Jacob vs. Puno

The Minister of Justice, exercising the power of control over provincial and city fiscals under Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 911, may reverse a fiscal’s finding of prima facie cause and direct the non-filing or dismissal of criminal informations; such action is not subject to certiorari, and the complainant’s remedy is a civil action for damages under Article 35 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob was the wife and court-appointed guardian of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob, while private respondents Jorge Centenera, Teodoro Alarcon, Pablo Paqueo, Jr., Amelia Lamit, Alfredo Silva, Jose Cea, Miguel Moll, and Olympio Clapis were the buyers, notaries, and instrumental witnesses in two deeds of absolute sale purportedly executed by Dr. Jacob. The controversy implicated the Minister of Justice’s authority under P.D. No. 911 and Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code to review and reverse the Provincial Fiscal’s preliminary investigation resolutions. Article 35 of the Civil Code supplied the remedy for a complainant when the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings.

Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur two criminal complaints for falsification of public documents purportedly executed by her husband, Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob. The first, I.S. No. 1162, involved a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1977 over a parcel of residential land in the Poblacion, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, in favor of Jorge M. Centenera; the deed was ratified on the same date before Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon and had Pablo Paqueo, Jr. and Amelia Lamit as instrumental witnesses. The second, I.S. No. 1163, involved a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 20, 1976 conveying 454,987 square meters of agricultural land situated at Barrio Mabalodbalod, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, to Dr. Daniel Mercado and Dr. Alfredo V. Silva; the deed was ratified on October 25, 1976 before Notary Public Jose Cea and had Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis as instrumental witnesses. The records also showed that on January 24, 1977, Dr. Jacob appeared to have executed another deed of sale covering the same agricultural parcel to Daniel Mercado only, ratified on the same date before the same Notary Public, Jose Cea.

Petitioner, who had been the court-appointed guardian of the then incompetent Dr. Alfredo Jacob since January 16, 1979, charged private respondents with conniving and confederating in falsifying the two deeds by making it appear that Dr. Jacob participated therein as seller when he never did so, because he was already seriously ill and practically bedridden on October 20, 1976 and December 2, 1977.

After preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ceferino P. Goce, on May 15, 1979, issued separate resolutions in I.S. Nos. 1162 and 1163 recommending the filing in court of the corresponding informations for falsification of public documents by private individuals under Article 171, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Private respondents appealed the resolutions to the Minister of Justice.

On April 15, 1981, the Minister of Justice directed the Provincial Fiscal to desist from filing the informations, or to move for their dismissal if already filed, and to dismiss the twin complaints. The Minister reasoned that the medical certificates showing that Dr. Jacob had undergone treatment since 1975 for arteriosclerosis and Parkinson’s disease did not sufficiently show that he could not have been in Camarines Sur on December 2, 1977 or October 20, 1976; that the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rodolfo Talag described Dr. Jacob’s weak physical condition and uncoordinated leg movements only as of the examination immediately prior to the certificate’s issuance on March 18, 1978; that the certificates did not indicate that Dr. Jacob was confined or under treatment from May 31, 1976, when he was discharged from the hospital after a cardio-vascular clearance, to October 20, 1976; and that the categorical declarations of the instrumental witnesses and Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon that Dr. Jacob actually and personally executed the deeds could not be overcome by the medical certificates, especially absent corroborating evidence showing in definite and precise terms that Dr. Jacob was not in Camarines Sur on the dates of execution. The Minister also noted that petitioner could not qualify to assert that fact because she was not yet married to Dr. Jacob on the dates of execution, and that the medical certificates, standing alone, raised merely assumptions that could not destroy the presumption of regularity in the execution of documents. In totality, the evidence could not sustain a prima facie case of falsification against respondents in both cases.

After the first and second motions for reconsideration, petitioner filed this appeal by certiorari, arguing that the Minister had transcended his authority to merely determine the existence of a prima facie case under P.D. No. 911 and had arrogated to himself the prerogatives or power vested in the courts.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner questioned whether the Minister of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur to desist from filing the corresponding informations against respondents, or to move for their dismissal if already filed, and to dismiss the twin complaints in I.S. Nos. 1162 and 1163.
• Excess of Authority / Judicial Power: Petitioner argued that the Minister transcended his authority to merely determine the existence of a prima facie case in pursuance of P.D. No. 911 and, in so doing, arrogated to himself the prerogatives or power vested in the courts.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Minister of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the Provincial Fiscal to desist from filing the informations and to dismiss the complaints in I.S. Nos. 1162 and 1163.
• Scope of Minister’s Authority: Whether the Minister of Justice exceeded his authority under P.D. No. 911 by reversing the fiscal’s finding of prima facie cause and directing non-filing or dismissal, thereby arrogating judicial power.
• Availability of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies to review the Minister of Justice’s directive.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Minister acted within his power of supervision and control over fiscals, and P.D. No. 911 authorizes him to reverse the fiscal’s resolution and direct dismissal or non-filing where no prima facie case exists.
• Scope of Minister’s Authority: No. The Minister did not transcend his authority; he has the ultimate power to decide between conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents and to determine whether a prima facie case exists.
• Availability of Certiorari: No. Certiorari does not lie; the complainant’s remedy when the Minister refuses prosecution for insufficiency of evidence is a civil action for damages under Article 35 of the Civil Code.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion was found. In Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47, the Court cited Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, which defines the extent of a department secretary’s power of control. That power means the power of the department head to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It also implies the right of the President, and naturally of his alter ego, to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. While the fiscal has the duty to prosecute persons who, according to the evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he ordered or sanctioned the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court. As he has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of Justice has the ultimate power to decide which, as between conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents, should be believed. The Court also cited Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA 214, for the principle that a prosecutor must weigh the evidence carefully and deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court, and that anything less would be a dereliction of duty.
• Scope of Minister’s Authority: P.D. No. 911 expressly provides that where the resolution of the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary, now Minister, of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statement or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation. The Minister found that the evidence on hand could not sustain a prima facie case of falsification of public documents against respondents in both cases. His directive to desist from filing and to dismiss the twin complaints therefore fell within the authority granted by P.D. No. 911 and did not amount to an arrogation of judicial power.
• Availability of Certiorari: Certiorari does not lie. The remedy of a complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused because, in the Minister’s opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an information, is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil Code. Article 35 provides that when a person claiming to be injured by a criminal offense charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in the Civil Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

• Power of Control over Prosecuting Officers — Under Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, as construed in Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47, the department secretary’s power of control includes the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It implies the right of the President, and naturally of his alter ego, to interfere in the exercise of discretion vested by law in national government officers and to act in lieu of such officers. The Court applied this to uphold the Minister of Justice’s directive reversing the Provincial Fiscal’s resolutions.
• Minister of Justice’s Authority under P.D. No. 911 — Where the fiscal’s resolution is reversed by the Minister of Justice, P.D. No. 911 authorizes the Minister, if he finds no prima facie case, to direct the investigating fiscal or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for dismissal of the case, or, if he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information based on the same sworn statement or evidence without another preliminary investigation. The Court relied on this proviso to sustain the directive to desist from filing and to dismiss the twin complaints.
• Remedy for Refusal or Failure to Prosecute — Article 35 of the Civil Code allows a person claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, when the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, to bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender, supported by a preponderance of evidence. The Court identified this as the complainant’s remedy instead of certiorari.
• Prosecutorial Duty to Weigh Evidence — A prosecutor must weigh the evidence carefully and deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing an information; anything less is a dereliction of duty. The Court cited Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA 214, in explaining why the Minister may protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or serious prosecution.

• "The power of control therein contemplated means (the power of the department head) to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." — This passage defines the scope of the department secretary’s power of control under Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and supplies the doctrinal basis for upholding the Minister of Justice’s reversal of the fiscal’s resolutions.
• "As he has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of Justice has the ultimate power to decide wich as between conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be believed." — This states the Court’s core rationale for denying the petition: the Minister may choose between the complainant’s and respondents’ conflicting theories in determining whether a prima facie case exists.
• "It is apparent from the facts above-stated that certiorari does not lie." — This is the Court’s direct holding on the remedy, rejecting petitioner’s attempt to review the Minister’s directive through certiorari.
• "Provided, Finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statement or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation." — This statutory proviso is the express source of the Minister’s authority to direct dismissal or non-filing after reversing the fiscal’s resolution.

• Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47 — Cited as authority defining the department secretary’s power of control under Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code; the Court used it to uphold the Minister’s power to reverse the fiscal’s acts.
• Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA 214 — Cited for the prosecutor’s duty to weigh evidence carefully before filing an information; the Court invoked it to support the Minister’s authority to prevent groundless prosecution.

• Section 79(c), Revised Administrative Code — Defines the extent of a department secretary’s power of control, including the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside a subordinate officer’s acts and substitute his judgment; applied to the Minister of Justice’s supervision and control over fiscals.
• Presidential Decree No. 911 — Its proviso authorizes the Minister of Justice, upon reversing the fiscal’s resolution, to direct dismissal or non-filing where no prima facie case exists, or filing where a prima facie case exists, based on the same sworn statement or evidence without another preliminary investigation; applied to validate the directive.
• Article 35, Civil Code — Provides that when a prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender, supported by a preponderance of evidence, with possible bond and suspension if an information is later presented; applied as the proper remedy in lieu of certiorari.

Justices Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Cuevas concurred. Justice Makasiar concurred in the result. Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Teehankee took no part.