Jalosjos, Jr. vs. COMELEC

A certificate of candidacy filed by a person suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification is void ab initio, rendering the filer a non-candidate and all votes cast for him stray, which entitles the qualified candidate who garners the highest number of votes to proclamation.

Dominador Jalosjos Jr. was convicted of robbery by final judgment in 1970 and sentenced to prision mayor, a penalty carrying the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Although granted probation in 1985, it was revoked in 1987 for failure to report to his probation officer. A 2003 certification by the Parole and Probation Administrator attesting to Jalosjos's compliance was later declared falsified, resulting in the administrator's conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Despite the revocation, Jalosjos relied on this fraudulent certification and a subsequent RTC order to run for and win the mayoralty of Dapitan City in 2004 and 2007. For the 2010 elections, rival Agapito Cardino filed a petition to cancel Jalosjos's CoC on the ground of material misrepresentation regarding his eligibility.

• The 1970 Conviction: Jalosjos was convicted of robbery by the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City and sentenced to prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. His appeal was dismissed in 1973.
• The Probation and Revocation: Jalosjos filed for probation in 1985, which was granted. However, due to his failure to report to his probation officer, the RTC revoked the probation on March 19, 1987, and issued a warrant for his arrest.
• The Fraudulent Certification: In December 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio Bacolod issued a certification attesting that Jalosjos had fulfilled his probation terms. Based on this, the RTC lifted the warrant of arrest in 2004. The COMELEC also relied on this certification to deny a disqualification case against Jalosjos in the 2004 elections.
• The Sandiganbayan Conviction: On September 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan convicted Bacolod for issuing a falsified certification, finding that Jalosjos could not have fulfilled the conditions of a probation order that had been revoked 16 years prior.
• The 2010 Election Dispute: For the May 2010 elections, Cardino filed a petition to cancel Jalosjos's CoC, alleging material misrepresentation of eligibility. On election day, the COMELEC First Division granted the petition. The En Banc denied Jalosjos's motion for reconsideration on August 11, 2010, ousting him from office and applying the Local Government Code's rule on succession.
• Resignation: Jalosjos resigned as Mayor effective April 30, 2012, citing his intent to run for Governor in 2013. The Court proceeded to resolve the case as it involved the COMELEC's constitutional duty and the validity of the votes cast.

• Jalosjos (G.R. No. 193237) — Probation Revocation: Jalosjos argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that his probation was revoked, claiming he had duly complied with its terms.
• Jalosjos (G.R. No. 193237) — Good Faith Misrepresentation: Jalosjos maintained that he committed no deliberate misrepresentation because he relied in good faith on the previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible.
• Jalosjos (G.R. No. 193237) — Procedural Violations: Jalosjos asserted that the COMELEC resolutions were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Cardino (G.R. No. 193536) — Erroneous Application of Succession: Cardino argued that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by applying the Local Government Code on succession, contending that the cancellation of Jalosjos's CoC meant he was never a candidate, making Cardino the highest vote-getter among qualified candidates.

• COMELEC — Material Misrepresentation: The COMELEC defended its ruling that Jalosjos committed material misrepresentation by declaring eligibility despite a final conviction and an unserved sentence.
• COMELEC — Fraudulent Probation: The COMELEC maintained that the certification of probation compliance was fraudulently issued, leaving the revocation of probation and the warrant of arrest as the only valid subsisting orders.
• COMELEC — Succession: The COMELEC applied the rule on succession under the Local Government Code to fill the vacancy created by Jalosjos's ouster, rejecting Cardino's claim to the office as a second placer.

• Proper Remedy: Whether a petition based on disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code is properly actionable as a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Effect of Ineligibility on CoC: Whether a certificate of candidacy is void ab initio if the filer suffers from perpetual special disqualification at the time of filing, and whether votes cast for such a person are stray votes.
• Rightful Successor: Whether the rule on succession under the Local Government Code or the proclamation of the second placer applies when the certificate of candidacy of the winning candidate is cancelled for being void ab initio.

• Proper Remedy: A petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is proper. A false statement in a CoC that a candidate is eligible constitutes a false material representation. Because a conviction by final judgment for a crime penalized by prision mayor creates an ineligibility (perpetual special disqualification), stating otherwise in the CoC is a false material representation. The petitioner has the choice of filing under Section 12, Section 40, or Section 78.
• Effect of Ineligibility on CoC: The CoC is void ab initio. Perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law to a prision mayor sentence and takes effect immediately upon finality of the judgment, independent of whether the convict serves the sentence. Because Jalosjos was ineligible from the start, his CoC was void from the moment of filing. The cancellation retroacts to the date of filing, meaning he was never a candidate, and all votes for him are stray.
• Rightful Successor: The rule on succession does not apply. The "rejection of the second placer" doctrine applies only when the first placer had a valid CoC that was subsequently invalidated. Where the CoC is void ab initio, the filer was never a candidate and cannot be a first placer. Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes and is entitled to proclamation.

• Perpetual Special Disqualification — An accessory penalty to prision mayor under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code. It deprives the convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election or to be elected to public office, and prohibits holding any public office during the period of disqualification. It takes effect immediately upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, independent of service of sentence, and remains unless expressly remitted in a pardon.
• Void Certificate of Candidacy — A CoC filed by a person who is ineligible at the time of filing is void from the beginning. It cannot give rise to a valid candidacy or valid votes. The cancellation of such a CoC retroacts to the day of filing.
• Stray Votes — Votes cast for a person whose CoC is void ab initio are considered stray and should not be counted, as the person was never a candidate. This applies whether the CoC is cancelled before or after the elections.
• Distinction Between Cancellation and Disqualification — A proceeding under Section 78 (cancellation) deals with eligibility based on material representations in the CoC, rendering the person a non-candidate. A proceeding under Section 68 (disqualification) deals with election offenses or acts of the candidate, leaving the CoC valid but prohibiting the candidate from continuing (allowing substitution). However, ineligibility due to a final conviction is also a ground for Section 78 because claiming eligibility when perpetually disqualified is a false material representation.

• "A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes."
• "The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not."
• "Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

• Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770 (1968) — Followed. Explained that perpetual special disqualification deprives the convict of the right to vote or be elected to public office perpetually, distinguishing it from temporary special disqualification which lasts only during the term of the sentence.
• Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369 (2008) — Followed. Held that a Section 78 petition is based on a false material representation which may relate to qualifications or eligibility, and distinguished Section 78 (cancellation) from Section 68 (disqualification).
• Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002) — Followed. Ruled that COMELEC jurisdiction to disqualify candidates under Section 68 is limited to offenses enumerated therein (election offenses), not crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
• Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736 (2007) — Followed. Held that votes cast for a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election are stray.
• Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1 (1998) — Followed. Declared that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy.

• Article 42, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty of prision mayor carries with it the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
• Article 32, Revised Penal Code — Defines the effects of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage, depriving the offender perpetually of the right to vote or be elected, and prohibiting the holding of public office.
• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Requires a candidate to state under oath in the certificate of candidacy that he is eligible for the office sought.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Allows a verified petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation required under Section 74 is false.
• Section 40(a), Local Government Code — Disqualifies from running for any elective local position those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence.

Bersamin (separate concurring opinion), Sereno, Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe.

• Brion, J. — Dissented on the characterization of the petition and the resulting proclamation. The petition was effectively for disqualification, not cancellation of the CoC. Disqualification applies to the person of the candidate, leaving the CoC valid. Because the disqualification was not final before the elections, Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate and won. Upon final disqualification after the elections, a permanent vacancy was created, which must be filled by succession under the Local Government Code (by the Vice-Mayor), not by the second placer.
• Reyes, J. — Dissented, agreeing with Justice Brion's distinction between cancellation and disqualification. The nature of the petition is determined by its allegations, which clearly invoked disqualification grounds (conviction for moral turpitude) rather than a misrepresentation of a requirement under Section 74. Since the disqualification became final after the elections, Jalosjos was a valid candidate who won, creating a vacancy that triggers succession, not the proclamation of a defeated second placer.