Jackson vs. Macalino

A foreign embassy’s cancellation of an alien’s passport on the ground that it was tampered with constitutes sufficient ground for the alien’s arrest and summary deportation under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, and such detention, being under a final order of the Board of Commissioners, is not illegal for purposes of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is unavailable when the restraint is imposed under process issued by a court or quasi‑judicial body with jurisdiction, including the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration.

Petitioner Raymond Michael Jackson, an American national also known as Allen Miller and Steven Bernard Bator, was the subject of multiple search warrants issued by Philippine trial courts for violations of Article 176 (usurpation of authority or official functions) of the Revised Penal Code. During the execution of one warrant at Angeles City, Pampanga, law enforcement seized two U.S. passports from him. The U.S. Embassy later informed the Department of Justice that the passports had been altered by photo‑substitution and were consequently cancelled. In addition to the criminal cases, summary deportation proceedings were initiated before the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, culminating in a summary deportation order. While detained under a mission order enforcing that deportation order, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus.

• Criminal Cases and Search Warrants: In November 1997, applications for search warrants were filed against petitioner and a companion for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Search warrants were issued by RTCs of Angeles City and Makati City. The search at Hensonville Homes, Angeles City, yielded, among other items, two U.S. passports: No. Z4613110 in the name of Raymond Michael Jackson and No. 085238399 in the name of Steven Bernard Bator. Criminal Informations were subsequently filed against petitioner in several trial courts, including Quezon City and Makati City. Petitioner posted bail in some of these cases, and the Makati RTC issued a hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155.

• Cancellation of Passports and Deportation Proceedings: On December 10, 1997, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene advised the Department of Justice that the two U.S. passports had been tampered with and were cancelled. A day later, on December 11, 1997, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Bureau of Immigration issued an Order in SDO No. BOC 97-46 summarily deporting petitioner to his country of origin, directing the Chief of the Civil Security Unit to implement the order within three days, and including petitioner’s name in the blacklist. The BOC found that the cancelled passports meant petitioner had lost the privilege to remain in the Philippines, citing Schonemann v. Commissioner Santiago.

• Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration: On October 1, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the Bureau of Immigration, alleging that he was married to a Filipina, had two children, and had been converted to a permanent resident under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act. He attached a marriage contract and birth certificates. The BOC denied the motion on October 14, 1998, noting inconsistencies between petitioner’s sworn statement and the documents (e.g., date and place of marriage, number of children) and holding that the alleged marriage and permanent residence did not cure the cancellation of the passports. The December 11, 1997 deportation order was treated as final and executory. Despite this, petitioner filed a separate petition to lift the summary deportation order, which remained unresolved as of December 15, 1998.

• Arrest and Detention: On May 18, 1999, U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal issued a certification confirming that the photographs on the seized passports did not match those in the original passport applications and that the passports had been altered by photo‑substitution. Based on this certification, the existing hold departure order, and the summary deportation order, Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 on May 21, 1999 for petitioner’s arrest as an undesirable alien under Section 37(a)(9) of the Immigration Act. Petitioner was apprehended and turned over to the Bureau of Immigration detention center in Bicutan, Parañaque.

• Habeas Corpus Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court on June 28, 1999, which referred the case to the Pasay RTC for hearing. In their return, respondents asserted that petitioner was detained by virtue of the final deportation order and the hold departure order, and that the petition was premature because the petition to lift the deportation order was still pending. The RTC dismissed the petition for being premature and because the detention was lawful under a mission order issued by the Commissioner.

• Authority to Issue Warrant of Arrest: Petitioner contended that under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, only judges may issue warrants of arrest; the Commissioner of Immigration had no such authority, and therefore the mission order effecting his arrest was void.

• Absence of a Final Deportation Order: Even assuming the Commissioner could issue an arrest order, petitioner argued that such authority exists only to enforce a final deportation order. He claimed the BOC order of December 11, 1997 was illegal and null and void because he was not apprised of specific charges and not heard, and thus there was no final order to enforce.

• Violation of Due Process: Petitioner asserted that no probable cause existed for his arrest and that the respondents violated the Secretary of Justice’s Memorandum Circular dated June 7, 1999. He cited Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals to support the proposition that his detention was illegal.

• Statutory Authority to Arrest: Respondents countered that Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 expressly authorizes the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens upon a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation.

• Finality of the Deportation Order: The deportation order of December 11, 1997 was final and executory, having been issued after summary proceedings and the denial of petitioner’s own motion for reconsideration on October 14, 1998. The subsequent petition to lift the order did not affect its finality. The mission order of May 21, 1999 merely enforced that final order.

• No Denial of Due Process: Petitioner could not claim lack of due process when he himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the deportation order, participated in the proceedings, and even offered to post a bail bond for his provisional release, thereby recognizing the jurisdiction of the deportation authorities.

• Authority to Effect Arrest: Whether the Commissioner of Immigration may issue a warrant or mission order for the arrest of an alien pending deportation.

• Finality of the Deportation Order: Whether there was a final and executory order of deportation justifying petitioner’s detention at the time of the filing of the habeas corpus petition.

• Due Process: Whether petitioner was denied due process in the deportation proceedings.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Whether the writ of habeas corpus lies to release a person detained under a mission order enforcing a final deportation order issued by a quasi‑judicial body.

• Authority to Effect Arrest: The arrest and detention were in accord with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which explicitly empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to arrest aliens upon a finding by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation. The mission order was issued after the BOC had determined that the cancellation of petitioner’s passports constituted a valid ground under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(d). The petitioner’s constitutional challenge was therefore unfounded; the statute provided ample authority.

• Finality of the Deportation Order: The December 11, 1997 summary deportation order had long become final and executory. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on October 14, 1998, and the pendency of his subsequent petition to lift the order did not suspend its finality. The mission order of May 21, 1999 was an implementation of a valid and final deportation order, not a fresh determination of deportability. The detention was thus squarely based on an existing final order of a quasi‑judicial body.

• Due Process: The claim of denial of due process was belied by petitioner’s own actions. He filed a motion for reconsideration with the Bureau of Immigration on October 1, 1998, in which he did not deny being informed of the charges or challenge the fact of passport cancellation; instead, he asserted marriage and permanent residence as mitigating factors. By seeking affirmative relief from the BOC and even offering to post a bail bond, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the deportation authorities and waived any procedural objection. Moreover, the BOC order itself recited the ground—tampered and cancelled U.S. passports—which was based on official representations of the U.S. Embassy, and petitioner had the opportunity to contest that ground in his motion.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person is in custody under a process issued by a court or quasi‑judicial body that had jurisdiction to issue it. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if the detention is by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record (a term that includes the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration), the writ shall not be allowed. The return of the respondents, showing that petitioner was held under a mission order enforcing a final deportation order, constituted prima facie evidence of the legality of the restraint. Even assuming the initial arrest was irregular, supervening events—the final deportation order—made the detention lawful at the time of filing. The habeas corpus petition was therefore properly dismissed.

• Writ of Habeas Corpus Barred by Valid Process from Quasi‑Judicial Body — Under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is not available when the person detained is in custody under a process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record that had jurisdiction. The term “court” includes quasi‑judicial bodies such as the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. The return setting forth such process is prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint (Section 13, Rule 102). Where a final deportation order exists, the detention is not illegal, and habeas corpus does not lie.

• Cancellation of Passport by Foreign Embassy as Ground for Deportation — When a foreign embassy cancels the passport of its national on the ground that it has been tampered with, that cancellation constitutes sufficient justification for the alien’s arrest and deportation under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The alien thereby loses the privilege to remain in the Philippines. Official communications from the embassy attesting to the cancellation are competent evidence of the ground for deportation.

• Submission to Jurisdiction Through Motion for Reconsideration — By filing a motion for reconsideration of a summary deportation order and offering to post a bail bond for provisional release, an alien acknowledges being under the custody of the deportation authorities and voluntarily accepts their jurisdiction. Such conduct estops the alien from later claiming denial of due process or lack of authority over his person.

• Prima Facie Validity of the Return in Habeas Corpus — If the return shows that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return is prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. The burden then shifts to the petitioner to allege and prove new matter that invalidates the apparent effect of the process.

• “The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained.” — This passage frames the confined scope of habeas corpus, which was central to dismissing the petition because the detention was under a valid final order.

• “If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed…” — The Court relied on this rule to conclude that the Bureau of Immigration’s final order barred habeas relief.

• “The term ‘court’ includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.” — This explicit inclusion extended the bar against habeas corpus to deportation orders.

• “[T]he letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese government belie the petitioner’s submission that there was no evidence to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily, these documents constitute sufficient justification for his deportation.” (from Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, quoted with approval). This doctrine was applied to the U.S. Embassy certifications in the present case.

• Schonemann v. Commissioner Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, May 30, 1989 — Established the rule that if a foreign embassy cancels an alien’s passport or does not reissue a valid one, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Applied by the BOC as the basis for summary deportation.

• Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 356 SCRA 31 (2001) — Held that official letters from a foreign government attesting to the cancellation of passports on the ground of tampering constitute sufficient justification for deportation. Followed as controlling authority.

• Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, (landmark case) — Affirmed the principle that a government may properly request the return of its citizen, underscoring the legitimacy of deportation based on actions of the foreign state. Cited with approval.

• Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677 (1995) — Clarified that the purpose of habeas corpus is to test the legality of detention as of the filing of the application, and that supervening events (such as a valid process) may render an originally illegal detention lawful. Also established that offering to post bail constitutes submission to custody. Applied to reject the petition.

• Feria v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 525 (2000) — Held that the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner, and that when the return shows a prima facie valid cause of detention, the petitioner must allege and prove new matter to invalidate it. Applied in determining that petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

• Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 (2000) — Reiterated that quasi‑judicial bodies like the Deportation Board fall within the term “court” for purposes of the bar to habeas corpus under Section 4, Rule 102. Followed.

• Section 37(a), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 — Empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to arrest an alien upon a warrant after the Board of Commissioners determines the existence of a ground for deportation. Applied to validate the mission order issued on May 21, 1999.

• Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(d), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 — Makes deportable any alien who obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact, independent of any criminal action. Applied because petitioner’s tampered passports constituted such misrepresentation.

• Section 37(c), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 — Requires that no alien be deported without being informed of the specific grounds and without a hearing under prescribed rules of procedure. The Court found no violation because petitioner was informed of the passport cancellation and actively participated through his motion for reconsideration.

• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed if the person is in custody under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record that had jurisdiction. Applied to bar the writ because the deportation order of the Board of Commissioners was a valid order of a quasi‑judicial body.

• Section 13, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that a return showing detention under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law is prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. The return showing the mission order and deportation order was deemed prima facie valid.

• Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Extends the writ of habeas corpus to all cases of illegal confinement or detention except as otherwise expressly provided by law. The exception under Section 4 was held to apply.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria‑Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.