Jacob vs. Court of Appeals

A marriage may be proven by competent evidence other than the marriage contract, provided the offeror establishes the due execution and subsequent loss or destruction of the original document; and the fact of adoption must be proven by the party claiming such relationship, failing which the alleged adoption is declared nonexistent.

Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob died intestate, leaving behind an estate that became the subject of settlement proceedings. Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be his surviving spouse and was appointed special administratrix of his estate by virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract. Respondent Pedro Pilapil claimed to be Dr. Jacob's legally adopted son and sole surviving heir, basing his claim on an Order dated July 18, 1961 purportedly issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, granting Dr. Jacob's petition for adoption. The Civil Code governed the case, as both the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The dispute centered on who, between petitioner and respondent, was the rightful heir of the deceased.

Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of the deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed special administratrix of his estate by virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract. Respondent Pedro Pilapil, for his part, claimed to be the legally adopted son of Dr. Jacob, presenting an Order dated July 18, 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, which purportedly granted Dr. Jacob's petition for adoption in favor of Pedro.

During the proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Jacob's estate, Pedro sought to intervene, claiming his share as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir, and questioned the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob. Tomasa opposed the motion for intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages, questioning Pedro's claim as legal heir. Two issues were raised before the trial court: whether the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob was valid, and whether Pedro was the legally adopted son of Dr. Jacob.

On the first issue, Tomasa claimed that the marriage was solemnized by Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana at CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not present the original marriage contract, stating that it was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to one Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented a reconstructed marriage contract issued in 1978. The trial court observed several irregularities in the reconstructed marriage contract: no copy was sent to the local civil registrar; Dr. Jacob placed only a thumbmark on the contract purportedly dated September 16, 1975, whereas he affixed his customary signature on a sworn affidavit executed the day before attesting that they had lived together as husband and wife for five years; Msgr. Yllana never mentioned in his affidavit that he gave the copies to Centenera for registration; and Centenera was admittedly in Australia on the date of the marriage, with one Benjamin Molina having signed over Centenera's typewritten name. Tomasa also admitted there was no record of the marriage in the book of records of San Agustin Church where it was allegedly solemnized.

On the second issue, Pedro presented the Order dated July 18, 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption. Tomasa questioned the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature. The deposition of Judge Moya was taken on October 1, 1990, at which time he was 79 years old and suffering from glaucoma. He testified that he could not remember having issued such an order and, when shown the signature over his name, positively declared that it was not his. Two handwriting experts were presented: NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who concluded that the questioned and standard signatures were not written by the same person, and former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio Pagui, who concluded that the signature was genuine. The trial court sustained Pagui's findings, declared the signature genuine, ruled for Pedro, and declared the reconstructed marriage contract spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.

• Validity of Marriage: Petitioner maintained that her marriage to Dr. Jacob was valid, arguing that the parties had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, as evidenced by a joint affidavit, thereby falling under the exception to the marriage license requirement under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: Petitioner argued that the due execution and subsequent loss of the marriage contract were sufficiently established by the testimonies of herself, Adela Pilapil (who was present during the ceremony), and Msgr. Yllana (the officiating priest), as well as by documentary evidence including photographs of the wedding, Msgr. Yllana's letter, the Archbishop's authorization for the marriage entry, and Msgr. Yllana's affidavit on the circumstances of the loss, and that these constituted the foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of the marriage's contents.
• Invalidity of Adoption Order: Petitioner questioned the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the purported adoption order, citing his deposition in which he categorically denied issuing the order and denied the signature as his own, supported by the findings of NBI Document Examiner Albacea, and by certifications from the Bureau of Records Management and the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon that no record of the adoption existed.

• Void Marriage: Respondent contended that the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.
• Spurious Reconstructed Marriage Contract: Respondent argued that the reconstructed marriage contract was fraudulently obtained and spurious, pointing to the irregularities observed by the trial court, the absence of an entry in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the NCSO, and the three-year delay in registration.
• Genuineness of Adoption Order: Respondent justified the trial court's reliance on his handwriting expert Atty. Pagui over the deposition of Judge Moya, arguing that the deposition was ambiguous because Judge Moya stated "I do not remember," and that the assessment of expert witness credibility rested in the discretion of the trial court.

• Validity of Marriage: Whether the marriage between petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid, notwithstanding the absence of the original marriage contract.
• Validity of Adoption: Whether respondent Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob, such that the purported adoption order bearing Judge Moya's signature is genuine and authentic.

• Validity of Marriage: Yes. The marriage was declared valid. The lower courts erred in excluding secondary evidence by confusing proof of due execution and loss — which is primary or collateral evidence — with secondary evidence of the document's contents. Marriage may be proven by competent evidence other than the marriage contract, and the presumption in favor of marriage was not rebutted.
• Validity of Adoption: No. The claimed adoption was declared nonexistent. Judge Moya himself categorically denied issuing the order and denied the signature as his own, supported by a disinterested handwriting expert whose competence was acknowledged even by respondent's own expert. No official records of the adoption existed, and respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving adoption.

• Validity of Marriage: The Civil Code governed, as the marriage and adoption occurred prior to the Family Code's effectivity. Under Article 76 of the Civil Code, no marriage license was necessary because the parties had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, as attested in a joint affidavit whose authenticity respondent did not question. The lower courts committed reversible error by excluding testimonial and documentary evidence that established the due execution and loss of the marriage contract — the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents. They confused evidence of due execution and loss with "secondary" evidence of the marriage itself. As clarified in Hernaez vs. McGrath, proofs of execution are not dependent on the existence of the document; they are necessarily collateral or primary evidence and precede proofs of contents. Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil (a witness to the ceremony) and petitioner (a party thereto); loss was shown by the testimony and affidavit of Msgr. Yllana and petitioner's own declaration. Even disregarding the reconstructed marriage contract, marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence, as held in Pugeda vs. Trias, Balogbog vs. CA, and Trinidad vs. CA. The failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar did not invalidate the marriage, and the duty to do so fell upon the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner. The presumption semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — that persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed married — was not rebutted, the fact of cohabitation being undisputed and even accepted by respondent.

• Validity of Adoption: Although factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight on appeal, the present case was an exception because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses, who rendered the decision; the Court thus examined the records and found that the lower courts failed to notice relevant facts justifying a different conclusion. Respondent's argument that Judge Moya's deposition was ambiguous was misleading, as it extracted the phrase "I do not remember" out of context. In the full deposition, Judge Moya was emphatic: he could not recall having issued the order and, when shown the signature, positively declared "Jose Moya is not my signature." His glaucoma did not discredit his statements, as he could still read with medication and even read a document shown to him during the deposition. Judge Moya's declaration was corroborated by NBI Document Examiner Albacea, a disinterested party whose services were uncompensated and whose competence was recognized by respondent's own expert, Atty. Pagui. Additional circumstances cast doubt on the adoption: Judge Moya testified he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases in open court; the questioned order did not contain the branch assignment he always included; Pedro's conduct gave no indication he recognized his own adoption; no proof showed Dr. Jacob treated Pedro as an adopted child; and both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon issued certifications that no record of the adoption existed. The burden of proof in establishing adoption rested on respondent, who failed to discharge it.

• Best Evidence Rule and Secondary Evidence — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original, except when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced without bad faith on the part of the offeror. Before secondary evidence of the contents may be introduced, the offeror must prove (1) the due execution of the document and (2) its subsequent loss or destruction without bad faith. The Court clarified that evidence of due execution and loss is necessarily collateral or primary evidence — not secondary evidence of the contents — and must not be confused with the latter. Due execution may be proven by the parties themselves, the swearing officer, witnesses who saw the signatures, or those to whom the parties narrated the execution. Loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of loss or who has made a sufficient examination where the document is usually kept.

• Presumption of Marriage (Semper Praesumitur Pro Matrimonio) — Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence to the contrary, to be in fact married. Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. The presumption is based on the principle that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In this case, the undisputed fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife triggered the presumption, which respondent failed to rebut.

• Proof of Marriage by Competent Evidence Other Than the Marriage Contract — Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage, including the testimony of one of the parties, a witness to the marriage, or the officiating priest or minister. The Court applied this doctrine to admit testimonial and documentary evidence of the marriage despite the absence of the original marriage contract.

• Five-Year Cohabitation Exception to Marriage License Requirement (Article 76, Civil Code) — No marriage license is necessary when a man and woman who have attained the age of majority, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The contracting parties must state these facts in an affidavit before a person authorized to administer oaths. The Court found this exception applicable because Dr. Jacob and petitioner executed such an affidavit, the authenticity of which was not questioned.

• Burden of Proof in Establishing Adoption — The burden of proof in establishing adoption rests upon the person claiming such relationship. Respondent Pedro Pilapil failed to discharge this burden, as the evidence showed the alleged adoption order was a sham: the issuing judge denied the signature, a disinterested expert corroborated the forgery, no official records existed, and neither Dr. Jacob nor Pedro acted in a manner consistent with an adoptive relationship.

• Exception to the Rule on Factual Findings of Trial Courts — While factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, the rule does not apply when the judge who rendered the decision was not the one who heard the testimonies of the witnesses. In such cases, the appellate court may examine the records and reverse if the lower court failed to notice relevant facts that would justify a different conclusion.

• "[T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents." — This passage, quoted from Hernaez vs. McGrath, articulates the critical distinction between evidence of a document's due execution and loss (which is primary or collateral) and secondary evidence of the document's contents, and was the ratio decidendi for admitting secondary evidence of the marriage.

• "Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage." — This is the canonical formulation of the presumption in favor of marriage, invoked by the Court to hold that the undisputed cohabitation of Dr. Jacob and petitioner gave rise to a presumption of valid marriage that respondent failed to rebut.

• "[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage." — Quoted from Balogbog vs. CA, this passage establishes that the absence of the marriage contract does not negate the fact of marriage, and that other competent evidence may suffice.

• "As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I can't make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature." — This excerpt from Judge Moya's deposition was the pivotal evidence upon which the Court declared the adoption order a sham, the judge having positively and categorically denied both issuing the order and the authenticity of the signature appearing thereon.

• Hernaez vs. McGrath, 91 Phil. 565 (1952) — Followed. The Court quoted this case to clarify the misconception between evidence of a document's execution (primary or collateral) and secondary evidence of its contents, establishing that proof of due execution and loss is the foundation for admitting secondary evidence.
• Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the proposition that marriage may be proven by other competent evidence, notwithstanding the lower courts' reliance on it to justify excluding secondary evidence.
• Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence, including the testimony of a party, a witness, or the officiating priest.
• Balogbog vs. CA, 269 SCRA 259 (1997) — Followed. Cited for the principle that failure to present a marriage contract is not proof that no marriage took place, and that other evidence may prove marriage.
• Trinidad vs. CA, 289 SCRA 188 (1998) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that where the marriage contract has been destroyed, testimonial evidence may be accepted in its place.
• Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975) — Followed. Cited for the presumption semper praesumitur pro matrimonio, drawing from Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
• De Vera vs. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1993) — Followed. Cited for the rule on proving due execution and loss as foundation for secondary evidence, and for the proposition that loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of loss or has made sufficient examination.
• De Guzman vs. CA, 260 SCRA 389 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the rule that when the original writing has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved by a copy, a recital in an authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses.
• Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703 (1997) — Followed. Cited for the exception allowing the Court to review factual findings when the lower court failed to notice relevant facts justifying a different conclusion.
• Lazatin vs. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 (1979) — Followed. Cited for the rule that the burden of proof in establishing adoption rests upon the person claiming such relationship.

• Article 76, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that no marriage license is necessary when a man and woman, being unmarried and of the age of majority, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry, provided they state these facts in an affidavit. The Court applied this provision to hold that the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner did not require a marriage license, as they had executed the requisite affidavit whose authenticity was not questioned.
• Article 6, Family Code — Provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties, witnesses, and the solemnizing officer. The Court of Appeals relied on this provision to require an authentic copy of the marriage contract as primary evidence, but the Supreme Court noted that the Civil Code, not the Family Code, governed the case.
• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides the best evidence rule: when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original, except when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced without bad faith. The Court applied this exception to allow secondary evidence of the marriage.
• Section 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that when the original document has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith, may prove its contents by a copy, a recital in an authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses. The Court held that petitioner had satisfied these requisites.
• Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court invoked this presumption, which respondent failed to rebut.
• Article 53, Civil Code — Cited for the proposition that failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.
• Article 68, Civil Code — Cited for the rule that the duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar falls upon the solemnizing officer, not the contracting parties.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.