Jao vs. Court of Appeals

The term "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court means actual residence or place of abode—personal, physical habitation in a given place with continuity and consistency—and not legal residence or domicile in the technical sense. Venue for the settlement of a decedent's estate is properly laid in the court of the province where the decedent was physically residing at the time of death, and entries in the death certificate reflecting such residence prevail over other documents pertaining to domicile.

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock, and other personal properties. The brothers eventually quarreled over the inheritance, with Perico alleging that Rodolfo was dissipating estate assets. The dispute required determining the proper venue for the intestate settlement proceedings, which in turn depended on whether "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court referred to the decedents' actual physical residence at the time of death or their permanent domicile.

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock, and other personal properties. On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507. Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator, alleging that Rodolfo was gradually dissipating the estate's assets—receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.

Rodolfo moved for dismissal on the ground of improper venue, arguing that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. He contended that the decedents' actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where their late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As their parents' health deteriorated due to old age, they stayed at Rodolfo's residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence including income tax returns, voter's affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration, and passports, all indicating Angeles City, Pampanga, as their permanent residence.

Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. The death certificates of both decedents conclusively declared their last residence as 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. Notably, Rodolfo himself supplied the entry on their mother Andrea's death certificate and affixed his signature thereon. Rodolfo replied that he gave the information in good faith and through honest mistake, providing his residence only as reference since their parents were treated at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong. He maintained that their stay in his house was merely transitory, as they were also taken at different times to Perico's residence at Legaspi Towers on Roxas Boulevard for the same purpose, and that the death certificates could not be deemed conclusive evidence of residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.

The trial court required the parties to submit nominees for the position of administrator; both initially failed to comply, and the petition was archived. Perico later moved for revival of the proceedings, and after the parties submitted their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator. On April 6, 1994, the trial court denied Rodolfo's motion to dismiss, finding that the death certificates confirmed Quezon City as the decedents' last place of residence and that Rodolfo could not disown his own representation on his mother's death certificate. Rodolfo elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC order in toto on December 11, 1996. His motion for reconsideration was denied on February 17, 1997. Both lower courts found that the decedents had been living with Rodolfo in Quezon City at the time of their deaths and for some three to four years prior thereto.

• Improper Venue: Petitioner argued that the decedents' permanent residence or domicile was in Angeles City, Pampanga, not Quezon City, and that their stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and solely for medical treatment and hospitalization.
• Domicile vs. Residence: Petitioner maintained that "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 refers to permanent residence or domicile, not mere physical presence, because the settlement venue should be where the records of properties are kept and where most of the decedents' properties are located.
• Distinction Between Venue Provisions: Petitioner argued that venue in ordinary civil actions under Section 2, Rule 4, which refers to actual physical residence for purposes of serving summons, should not be analogized to venue in special proceedings under Section 1, Rule 73, which should refer to permanent residence or domicile.
• Evidentiary Weight of Death Certificates: Petitioner contended that the entries in the death certificates should not prevail over the overwhelming documentary evidence showing the decedents' intention to establish permanent residence in Angeles City, and that the entries were made in good faith and through honest mistake.
• Estoppel Improperly Applied: Petitioner argued that the principle of estoppel applied against him could not be more persuasive than the decedents' own clear intention to establish permanent residence in Angeles City.
• Reliance on Eusebio: Petitioner invoked the ruling in Eusebio vs. Eusebio, which interpreted "residence" in Section 1, Rule 73 as requiring capacity to choose, physical presence, and intention to stay permanently, and argued that the decedents never intended to adopt Quezon City as their permanent residence.

• Actual Residence in Quezon City: Respondent countered that the deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths, as conclusively declared in their death certificates.
• Death Certificates as Evidence: Respondent argued that the death certificates, accomplished before the parties quarreled over the inheritance, reliably reflected the true situation at the time of the parents' death, and that Rodolfo himself supplied the residence entry on their mother's death certificate and could not now disown it.

• Meaning of "Resides" in Rule 73: Whether "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court refers to the decedent's actual physical residence at the time of death or to the decedent's permanent residence or domicile.
• Evidentiary Weight of Death Certificates: Whether the entries in the decedents' death certificates reflecting Quezon City as their residence should prevail over petitioner's documentary evidence indicating Angeles City, Pampanga, as their permanent residence.
• Uniformity of Venue Rules: Whether the concept of "residence" for venue purposes is the same in ordinary civil actions under Rule 4 and in special proceedings under Rule 73.

• Meaning of "Resides" in Rule 73: No. "Resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 means actual residence or place of abode—personal, physical habitation with continuity and consistency—not legal residence or domicile in the technical sense.
• Evidentiary Weight of Death Certificates: Yes. The death certificates prevailed as proof of the decedents' residence at the time of death over petitioner's documentary evidence, which pertained to permanent residence or domicile rather than residence at the time of death as required by the Rules.
• Uniformity of Venue Rules: No. Venue for ordinary civil actions and venue for special proceedings have one and the same meaning; "residence" in both contexts means actual residence or place of abode, provided the person resides therein with continuity and consistency.

• Meaning of "Resides" in Rule 73: Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that the estate of a decedent who is an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled in the court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." Citing Garcia-Fule vs. Court of Appeals, the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." The term is elastic and must be interpreted in light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules, residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. "Resides" should be understood in its popular sense—personal, actual, or physical habitation in a given place, signifying physical presence and actual stay thereat. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires both bodily presence and intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time is required, but the residence must be more than temporary. Petitioner's reliance on Eusebio vs. Eusebio was unavailing because the facts therein were materially different: the decedent in Eusebio died before he could move into his newly acquired Quezon City residence, so his physical presence there was merely temporary. In the present case, substantial proof showed that the decedents had transferred to and lived in petitioner's Quezon City residence for three to four years before their deaths, making their stay more than temporary.

• Evidentiary Weight of Death Certificates: The death certificates of both decedents stated that they were residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Petitioner himself filled up his late mother's death certificate and signed it, unqualifiedly showing that at that time he recognized his mother's residence to be Quezon City. He also failed to contest the entry in Ignacio's death certificate accomplished a year earlier by respondent. The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were properly considered and presumed correct by the trial court. Because the death certificates were accomplished before the parties quarreled over their inheritance, they could be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of the parents' death. The documents presented by petitioner—income tax returns, voter's affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registrations, and passports—pertained not to residence at the time of death as required by the Rules, but to permanent residence or domicile. The death certificates thus prevailed as proof of residence at the time of death. The factual findings of the lower courts, which found that the decedents had been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior, were substantiated by the evidence and, absent any showing of erroneous apprehension of the evidence, were conclusive and binding.

• Uniformity of Venue Rules: Petitioner's attempt to distinguish venue in ordinary civil actions under Rule 4, Section 2 from venue in special proceedings under Rule 73, Section 1 failed. In Raymond vs. Court of Appeals and Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and venue for special proceedings have one and the same meaning: "residence" means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Petitioner's argument that records of properties are kept where one permanently resides, or that most properties are located at one's domicile, was rejected as speculative; where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent on individual choice and cannot be generalized.

• Residence vs. Domicile in Venue Provisions — In the context of venue statutes and rules, including Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, "resides" means actual residence or place of abode—personal, physical habitation in a given place with continuity and consistency—and not legal residence or domicile in the technical sense. Residence requires only bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires both bodily presence and intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time is required, but the residence must be more than temporary. The term is elastic and must be interpreted in light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.

• Uniformity of "Residence" in Venue Rules — Venue for ordinary civil actions under Rule 4 and venue for special proceedings under Rule 73 have one and the same meaning. "Residence" in both contexts refers to actual residence or place of abode, provided the person resides therein with continuity and consistency.

• Evidentiary Value of Death Certificates — Recitals in death certificates are admissible in evidence and presumed correct. When accomplished by a party before any dispute arises, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of death. Entries in a death certificate supplied and signed by a party may be used against that party, who cannot later disown the representation by taking an inconsistent position.

• "the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides', like the terms 'residing' and 'residence', is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed." — This passage, quoting Garcia-Fule vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the controlling doctrine that "resides" in venue provisions means actual residence, not domicile, and is the canonical formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor." — This sentence establishes the direct application of the residence-versus-domicile distinction to Rule 73, Section 1, resolving the central issue of the case.

• "Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary." — This passage defines the elements distinguishing residence from domicile and sets the threshold that residence must be more than temporary, a formulation central to the Court's analysis.

• Eusebio vs. Eusebio, 100 Phil. 593 (1956) — Distinguished. Petitioner invoked this case for the proposition that "residence" in Section 1, Rule 73 means permanent residence or domicile, requiring capacity to choose, physical presence, and intention to stay permanently. The Court distinguished it on the facts: the decedent therein died before moving into his Quezon City residence, making his presence merely temporary, unlike the present case where the decedents lived in Quezon City for three to four years before death.

• Garcia-Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) — Followed and quoted at length. This case established that "resides" in venue provisions connotes actual residence, not legal residence or domicile, and that the term must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the statute or rule. It is the primary authority for the Court's ruling.

• Raymond vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 50 (1988) — Followed. Held that venue for ordinary civil actions and venue for special proceedings have one and the same meaning, refuting petitioner's attempt to distinguish the two.

• Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566 (1989) — Followed. Reinforced the principle that "residence" in the context of venue provisions means actual residence or place of abode with continuity and consistency, applicable to both ordinary civil actions and special proceedings.

• Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Provides that the estate of a decedent who is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of death shall be settled, or letters of administration granted, in the court of the province in which he "resides at the time of his death." The Court interpreted "resides" as actual physical residence, not domicile, and applied it to hold that Quezon City was the proper venue.

• Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court — Governs venue of personal actions, providing that such actions may be commenced where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Petitioner argued this provision's concept of residence should not be analogized to Rule 73, but the Court rejected the distinction, holding that "residence" has the same meaning in both provisions.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurred.