Jakihaca vs. Aquino

In an action for illegal detainer, a complaint that alleges a verbal demand to vacate and the defendant’s refusal is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand, even if the date of demand is not specified; a party who voluntarily invokes the court’s jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief is estopped from subsequently challenging that jurisdiction.

Petitioner Jesus Jakihaca owned a residential lot in Buntong Palay, Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-103650. Private respondents Lilia Aquino, Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde constructed houses on the lot allegedly without the owner’s knowledge and consent. Despite a verbal demand to remove the structures, they refused to vacate.

• Nature of the Action: On September 10, 1986, petitioner filed an ejectment complaint under the Rules on Summary Procedure against respondents before the MTC of San Mateo, Rizal, alleging that they had illegally built houses on his land without his knowledge and consent, and that they refused to remove the structures despite verbal demand. The case was referred to the Barangay Lupon, which issued a certification to file action after respondents repeatedly refused to appear.

• Respondents’ Defenses: In their answer, respondents alleged a verbal contract of tenancy with the former owner, Gloria Gener, claiming they had occupied and cultivated the land for more than ten years, planting fruit-bearing trees, rice, and corn. They argued they could not be ejected under the Land Reform Law (Presidential Decree No. 1) without a certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform that the case was proper for trial.

• MTC Findings: The MTC found that respondents were not agricultural tenants or farmworkers of either the former or present owner. They entered the premises 10 to 20 years earlier by tolerance of Gloria Gener. As occupants by tolerance, they were bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. The MTC ordered removal of houses, surrender of possession, and payment of attorney’s fees and costs, denying moral and exemplary damages. Significantly, the MTC relied on a report from the Agrarian Office stating that the land was not devoted to rice or corn production, respondents were not sharing harvests with the landowner, the land was not tenanted, and thus not covered by P.D. No. 27 or Operation Land Transfer.

• RTC Decision on Appeal: The RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the complaint failed to allege when the verbal demand was made, a defect that deprived the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.

• Sufficiency of Demand Allegation: Petitioner maintained that the complaint’s allegation — “plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses … but the latter refused” — sufficiently complied with the jurisdictional requirement, as established in Hautea v. Magallon.

• Estoppel to Challenge Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that respondents never challenged the sufficiency of the demand allegation in their answer before the MTC, instead invoking the court’s jurisdiction and seeking affirmative relief. Under Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court, they were estopped from attacking jurisdiction on appeal.

• Tenancy Defense Negated: Petitioner pointed to the Agrarian Office report that categorically found the land was not agricultural, not tenanted, and not covered by land reform laws. Thus, the MTC properly assumed jurisdiction without a certification from the agrarian reform secretary.

• Timeliness and Proper Court: Petitioner contended that the Rule on Summary Procedure’s prohibition on motions for reconsideration applies only to MTCs, not RTCs. The motion for reconsideration was therefore proper, the appeal period was tolled, and the petition to the Supreme Court was timely. He further maintained that a decision of the RTC exercising appellate jurisdiction over an MTC ejectment case is appealable directly to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45, per Lacsamana v. IAC.

• Defective Allegation of Demand: Respondents argued that the complaint’s failure to state when the demand was made was a fatal jurisdictional defect, rendering the MTC’s decision void.

• Agricultural Tenancy as Jurisdictional Bar: Respondents insisted they were tenant-farmers protected by the Land Reform Law, and the absence of a certification from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform deprived the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.

• Untimely Filing of Petition: Respondents asserted that the petition was filed out of time. The ejectment case was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibit a motion for reconsideration; thus, the motion filed in the RTC did not toll the 15-day period to appeal, and the petition filed three months later was belated.

• Wrong Court for Appeal: Respondents contended that the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court.

• Sufficiency of Demand Allegation: Whether a complaint for illegal detainer that alleges a verbal demand and refusal to vacate, without specifying the date of demand, sufficiently complies with the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand.

• Estoppel to Challenge Jurisdiction: Whether respondents, who did not raise the demand defect in their answer and participated in trial, were estopped from later questioning the MTC’s jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

• Agricultural Tenancy Defense: Whether the respondents’ claim of agricultural tenancy and the lack of an agrarian reform certification deprived the MTC of jurisdiction.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the petition for review filed with the Supreme Court was filed out of time due to the alleged prohibition against motions for reconsideration under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

• Correct Appellate Court: Whether the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals instead of the Supreme Court.

• Sufficiency of Demand Allegation: The allegation that “plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses … but the latter refused” constituted sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand. The doctrine in Hautea v. Magallon was directly controlling: an allegation of demand and refusal is enough; the exact date of demand need not be pleaded.

• Estoppel to Challenge Jurisdiction: Respondents were barred from attacking the MTC’s jurisdiction on the ground of insufficient demand allegation. Their answer did not raise this issue; they instead submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, sought affirmative relief, and participated in trial. Having invoked jurisdiction to obtain a favorable ruling, a party cannot later disavow that same jurisdiction to escape an unfavorable outcome (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy; PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court).

• Agricultural Tenancy Defense: The MTC properly assumed jurisdiction. The report of the Agrarian Office unequivocally stated that the land was not devoted to rice or corn, respondents were not sharing with the landowner, and the property was not covered by P.D. No. 27 or the government’s Operation Land Transfer. No tenancy relationship existed, and a certification from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was therefore unnecessary.

• Timeliness of Appeal: The petition was timely filed. The Rule on Summary Procedure’s prohibition on motions for reconsideration applies only to cases before Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It does not apply to proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC tolled the period to appeal, making the subsequent petition seasonable.

• Correct Appellate Court: The petition was filed with the proper court. Under Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the IAC, a final judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an MTC ejectment case may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, in accordance with Section 25 of the Interim Rules.

• Doctrine on Sufficiency of Demand Allegation (Hautea v. Magallon) — In an action for illegal detainer, an allegation that the plaintiff made a demand upon the defendants and that they refused to restore possession is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand. The specific date of demand need not be stated. Here, the complaint’s averment that “plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses … but the latter refused” satisfied this standard.

• Doctrine of Estoppel on Jurisdiction (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy) — A party who voluntarily submits to a court’s jurisdiction by filing an answer, seeking affirmative relief, and participating in trial cannot later adopt an inconsistent posture by challenging that same jurisdiction on appeal. The Court applied this principle to bar respondents from raising the demand defect after they had invoked the MTC’s authority and litigated on the merits.

• Non-Application of Summary Procedure to RTC — The Rule on Summary Procedure under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 36, governs only proceedings in Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts. It does not extend to the Regional Trial Court when that court exercises appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC is not prohibited and tolls the appeal period.

• Mode of Appeal from RTC in Appellate Jurisdiction (Lacsamana v. IAC) — A final judgment of the Regional Trial Court in an appeal from a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court is reviewable by the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The petition here was filed with the correct tribunal.

• “An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.” (Hautea v. Magallon, 12 SCRA 514)

• “It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.” (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30)

• Hautea v. Magallon, 12 SCRA 514 — Followed. Established the rule that an allegation of demand and refusal satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisite, without needing to specify the date of demand.

• Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30 — Followed. Applied the principle of estoppel by laches to prevent a party from challenging jurisdiction after invoking it and participating in the proceedings.

• Tejones v. Gironella, 159 SCRA 104 — Cited as reaffirming the Tijam doctrine.

• PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 305 — Followed. Bolstered the rule that a party who files an answer and seeks affirmative relief cannot belatedly attack jurisdiction.

• Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the IAC, 143 SCRA 643 — Followed. Settled the proper mode of appeal from RTC decisions in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over lower court cases.

• Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) — Required referral of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. The Lupon issued a certification to file action after respondents’ repeated non-appearance, satisfying this precondition.

• Presidential Decree No. 1 and Land Reform Law — Invoked by respondents as a defense, claiming tenancy and security of tenure. The Court found these inapplicable because the Agrarian Office report established the land was not agricultural and no tenancy existed.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 36 (Judiciary Reorganization Act) — Provided the statutory basis for limiting the application of the Rules on Summary Procedure to Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts, thus allowing motions for reconsideration in the RTC.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court; Section 25, Interim Rules — Governed the mode of appeal from the RTC to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari, which the Court deemed the correct procedural avenue.

Justices Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado concurred.