Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals

An accused acquitted on reasonable doubt may still be held civilly liable ex quasi delicto in a separate civil action under Article 29 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding the complainant’s failure to reserve the civil action and his intervention in the criminal prosecution, provided the offended party does not recover damages under both ex delicto and ex quasi delicto. Resolutions dismissing a special civil action for lack of merit without any specific opinion or explanation do not establish the law of the case.

Edgar Jarantilla was the driver of a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car involved in the July 7, 1971 mishap on Iznart Street, Iloilo City, while Jose Kuan Sing was the pedestrian who sustained physical injuries. Philippine law treats the same negligent act as capable of generating civil liability ex delicto under the Revised Penal Code and ex quasi delicto under the Civil Code, subject to Article 2177’s prohibition against double recovery, and Article 29 permits a civil action for damages after an acquittal on reasonable doubt. The case required the Court to reconcile those provisions with the rules on reservation and intervention in the criminal prosecution.

On the evening of July 7, 1971, Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle on Iznart Street, Iloilo City. The vehicle was a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car then driven by Edgar Jarantilla along the street toward the direction of the provincial capitol. Kuan Sing sustained physical injuries as a consequence. The Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the trial court on these facts.

Jarantilla was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207. Kuan Sing, as the complaining witness, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in the criminal case on reasonable doubt.

On October 30, 1974, Kuan Sing filed a complaint against Jarantilla in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 9976, involving the same subject matter and act complained of in the criminal case. The complaint alleged that in the evening of July 7, 1971, at about 7:00 o’clock, Kuan Sing crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant at 220 Iznart St. on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street; that while he was standing in the middle of the street because there were vehicles coming from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, he was bumped and sideswiped by a Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol; and that the car was driven by Jarantilla in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed, in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle law, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and city ordinances, and by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due negligence.

In his answer, Jarantilla alleged as special and affirmative defenses that Kuan Sing had no cause of action and that the cause of action, if any, was barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 because when the criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted, since Kuan Sing failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. Jarantilla moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the motion on April 3, 1975, suggesting that he bring the ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy. On June 17, 1975, Jarantilla filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the order. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 23, 1975, and his motion for reconsideration was denied on October 28, 1975.

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of Kuan Sing and ordered Jarantilla to pay P6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and costs. On July 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the award for moral damages, which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on September 18, 1987.

• Law of the Case: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal on the ground that the main issue had already been passed upon by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-40992; he maintained that the two resolutions of the Court in that case—the first dismissing the petition and the second denying reconsideration—did not constitute the law of the case.
• Prior Judgment and No Cause of Action: Petitioner alleged that private respondent had no cause of action and that the cause of action, if any, was barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 because the civil liability was deemed instituted when the criminal case was instituted, private respondent having failed to reserve the civil aspect and having actively participated in the criminal case.
• Roa Doctrine: Petitioner relied on Roa vs. De la Cruz, arguing that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.
• Azucena Reliance: Petitioner invoked Azucena vs. Potenciano as a reiteration of the Roa doctrine in a case involving damage to property through negligence.
• Acquittal as Bar: Petitioner maintained that his acquittal in the criminal case barred the separate civil action, especially since no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

• Law of the Case: Whether the prior resolutions of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-40992 dismissing the petition and denying reconsideration constituted the law of the case that barred the Court of Appeals from resolving petitioner’s assignment of error.
• Separate Civil Action After Acquittal: Whether private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution without reserving the civil action, could file a separate civil action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

• Law of the Case: No. The prior resolutions did not constitute the law of the case because they were issued in a special civil action assailing an interlocutory order and contained no specific opinion or explanation on the merits; the doctrine requires an opinion delivered on a former appeal establishing the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case.
• Separate Civil Action After Acquittal: Yes. Article 29 of the Civil Code allows a civil action for damages for the same act or omission when the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt; such action requires only preponderance of evidence. Failure to reserve the civil action and intervention in the criminal prosecution did not bar the separate quasi-delict action.

• Law of the Case: The doctrine of law of the case applies to the opinion delivered on a former appeal; it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue. The prior G.R. No. L-40992 was a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed it for lack of merit and denied reconsideration without rendering a specific opinion or explanation of the legal and factual bases; the dismissal may have been premised on the absence of grave abuse of discretion at that stage. Because no rationale on the merits was expounded, no law of the case was laid down. The Court thus inclined favorably to petitioner’s submission that the Court of Appeals should not have refused to consider his claim solely on that ground. This ancillary ruling did not, however, resolve the principal issue in petitioner’s favor.
• Separate Civil Action After Acquittal: The same act or omission can create two kinds of liability: civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either type may be enforced, subject to Article 2177’s caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages under both. Roa vs. De la Cruz was distinguished: the criminal action there was for serious oral defamation, a penal offense that cannot be considered a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2177. Azucena vs. Potenciano did not reiterate Roa for this situation because the plaintiff there did not intervene in the criminal action; the citation was obiter. Here, private respondent intervened in the criminal prosecution without reserving the civil action. Under jurisprudence, when the trial court acquits on reasonable doubt, it may pronounce on the civil liability of the accused, and the complainant may file mandamus to compel inclusion of that civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Private respondent instead filed a separate civil action after acquittal. Article 29 of the Civil Code allows this: when the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted, requiring only preponderance of evidence. Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. held that an accused acquitted because guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt may still be civilly liable; the judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement on civil liability amounts to a reservation of the right to litigate it separately. The civil liability sought under Article 29 is no longer based on the criminal offense; acquittal forecloses civil liability under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which presupposes criminal liability or conviction. Divested of its penal element, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, so only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted, provable by preponderance of evidence. The complaint’s allegations—that private respondent was bumped and sideswiped by the Volkswagen car driven by petitioner in a reckless and negligent manner, at excessive speed, in violation of traffic laws and ordinances—constituted a case for quasi-delict. Because the action was based on quasi-delict, private respondent’s failure to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar the separate civil action for damages. Elcano vs. Hill similarly held that a separate civil action lies against the offender whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided the offended party does not recover damages on both scores; the extinction of civil liability under Rule 111 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, while civil liability for the same act as a quasi-delict is not extinguished even by a declaration that the criminal act charged did not happen or was not committed by the accused. Lontoc involved virtually the same factual situation. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err on the issues decisive of the case.

• Law of the case — The doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue. It applies to the opinion delivered on a former appeal and to a decision on the merits. In this case, the prior Supreme Court resolutions in G.R. No. L-40992 did not constitute law of the case because they were issued in a special civil action assailing an interlocutory order and contained no specific opinion or explanation on the merits.
• Civil liability ex delicto and ex quasi delicto — The same act or omission can create two kinds of civil liability: civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either type may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both. In this case, the acquittal foreclosed civil liability under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code but did not foreclose civil liability based on quasi-delict.
• Effect of acquittal on reasonable doubt — Under Article 29 of the Civil Code, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted; such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist. In this case, the acquittal was on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated, so the separate civil action was allowed.
• Failure to reserve civil action and intervention — The failure of the offended party to reserve the civil action and his intervention in the criminal prosecution through a private prosecutor do not bar a separate civil action based on quasi-delict. This is because the separate action is anchored on a different cause of action—quasi-delict—rather than on the criminal offense. In this case, private respondent’s failure to reserve and his intervention did not bar his separate action for damages.
• Failure to pronounce on civil liability — The failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. In this case, no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal, so the civil liability could be litigated separately.

• "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ..." — This is the Court’s quotation of Article 29 of the Civil Code, the statutory basis for allowing the separate civil action despite the acquittal.
• "The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'." — This passage, drawn from Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., states the controlling distinction between an acquittal on reasonable doubt and an acquittal that negates the underlying facts.
• "Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages." — This is the ratio decidendi on the effect of failure to reserve and intervention in the criminal case.
• "Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence." — This explains why the acquittal did not extinguish the civil liability and why the separate action could proceed as a quasi-delict.

• Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8 (1960) — Cited by petitioner but distinguished; the criminal action there was for serious oral defamation, a penal offense not a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2177, so its bar rule did not apply.
• Azucena vs. Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468 (1962) — Petitioner’s secondary reliance rejected; the plaintiff there did not intervene in the criminal action, so the citation of Roa was obiter and did not support petitioner.
• Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-48949, April 15, 1988 — Followed; involving virtually the same factual situation, it held that failure to reserve the civil action is not fatal, intervention did not bar a separate civil action, and an acquittal on reasonable doubt allowed the action under Article 29.
• Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98 (1977) — Cited; a separate civil action lies against the offender whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided the offended party does not recover damages on both scores; extinction under Rule 111 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942) — Cited for the rule that the same act or omission can create both civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto.
• Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 (1979) — Cited in Lontoc; a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
• Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984) — Cited; the judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
• Dula vs. Dianala, 132 SCRA 245 (1984) — Cited; failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil case and intervention in the criminal case did not bar a separate civil action based on quasi-delict.
• Bachrach Motors Co. vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219 (1957) and Bernaldez vs. Bohol Land Transportation Co., 7 SCRA 276 (1963) — Cited for the rule that the failure of the court to determine civil liability amounts to a reservation of the right to litigate it separately.
• Maximo vs. Gerochi Jr., 144 SCRA 325 (1986) — Cited; mandamus may compel the trial court to include the civil liability in the judgment of acquittal.
• People vs. Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454 (1984) — Cited; where the trial court acquits on reasonable doubt, it may make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused.
• People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967); Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, Oct. 20, 1962; Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881 (1924) — Cited for the definition and requirements of the law of the case doctrine.

• Article 29, Civil Code — Provides that when the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted, requiring only preponderance of evidence. The Court applied it to allow private respondent’s separate civil action after petitioner’s acquittal.
• Article 2177, Civil Code — Provides the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages under both civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. The Court cited it to explain that either type may be enforced but double recovery is barred.
• Articles 2176 and 2180, Civil Code — Define quasi-delict and related liability. The Court cited them in distinguishing Roa and in treating the complaint’s negligence allegations as constitutive of a quasi-delict.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Establishes civil liability ex delicto, which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires conviction. The Court held that the acquittal foreclosed civil liability based on this article.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence. The criminal case against petitioner was for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence under this provision; the subsequent complaint was based on quasi-delict.
• Rule 111, Rules of Court (Sec. 3(c), 1964 Rules; Sec. 3(b), 1985 Rules; Sec. 2(b), as amended in 1988) — Governs reservation and extinction of civil liability. The Court explained that the extinction of civil liability referred to in the rule applies exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, not to civil liability based on quasi-delict.
• Article 33, Civil Code — Mentioned in the discussion of Roa vs. De la Cruz as an independent civil action provision for defamation; the Court noted that serious oral defamation is a penal offense and cannot be considered a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2177.

Justices Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento concurred.