Jarillo vs. People

A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not constitute a valid defense to a charge of bigamy, because the crime is already consummated when the second marriage is contracted while the first marriage, not yet judicially declared void, is presumed valid and subsisting. The mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is what Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes.

The petitioner, Victoria S. Jarillo, was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The case involves the legal principle that a marriage, even one that is void or voidable, is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The petitioner had filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of her marriages to Alocillo, and Alocillo's marriage to Uy was the subject of a separate annulment case. The legal backdrop concerns the presumption of validity of marriage and the requirement of a judicial declaration before a marriage can be considered void for purposes of criminal liability.

Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony on May 24, 1974, solemnized by then Municipal Mayor Monico C. Tanyag of Taguig, Rizal. They again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony on May 4, 1975, before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the marital union, a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo, was born on October 29, 1975.

Thereafter, on November 26, 1979, Victoria Jarillo contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Judge Nicanor Cruz. On April 16, 1995, petitioner and Emmanuel Uy again exchanged marital vows in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against petitioner Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

On October 5, 2000, petitioner filed against Alocillo, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage. For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

The RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner's 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo's psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. The trial court in the bigamy case observed that petitioner did not call her mother to the witness stand — the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo — and that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of any act which she allegedly did was hearsay.

• Prejudicial Question: Petitioner argued that the CA committed reversible error in proceeding with the case despite the pendency of a case which is prejudicial to the outcome of the case, specifically the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriages to Alocillo and the pending annulment of her marriage to Uy.
• Effect of Nullity Declaration: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in affirming her conviction despite the supervening proof that her first two marriages to Alocillo had been declared by final judgment null and void ab initio.
• Prescription: Petitioner argued that the case had already prescribed because Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978, and thus the prescriptive period should be counted from that time.
• Absence of Marriage License: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in not considering that her marriage to Emmanuel Santos Uy had no valid marriage license.
• Erroneous Penalty: Petitioner argued that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Affirmation of Conviction: The respondent maintained that the conviction for bigamy was proper because at the time petitioner contracted her second marriage with Uy, her marriage to Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by a court, and thus the presumption was that the previous marriage was still existing.
• Immateriality of Subsequent Nullity: The respondent argued, citing Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, that the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, does not negate criminal liability for bigamy because the marriage is not without legal consequences.

• Prejudicial Question: Whether the pendency of the civil cases for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriages constituted a prejudicial question warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings for bigamy.
• Effect of Supervening Nullity Declaration: Whether the subsequent final judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's first marriages to Alocillo on the ground of psychological incapacity negates her criminal liability for bigamy.
• Prescription: Whether the crime of bigamy had already prescribed, given petitioner's claim that Uy knew of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
• Validity of Second Marriage License: Whether the alleged absence of a valid marriage license for petitioner's marriage to Uy constitutes a defense to the charge of bigamy.
• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA was proper under the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Prejudicial Question: No. The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not a prejudicial question that warrants suspension of the criminal prosecution for bigamy, because a decision in the civil case would not erase the fact that the accused entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
• Effect of Supervening Nullity Declaration: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy, because the crime was already consummated when the second marriage was contracted while the first marriage was still presumed valid and subsisting.
• Prescription: No. Petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the prescriptive period began to run as of 1978, and the prescriptive period for bigamy is counted only from the day the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
• Validity of Second Marriage License: No. The nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy, since Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
• Propriety of Penalty: Yes, with modification. The penalty imposed was proper under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but the Court reduced it for humanitarian purposes in light of the final declaration that petitioner's marriage to Alocillo was void ab initio due to his psychological incapacity.

• Prejudicial Question: The Court applied the rulings in Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis and Abunado vs. People. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. Without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the accused entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage; thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.

• Effect of Supervening Nullity Declaration: The Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro, since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code indicates that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

• Prescription: Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 provides that crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. Petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation that Uy knew of her previous marriage as early as 1978. Her testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 was unsupported by corroborating evidence and was hearsay, as her mother was not called to the witness stand. As ruled in Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.

• Validity of Second Marriage License: The Court held that the nullity of the second marriage does not negate criminal liability for bigamy. The crime is committed by the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage, regardless of whether the second marriage itself is void.

• Propriety of Penalty: The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term. Under Article 349, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court was correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. The trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner's marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latter's psychological incapacity, by reason of which petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deemed it proper to reduce the penalty.

• Prejudicial Question in Bigamy Cases — A civil case for declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not a prejudicial question that warrants suspension of a criminal prosecution for bigamy. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. A decision in the civil case would not erase the fact that the accused entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage, and thus is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.

• Effect of Subsequent Declaration of Nullity on Criminal Liability for Bigamy — The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not negate criminal liability for bigamy. The crime is already consummated at the moment the second marriage is contracted while the first marriage, not yet judicially declared void, is presumed valid and subsisting. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

• Prescription of Bigamy — The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is counted only from the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. The accused raising prescription as a defense bears the burden of proving that the prescriptive period began to run from an earlier date.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law Application — The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence must be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

• "The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the crime of bigamy is consummated at the time of the second marriage, and a subsequent nullity declaration cannot erase that liability.

• "A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." — This quotation from Tenebro, adopted by the Court, defines the scope of the crime of bigamy: the act itself is penalized, regardless of the validity of the second marriage.

• "The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case." — This passage from Abunado, quoted with approval, explains the policy rationale against allowing subsequent nullity declarations to defeat bigamy prosecutions.

• Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 723 (2004) — Controlling precedent cited by the CA and the Supreme Court for the proposition that the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not negate criminal liability for bigamy, and that the nullity of the second marriage is not per se a defense.
• Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648 (2000) — Followed for the ruling that a criminal case for bigamy may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of the first marriage, as the latter is not a prejudicial question.
• Abunado vs. People, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562 — Followed for the ruling that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because the crime had already been consummated, and for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in bigamy cases.
• Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155 — Followed for the ruling that the prescriptive period for bigamy is counted from the day the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, not from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.
• Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. vs. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411 — Cited for the rule that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy, which is committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. The Court applied this provision to hold that the mere act of contracting a second marriage, regardless of the validity of that second marriage, constitutes bigamy.
• Article 25, Revised Penal Code — Classifies prision mayor as an afflictive penalty. The Court applied this to determine the prescriptive period for bigamy.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties prescribe in fifteen years. The Court applied this to the crime of bigamy.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court applied this to reject petitioner's prescription defense for lack of proof of earlier discovery.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Provides the framework for imposing indeterminate penalties, with the minimum within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code, and the maximum based on attending circumstances. The Court applied this to validate the penalty imposed and to justify its modification.

• Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson)
• Chico-Nazario, J.
• Velasco, Jr., J.
• Nachura, J.