Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

The Commission on Elections may motu proprio cancel a certificate of candidacy without prior quasi-judicial proceedings when the ground therefor is a candidate's perpetual absolute disqualification based on a final judgment of conviction, as this constitutes an administrative function of enforcing election laws; and Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code is a general provision that does not supersede the specific penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification under the Revised Penal Code.

Romeo G. Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment on November 16, 2001, of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness under Republic Act No. 7610, for which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. These principal penalties carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo commuted his prison term, and he was discharged from prison on March 18, 2009. In April 2012, Jalosjos applied for voter registration in Zamboanga City but was denied by the Election Registration Board due to his prior conviction. He nevertheless filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor in October 2012, claiming eligibility. The Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court subsequently denied his petition for inclusion as a voter, with the RTC decision becoming final and executory.

• On November 16, 2001, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos (G.R. Nos. 132875-76), convicting the petitioner by final judgment of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness.
• The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
• On April 30, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen years, three months, and three days.
• On March 18, 2009, the petitioner was issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison after serving the commuted sentence.
• On April 26, 2012, the petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City, but his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board.
• On October 5, 2012, the petitioner filed a Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 2013 elections, stating under oath that he was eligible for the office and a registered voter.
• On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification.
• On October 31, 2012, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the MTCC denial, and pursuant to Section 138 of the Omnibus Election Code, the decision was immediately final and executory.
• On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 9613, cancelling the petitioner's CoC motu proprio based on his perpetual absolute disqualification and his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.

• The COMELEC En Banc usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC Divisions by issuing a motu proprio resolution cancelling the CoC without a prior decision from a Division and without a motion for reconsideration, allegedly violating Article IX-C, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
• The motu proprio cancellation violated the petitioner's right to procedural due process.
• The perpetual absolute disqualification under the Revised Penal Code was removed by Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which allows persons sentenced by final judgment for offenses punishable by one year or more to run for elective local positions within two years after serving sentence.

• The COMELEC En Banc acted within its administrative power under the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
• The cancellation of a CoC based on a final judgment of conviction involving perpetual absolute disqualification is an administrative function, not a quasi-judicial function requiring prior proceedings or a motion for reconsideration.
• Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code is a general law that cannot repeal or amend the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Articles 30 and 41) regarding perpetual absolute disqualification.
• The petitioner failed to meet the voter registration requirement under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code, as conclusively established by the final RTC decision denying his inclusion as a voter.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction in issuing motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 without a prior division ruling and without a motion for reconsideration.
  • Whether the motu proprio cancellation violated the petitioner's right to procedural due process.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

• Procedural:
  • The constitutional requirement under Article IX-C, Section 3 that motions for reconsideration be decided by the Commission en banc applies only to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions, not its administrative functions.
  • The cancellation of a CoC based on a final judgment of conviction imposing perpetual absolute disqualification is an administrative function of enforcing election laws, not a quasi-judicial function requiring hearings and weighing of evidence.
  • No violation of procedural due process occurred because the disqualification was already conclusively established by the final judgment of conviction; the COMELEC was merely giving effect to an existing judgment and fulfilling its constitutional duty to enforce election laws.
  • The COMELEC has the authority to motu proprio cancel certificates of candidacy of persons suffering from perpetual disqualification by virtue of final judgment without waiting for a petition to be filed.
• Substantive:
  • Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code is a general law applicable to local elective candidates, while Articles 30 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code are specific laws imposing perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory penalty to reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal.
  • Under the principle of lex specialis derogat generali, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code prevail over the general provision of the Local Government Code.
  • Perpetual absolute disqualification lasts for the lifetime of the convict and continues even after service of sentence or commutation of the principal penalty, unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
  • The accessory penalty takes effect immediately upon finality of judgment and does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty or whether the convict serves the sentence.
  • Therefore, Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code did not remove the petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification, and he remained disqualified to run for mayor.

• Administrative vs. Quasi-Judicial Functions — Administrative functions involve applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs without the need for hearings or weighing evidence, while quasi-judicial functions require the investigation of facts, holding of hearings, and weighing of evidence. The COMELEC exercises administrative power when it cancels a CoC based on a final judgment of conviction because the disqualification is already established by the judgment itself; it exercises quasi-judicial power when it must determine contested facts and evidence.
• Lex Specialis Derogat Generali — Special legislation prevails over general legislation on the same subject. Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, which specifically imposes perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory penalty to certain crimes, prevails over Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which is a general provision on disqualifications for local officials.
• Perpetual Absolute Disqualification — An accessory penalty under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code attached to reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal, which deprives the convict of the right to vote or be elected to public office perpetually. It takes effect immediately upon finality of judgment and continues even if the principal penalty is pardoned or commuted, unless the accessory penalty itself is expressly remitted in the pardon.
• COMELEC's Motu Proprio Power — The COMELEC has the constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to elections, which includes the power to motu proprio cancel certificates of candidacy of persons disqualified by final judgment without waiting for a petition to be filed, to prevent the anomaly of disqualified candidates appearing on the ballot.

• "The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of 'all laws' relating to the conduct of elections."
• "The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to 'enforce and administer all laws' relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment."
• "The accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon."
• "The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not."
• "Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually."

• People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos (G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001) — The original criminal case where the petitioner was convicted of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness, establishing the final judgment of conviction and the imposition of perpetual absolute disqualification.
• Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536, October 9, 2012) — Controlling precedent establishing that the COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio cancel certificates of candidacy of persons suffering from perpetual disqualification by virtue of final judgment as part of its administrative function to enforce election laws.
• Villarosa v. COMELEC (377 Phil. 497, 1999) — Cited for the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, defining administrative power as pertaining to management and superintending the execution of laws, and quasi-judicial power as requiring investigation of facts and weighing of evidence.
• Aratea v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 195229, October 12, 2012) — Reaffirmed that disqualification based on final conviction is part of the enforcement of election laws and discussed the immediate effectivity of perpetual disqualification upon finality of judgment.
• Lacuna v. Abes (133 Phil. 770, 1968) — Established that perpetual disqualification lasts perpetually and is distinct from temporary disqualification which lasts only during the term of the sentence.
• Cipriano v. COMELEC (479 Phil. 677, 2004) — Defined administrative power as concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.

• Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc; interpreted to apply only to quasi-judicial functions, not administrative functions.
• Article 30, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the effects of perpetual absolute disqualification, including the deprivation of the right to vote in any election or to be elected to such office.
• Article 41, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal carry the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty unless expressly remitted.
• Section 40(a), Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) — Disqualifies those sentenced by final judgment for offenses involving moral turpitude or punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two years after serving sentence; held to be a general law that does not apply to cases covered by specific RPC provisions on perpetual disqualification.
• Section 39(a), Local Government Code of 1991 — Requires elective local officials to be registered voters in the locality where they intend to be elected; basis for the cancellation of the CoC due to failure to meet voter registration requirement.
• Section 12, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Enumerates disqualifications for candidates, including those sentenced by final judgment for certain offenses.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy; distinguished as requiring quasi-judicial proceedings when facts are contested.
• Section 138, Omnibus Election Code — Grants the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over appeals from municipal/metropolitan trial courts in voter inclusion/exclusion cases, providing that the RTC decision shall be immediately final and executory.

• Brion, J. — Concurred with the cancellation of the CoC based on the voter registration requirement but expressed reservation regarding the use of perpetual absolute disqualification as an independent ground for motu proprio cancellation. Argued that perpetual disqualification is properly a ground for disqualification (a personal trait requiring quasi-judicial determination with full due process), not for cancellation (which relates to eligibility requirements common to all citizens and can be determined administratively). Contended that the COMELEC cannot motu proprio determine factual questions regarding disqualification without hearing, and that cancellation and disqualification are distinct remedies with different procedural requirements.