Japzon vs. COMELEC

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically restore a former natural-born Filipino’s domicile of origin; a new domicile of choice must be established through bodily presence, intention to remain (animus manendi), and intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).

Manuel B. Japzon and Jaime S. Ty were rival candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the 14 May 2007 elections. Ty was a natural-born Filipino who migrated to the United States and acquired American citizenship. He reacquired his Philippine citizenship via oath taking under Republic Act No. 9225 on 2 October 2005, executed a renunciation of his foreign citizenship on 19 March 2007, and filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on 28 March 2007, claiming residency in the municipality for over one year preceding the elections. Japzon contested Ty's residency, citing Ty's prolonged absence from the Philippines and his brief trips abroad after his return.

• Citizenship History: Ty was born a natural-born Filipino in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, but migrated to the United States and became a naturalized American citizen in 1969, thereby abandoning his Philippine domicile of origin.
• Reacquisition of Citizenship: On 2 October 2005, Ty took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 9225. He applied for and was issued a Philippine passport on 26 October 2005, indicating his residence as General Macarthur.
• Acts of Residency: Ty secured Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) from the Municipality of General Macarthur on 8 March 2006 and 4 January 2007, listing his address therein. He was also registered as a voter in the municipality on 17 July 2006.
• Physical Presence and Travel: Ty arrived in the Philippines on 4 May 2006. He took brief trips to Bangkok, Thailand (14–18 July 2006) and the USA (31 October 2006 – 19 January 2007), returning to General Macarthur after each trip.
• Election and Disqualification Case: On 19 March 2007, Ty executed a notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, and on 28 March 2007, he filed his COC for Mayor. He won the 14 May 2007 elections. Japzon sought his disqualification on the ground of material misrepresentation regarding residency, arguing that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

• Loss and Non-Restoration of Domicile: Petitioner maintained that Ty lost his domicile of origin in the Philippines upon his naturalization as a US citizen, and that the mere reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 did not automatically restore his domicile in General Macarthur.
• Failure to Establish Domicile of Choice: Petitioner argued that Ty failed to discharge the burden of proving he established a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur, as his brief return and subsequent trips abroad negated any intent to remain indefinitely.
• Entitlement to Office: Petitioner asserted that, being the only qualified candidate, he should be declared the duly elected Mayor following Ty's disqualification.

• Compliance with R.A. 9225: Respondent countered that he fully complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 by taking his oath of allegiance and executing a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
• Residency: Respondent argued that his application for a Philippine passport, voter registration, and procurement of local CTCs proved his residency in General Macarthur for over one year prior to the election.
• Binding Factual Findings: Respondent maintained that the COMELEC's factual findings on residency are binding on the Supreme Court and supported by substantial evidence.
• Second Placer Rule: Respondent contended that even if he were disqualified, petitioner, as the second placer, could not assume the office of Mayor.

• Effect of R.A. 9225 on Domicile: Whether the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 automatically restores a former natural-born Filipino's domicile of origin.
• Residency Requirement: Whether private respondent satisfied the one-year residency requirement for local elective office under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding private respondent's Certificate of Candidacy and finding no material misrepresentation regarding his residency.

• Effect of R.A. 9225 on Domicile: Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 does not automatically restore a former natural-born Filipino's domicile of origin. The statute treats citizenship independently of residence, allowing dual citizens to establish residence either in the Philippines or abroad. The length of residence must be determined from the time the individual makes the Philippines their domicile of choice, and does not retroact to the time of birth.
• Residency Requirement: The residency requirement was satisfied. Private respondent established a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur through bodily presence and acts demonstrating animus manendi, such as applying for a Philippine passport, registering as a voter, and paying local taxes. Brief trips abroad did not negate this intent, as absence from one's residence to pursue studies or practice a profession does not constitute loss of residence, and private respondent was physically present in the municipality for at least nine of the twelve months preceding the election.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC. Factual findings of administrative agencies like the COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the will of the electorate should be respected absent a clear showing of ineligibility antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles.

• Domicile of Choice — To acquire a new domicile by choice, three elements must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there (animus manendi); and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi). The change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
• R.A. 9225 and Residency — Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship does not automatically revive a former natural-born Filipino's domicile of origin; the individual must establish a new domicile of choice, the length of which is determined from the time the new domicile was established and does not retroact to the time of birth.
• Finality of COMELEC Factual Findings — Factual findings of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court, owing to the constitutional mandate placing the COMELEC on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.

• "Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen."
• "In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi."

• Coquilla v. Commission on Elections — Followed. Naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines; reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically restore the domicile of origin.
• Caasi v. Court of Appeals — Followed. Immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard" constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines; with more reason does naturalization in a foreign country result in such abandonment.
• Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections — Followed. Summarized principles on residency qualification for elective local officials, emphasizing that the fact of residence is the decisive factor.
• Romualdez v. RTC — Followed. "Domicile" and "residence" are synonymous in election law; acquiring a new domicile requires bodily presence, intention to remain, and intention to abandon the old domicile.
• Aquino v. COMELEC — Followed. Changing residence to qualify for an elective post is permissible provided the change is proven with reasonable certainty for the period required by law.

• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) — Requires those seeking elective public office to meet the qualifications for holding such office as required by the Constitution and existing laws, and to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. Applied to determine that private respondent complied with the renunciation requirement.
• Section 39(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Requires an elective local official to be a resident therein for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Applied as the standard to determine private respondent's eligibility to run for Mayor.

Reynato S. Puno (CJ), Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion.