Jaso vs. Metrobank & Trust Co.

A probationary employee may be validly terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee under reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement, and the six-month probationary period is computed from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the sixth month following, regardless of the number of days in each intervening month.

Petitioner Karen G. Jaso was hired by Metrobank & Trust Co. as a Management Trainee on July 16, 2012, a probationary position intended to train her for eventual managerial or officership roles within the bank. The position was offered after petitioner initially applied for the role of Compensation Officer but was found to lack the necessary qualifications for direct hiring into that role. Metrobank's regularization standards for Management Trainees required an overall performance appraisal rating of at least 3.0, and the bank communicated these standards through various documents and orientation programs that petitioner signed and attended. The individual respondents — De Grano, Lee-Tiu, Hernandez, and Dee — were Metrobank officers involved in petitioner's supervision, evaluation, and the decision to terminate her employment.

Petitioner Karen G. Jaso initially applied for the position of Compensation Officer at Metrobank & Trust Co. During her job interview, Deputy Head of Employee Services Division Rowena B. De Grano explained that petitioner lacked the qualifications for direct hiring as a Compensation Officer and could only be offered the position of Management Trainee on a probationary basis, with the possibility of regularization upon meeting expected skills and attitude standards and eventual endorsement to the Officership Development Program. Petitioner accepted, and Metrobank hired her on July 16, 2012 under a six-month probationary Employment Agreement. On July 25, 2012, petitioner signed an Orientation Checklist confirming receipt of her Job Description, the HRMG Personnel Policy Manual, the HRMG Operating Manual, the CBA Handbook, and the Employee's Performance Appraisal Management System sheet, as well as confirming her attendance at a detailed orientation where the criteria for regularization — including company expectations on attitude, pro-activeness, ability to work under pressure, and work output quality — were discussed. She was informed that an overall performance rating of at least 3.0 was required for regularization and that a rating of "Below Meets Standard" or lower would mean non-regularization and termination of probationary employment. Petitioner also attended a New Employees Orientation from August 1 to 3, 2012 where the regularization criteria were further discussed.

Metrobank assessed petitioner's performance from July 16, 2012 to December 2012 and found her overall performance appraisal rating to be 2.21, equivalent to "Below Meets Standard." A Core Competency Assessment as of December 26, 2012 likewise found her lacking in the skills and attitude required to become a bank officer. Petitioner also committed errors in banking documents called "RF Regularization Evaluation Sheets," writing "Promotion Criteria" instead of "Regularization Criteria," making it appear that two probationary employees underwent training on specific dates when they did not, and alleging that other employees incurred job-related cash accountabilities when those employees were never assigned to handle cash. Petitioner admitted these lapses but claimed that previous employees had made similar mistakes.

On December 17, 2012, De Grano called petitioner's attention regarding the critical errors in the RF Regularization Evaluation Sheets and informed her of her disqualification from the Officership Development Program. Petitioner reacted by exclaiming "hindi ko na po kaya ito!" and left the meeting. When De Grano asked her to explain her outburst, petitioner threw her belongings around and, in a subsequent confrontation inside a conference room, shouted at De Grano in the presence of another employee. Thereafter, petitioner incurred unauthorized absences from December 18, 2012 to January 14, 2013 without filing a leave of absence, justifying her failure by claiming that leave approvals typically took one to two months to secure.

On January 2, 2013, Maria Zarah C. Hernandez, Head of Employee Relations Division, issued a Show Cause Order charging petitioner with gross and habitual negligence, unprofessional behavior, unauthorized absences, non-disclosure of material information, and dishonesty. Petitioner submitted a Letter of explanation dated January 9, 2013 refuting the charges. On January 14, 2013, Hernandez issued a termination letter effective January 15, 2013. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, who ruled in her favor on May 2, 2013, finding that her probationary period had expired on December 16, 2012 and that the belated performance appraisal rendered her a regular employee by the time of dismissal. The NLRC reversed this ruling on January 30, 2014, computing the probationary period to end on January 17, 2013 and finding that petitioner was adequately informed of regularization standards and validly dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC on September 13, 2017, and denied reconsideration on November 23, 2017.

• Notification of Standards: Petitioner argued that Metrobank presented no proof of the alleged performance standards to be met and contended that she was not apprised of any performance criteria at the time of her engagement.
• Basis for Termination: Petitioner averred that her termination was baseless because Metrobank had no proof of the infractions she allegedly committed.
• Probationary Period Computation: Petitioner contended that having been engaged on July 16, 2012, her six-month probationary contract was completed on January 12, 2013, making her a regular employee by the time of her dismissal on January 15, 2013.
• Due Process: Petitioner alleged that her termination was unjust, invalid, and carried out without observance of due process.
• Lack of Job Orientation: Petitioner claimed that Metrobank did not afford her any job orientation to effectively discharge her tasks.

• Probationary Status Made Known: Metrobank averred that petitioner was fully informed of the probationary character of her employment and the standards for regularization at the time of engagement, as evidenced by her signed Employment Agreement, Orientation Checklist, Performance Appraisal Management System sheet, and attendance at orientation seminars.
• Failure to Meet Standards: Metrobank argued that petitioner's overall performance rating of 2.21 ("Below Meets Standard") and her Core Competency Assessment showing deficiencies in skills and attitude demonstrated her failure to qualify as a regular employee.
• Just Cause for Dismissal: Metrobank cited petitioner's errors in the RF Regularization Evaluation Sheets, her unprofessional behavior toward De Grano on December 17, 2012, and her unauthorized absences from December 18, 2012 to January 14, 2013 as additional grounds supporting termination.
• Due Process Compliance: Metrobank maintained that it complied with the two-notice rule by serving a Show Cause Letter on January 2, 2013 and a termination notice on January 14, 2013, affording petitioner the opportunity to explain her side.

• Notification of Standards: Whether petitioner was apprised of the reasonable standards for regularization at the time of her engagement.
• Failure to Qualify: Whether petitioner failed to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with Metrobank's standards.
• Probationary Status at Time of Dismissal: Whether petitioner was still a probationary employee on the date of her termination on January 15, 2013.

• Notification of Standards: Yes. Metrobank sufficiently apprised petitioner of the regularization standards at the time of engagement through the Orientation Checklist, the Performance Appraisal Management System sheet, the Employment Agreement, and orientation seminars, satisfying the requirement under Article 296 of the Labor Code and Section 6(d) of Rule VIII-A of the Implementing Rules.
• Failure to Qualify: Yes. Petitioner's overall performance rating of 2.21 ("Below Meets Standard"), her errors in the RF Regularization Evaluation Sheets, her unprofessional conduct, and her unauthorized absences constituted substantial evidence that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for regularization.
• Probationary Status at Time of Dismissal: Yes. Under the "same calendar date" rule from Alcira vs. NLRC and CALS Poultry Supply Corp. vs. Roco, the six-month probationary period was reckoned from July 16, 2012 up to January 16, 2013, meaning petitioner was still a probationary employee when dismissed on January 15, 2013.

• Notification of Standards: Article 296 of the Labor Code provides that probationary employment may be terminated when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement. Section 6(d) of Rule VIII-A of the Implementing Rules reinforces this, stating that where no standards are made known at the time of engagement, the employee shall be deemed a regular employee. The Court applied the standard from Abbott Laboratories, Phils. vs. Alcaraz that an employer is deemed to have made known the standards when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what is expected during the probationary period. The record showed that petitioner signed an Orientation Checklist on July 25, 2012 confirming receipt of her Job Description, policy manuals, and Performance Appraisal Management System sheet, and confirming attendance at an orientation where regularization criteria were discussed. Her Employment Agreement specifically stated a six-month probationary period. Petitioner herself admitted in her January 9, 2013 Letter that she did not immediately accept the Management Trainee position because it meant probationary status. The Court further noted that for Management Trainees, whose functions are managerial in nature, it is sufficient that they are informed of their duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which serves as the inherent and implied standard for regularization — unlike positions such as sales where a quantitative standard like a quota is readily articulable. Metrobank discharged its burden of substantial evidence on this point.

• Failure to Qualify: A probationary employee enjoys security of tenure, but an additional ground for termination exists under Article 295 of the Labor Code: failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards. The Court found that petitioner's overall performance rating of 2.21 fell under "Below Meets Standard," failing the required 3.0 for regularization. She also committed specific errors in the RF Regularization Evaluation Sheets — writing "Promotion Criteria" instead of "Regularization Criteria," falsely representing training dates of probationary employees, and making unfounded allegations about other employees' cash accountabilities. She displayed unprofessional conduct on December 17, 2012 by shouting at and walking out on her superior De Grano, as confirmed in her own January 9, 2013 Letter. She incurred unauthorized absences from December 18, 2012 to January 14, 2013 without filing leave, justifying her omission with the claim that approvals took too long. These facts, taken together, constituted substantial evidence — that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion — that petitioner failed to qualify as a regular employee.

• Probationary Status at Time of Dismissal: Petitioner contended that her six-month probationary period ended on January 12, 2013, computed by counting 180 days from July 16, 2012 based on Article 13 of the Civil Code (six months = 180 days). The Court rejected this computation, applying the "same calendar date" rule from Alcira vs. NLRC, which cited CALS Poultry Supply Corp. vs. Roco: the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the sixth month following. The number of days in each intervening month is irrelevant. Since petitioner was hired on July 16, 2012, her probationary period lasted until January 16, 2013 — the same calendar date of the sixth month following July 16, 2012. She was therefore still a probationary employee when Metrobank terminated her on January 15, 2013. The Court added that even assuming she was already a regular employee, Metrobank still validly effected dismissal because it complied with the two-notice rule — serving a Show Cause Letter on January 2, 2013 and a termination notice on January 14, 2013 — and the termination constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative exercised in good faith.

• Standards for Regularization of Probationary Employees — Under Article 296 of the Labor Code and Section 6(d) of Rule VIII-A of the Implementing Rules, an employer must make known to the probationary employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of engagement. Where no standards are made known, the employee shall be deemed a regular employee. The employer is deemed to have made known the standards when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what is expected during the probationary period. The Court applied this by finding that Metrobank's provision of orientation documents, seminars, and signed checklists constituted sufficient notification.

• Inherent and Implied Standards for Managerial Positions — For Management Trainees and similar managerial roles, it is sufficient that the employee is informed of duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which serves as the inherent and implied standard for regularization, unlike positions such as sales where a quantitative standard like a quota is readily articulable at the outset. The Court applied this to uphold that Metrobank's notification to petitioner of her managerial duties sufficed as communication of regularization standards.

• "Same Calendar Date" Rule for Computing Probationary Period — The six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the sixth month following, regardless of the number of days in each intervening month. The Court applied this rule from Alcira vs. NLRC and CALS Poultry Supply Corp. vs. Roco to find that petitioner's probationary period ran from July 16, 2012 to January 16, 2013, making her still a probationary employee when terminated on January 15, 2013.

• Substantial Evidence in Labor Cases — The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge in labor cases is merely substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. The Court found that Metrobank satisfied this threshold.

• Two-Notice Rule in Probationary Termination — The usual two-notice rule does not strictly apply when dismissal is brought about by a probationary employee's failure to meet the employer's standards; a single written notice within a reasonable time from the date of termination suffices. However, Metrobank voluntarily applied the two-notice rule in petitioner's favor, serving both a Show Cause Letter and a termination notice, thereby exceeding the minimum due process requirement.

• Management Prerogative — It is the prerogative of management to regulate all aspects of employment according to its discretion and judgment, provided it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not to defeat or circumvent employee rights. The Court found Metrobank's termination of petitioner to be a valid exercise of management prerogative.

• "(O)ur computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following." — This passage states the controlling rule for computing the probationary period, directly resolving the issue of whether petitioner had already attained regular status by the date of dismissal.

• "Due to the nature and variety of these managerial functions, it is already sufficient that they are informed of their duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which is the inherent and implied standard for regularization; this is unlike other jobs, such as in sales, where a quantitative regularization standard, like a sales quota, is readily articulable to the employee at the outset." — This passage articulates the distinction between managerial and non-managerial probationary positions regarding the articulation of regularization standards, establishing that implied standards suffice for Management Trainees.

• "In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee." — This is the statutory text of Section 6(d) of Rule VIII-A of the Implementing Rules, central to the issue of whether Metrobank validly communicated regularization standards to petitioner.

• Abbott Laboratories, Phils. vs. Alcaraz, 714 Phil. 510 (2013); 733 Phil. 637 (2014) — Controlling precedent on the notification of regularization standards. The Court relied on this case for the principle that an employer is deemed to have made known the standards when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of expectations during the probationary period, and for the doctrine that implied standards suffice for managerial positions.

• Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 475 Phil. 455 (2004) — Controlling precedent on the computation of the probationary period. The Court applied the "same calendar date" rule from this case to determine that petitioner's probationary period ran until January 16, 2013.

• CALS Poultry Supply Corp. vs. Roco, 434 Phil. 720 (2002) — Foundational precedent cited within Alcira for the rule that the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the sixth month following, regardless of the number of days in each intervening month.

• Wise and Co., Inc. vs. Wise & Co., Inc. Employees Union-NATU, 258-A Phil. 316 (1989) — Cited for the doctrine of management prerogative, supporting the Court's conclusion that Metrobank's termination decision was a valid exercise of managerial discretion exercised in good faith.

• De La Salle Araneta University, Inc. vs. Magdurulang, 820 Phil. 1133 (2017) — Cited for the principle that an employee on probation is on trial for the employer, during which the latter determines fitness for regular employment.

• PNOC-Energy Development Corp. vs. Estrella, 713 Phil. 560 (2013) — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as the quantum of proof required in labor cases.

• Article 296 [formerly 281], Labor Code of the Philippines — Governs probationary employment, providing that probationary employment shall not exceed six months and that services may be terminated for just cause or when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement. The Court applied this provision to find that Metrobank's termination of petitioner fell within the statutory ground of failure to qualify as a regular employee.

• Section 6(d), Rule VIII-A, Rules Implementing Books III and VI of the Labor Code (DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997) — Requires the employer to make known to the probationary employee the standards for regularization at the time of engagement, with the consequence that failure to do so results in the employee being deemed a regular employee. The Court found that Metrobank complied with this requirement.

• Article 13, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides rules for computing periods, stating that months are of thirty days and that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. The NLRC cited this provision, but the Supreme Court effectively superseded its application to the probationary period computation by applying the "same calendar date" rule from Alcira and CALS Poultry.

Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.