismanic phrases that may be invoked at whim to magically justify each and every case of long delays in the disposition of cases. Like all other facts that courts take into consideration in each case, the 'steady stream of cases' should still be subject to proof as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right." — Rejecting blanket justifications for institutional delay.
• "Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it." — Establishing the lack of duty on accused to follow up during preliminary investigation.

• Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018 — Controlling precedent establishing the guidelines for determining violations of the right to speedy disposition of cases, including the shifting of burden of proof and the requirements for justification of delay.
• Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55 (2013) — Followed for the principle that respondents in preliminary investigation have no duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.
• Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 563 (1988) — Cited by petitioners as precedent for dismissal due to delay of close to three years.
• Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557 (1998) — Cited by petitioners as precedent for dismissal due to delay of more than four years.
• People v. Sandiganbayan, 723 Phil. 444 (2013) — Cited by petitioners as precedent for dismissal due to delay of around five years and five months; explicitly abandoned by the Court in Cagang regarding the computation of delay period but cited here for comparison.
• Dansal v. Judge Fernandez, Sr. — Cited by respondent for the proposition that judicial notice should be taken of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision under which petitioners were charged, prohibiting public officers from causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Section 3, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the investigating prosecutor has 10 days after the investigation to determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, serving as the benchmark period for determining when delay becomes inordinate.
• Rule II, Section 4(d), Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — Prohibits motions to dismiss during preliminary investigation except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, supporting the ruling that petitioners could not be faulted for failing to file motions during the preliminary investigation stage.
• Rule V, Section 3, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — Provides that the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character to proceedings in the Ombudsman, making the 10-day period under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to Ombudsman preliminary investigations.

Peralta, C.J., Chairperson; J. Reyes, Jr.; Lazaro-Javier; and Lopez, JJ.