Jalosjos vs. COMELEC

A candidate for local elective office must establish by clear and positive proof the concurrence of three requisites to acquire a domicile of choice—bodily presence in the new locality, intention to remain there, and intention to abandon the old domicile—at least one year prior to the elections.

Svetlana P. Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, indicating Barangay Tugas as her place of birth and residence. Private respondents sought to deny due course to or cancel her CoC, alleging she was born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not abandoned her domicile of origin in Dapitan City.

• The Certificate of Candidacy: On November 20, 2009, Svetlana P. Jalosjos filed her CoC for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, declaring Barangay Tugas as her place of birth and residence.
• The Petition to Cancel: Private respondents filed a petition to deny due course to or cancel the CoC, presenting certifications that Jalosjos had no tax declarations or birth records in Baliangao, and joint affidavits from local officials asserting she was not and had never been a resident of the barangay.
• Petitioner's Evidence: Jalosjos claimed residence in Brgy. Tugas since December 2008 after purchasing land, staying at Lourdes Yap's house while her own was being constructed. She submitted land documents, photographs, voter registration, and affidavits from construction workers and organization presidents attesting to her residency. She attributed the error in her place of birth to her secretary, arguing it was immaterial.
• Proclamation and COMELEC Ruling: Despite the pending petition, Jalosjos won the election and was proclaimed mayor on May 10, 2010. The COMELEC Second Division disqualified her on June 4, 2010, finding that while the error in place of birth was not a ground for cancellation, she failed to prove she acquired a new domicile in Baliangao. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this ruling on August 19, 2010, finding her evidence insufficient—she was not a party to the extrajudicial partition, her sketch plans were unsigned, her voter registration only proved minimum voter residency, and her affiants were partial.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to promulgate its June 4, 2010 and August 19, 2010 Resolutions in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, which requires advance notice of promulgation, thereby violating her right to due process.
• Residency: Petitioner maintained that she had established her domicile in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, as evidenced by her purchase of property, voter registration, and the affidavits of local residents and workers.

• Due Process: Respondent COMELEC countered that it had suspended Resolution No. 8696 through an En Banc Order dated May 4, 2010, and that even if the rule were in effect, the lack of advance notice was a procedural lapse that did not prejudice the parties, who were afforded the opportunity to be heard.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Respondent argued that the Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale was insufficient proof of property ownership because petitioner was never a party to it; the sketch plans were unsigned; the voter registration only proved the minimum six-month residency for voters; and the affiants were partial, being either employees or beneficiaries of petitioner's financial assistance.

• Due Process: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its resolutions in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure regarding advance notice.
• Residency: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

• Due Process: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The COMELEC validly suspended Section 6 of Resolution No. 8696. Even assuming the rule remained in effect, the failure to serve advance notice of promulgation is a procedural lapse that does not invalidate the decision. Promulgation consists of the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication coupled with notice to the parties; advance notice is not part of this process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which was afforded to the petitioner.
• Residency: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao. Inconsistencies in her affidavits—stating she was an actual resident since 2008 but also that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was being built, that construction was ongoing in December 2009, and that she only visited occasionally—negated bodily presence and intent to remain. Ownership of property does not establish domicile, and voter registration only proves the minimum residency requirement for voters, not the one-year requirement for candidates.

• Domicile of Choice — To acquire a new domicile by choice, three requisites must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. These requisites must be established by clear and positive proof. In the absence of such proof, the domicile of origin continues. The date of acquisition of the domicile of choice must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
• Promulgation of Decisions — Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties. An advance notice of promulgation is not part of the process; noncompliance therewith is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision, provided the parties were afforded the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered.

• "The term ‘residence’ as so used, is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." — Defines the standard for residency in election law.
• "The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. ... The failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision." — Clarifies the nature of advance notice requirements.
• "To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional." — Explains why property ownership alone is insufficient to prove domicile.

• Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928) — Followed. Established that "residence" in the context of qualifications for public office is synonymous with "domicile."
• Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) — Followed. Set forth the three requisites for acquiring a domicile of choice, requiring clear and positive proof.
• Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado, 511 Phil. 720 (2005) — Followed. Held that absent clear and positive proof of the three requisites, the residence of origin continues.
• Fernandez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 733 — Followed. Established that ownership of a house or property does not establish domicile.
• Sabili v. COMELEC — Followed. Held that failure to serve advance notice of promulgation does not invalidate a decision.
• Lindo v. Commission on Elections — Followed. Clarified that advance notice of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation itself.
• Pimping v. COMELEC — Followed. Held that failure to receive advance notice does not warrant setting aside the judgment if parties had the opportunity to be heard.

• Section 78 in relation to Section 74, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) — Applied to determine that a material misrepresentation in the CoC regarding eligibility warrants its cancellation.
• Section 39, Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Applied to establish the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
• Section 44, Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Applied to determine succession, stating that the vice-mayor shall become the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy.
• Section 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 — Discussed regarding the requirement of advance notice of promulgation, which was suspended by the COMELEC.
• Section 9, R.A. 8189 (1996) — Distinguished. The Court noted that approval of voter registration only proves the minimum six-month residency requirement for voters, which is different from the one-year requirement for candidates.

Carpio, Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe.