Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals

Public school teachers and other government employees have no right to strike; mass actions that result in work stoppages are strikes and may be administratively penalized notwithstanding the constitutional rights to assemble, petition, and organize, because the right to strike is qualified by the proviso “in accordance with law.” Backwages may be granted only to those illegally dismissed and reinstated or acquitted/exonerated; a finding of a lesser administrative offense does not amount to exoneration where the employee gave cause for suspension, except where the employee did not join the illegal mass action.

Petitioners are public school teachers in various schools in Metropolitan Manila and thus employees of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Their administrative liability arose from absences during mass actions staged from September 17 to 21, 1990. The 1987 Constitution guarantees government employees the right to self-organization and guarantees the people the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, while providing that the right to strike shall be exercised in accordance with law. Civil service law and rules, reinforced by Executive Order No. 180 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987, prohibit strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other mass actions that disrupt public service.

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between September 17 and 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. The grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially, such as the immediate release of P680 million Secondary Education Fund fringe benefits under Section 17 of Republic Act 6758, clothing allowance, DMB Circular 904, and an increase in minimum wage to P5,000 for teachers; they also raised national issues such as the removal of the U.S. bases and the repudiation of foreign debt. On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers and other DECS personnel, stating that strikes, unauthorized mass leaves, and other forms of mass actions by civil servants which disrupt public services are strictly prohibited, and ordering those engaged in such acts to return to work within 24 hours from their walkout, otherwise dismissal proceedings would be instituted against them.

The directive was ignored by petitioners. Consequently, on separate dates, Secretary Cariño issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without approved leave. These charges were based on their alleged unauthorized participation in the mass actions in September 1990, disregard of report-to-work directives, unjustified abandonment of teaching posts, unauthorized absences without leave, and other similar violations reported to the DECS Secretary by their respective school supervisors. An investigation committee was created by Secretary Cariño to look into the matter. During the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the charges against them. As a consequence, Secretary Cariño found them guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto and Adelina Agustin, who were meted only six months suspension.

The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which dismissed the appeals for lack of merit, and then to the Civil Service Commission, which set aside the MSPB orders in the contested resolutions. In separate resolutions, the Civil Service Commission found petitioners, except Merlinda Jacinto, guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six months suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of back salaries. In the case of Jacinto, the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the service without payment of back salaries. Acting on the motions for reconsideration, the CSC rendered resolutions denying the motions for lack of merit.

Petitioners initially questioned the CSC resolutions directly before the Supreme Court in petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 118252 to 118271. In accordance with Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, the Court referred them to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners absented themselves from their classes in furtherance of or in connection with the mass action for the purpose of pressuring the government to grant their demands. Citing the resolution of the Supreme Court in MPSTA vs. Laguio that the mass actions staged by the public school teachers from September 17 to September 19, 1990, were “to all intents and purposes a strike,” the Court of Appeals denied the petition, since the right to strike did not extend to civil service employees. In Jacinto's case, the Court of Appeals found no error on the part of the CSC in finding her guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Neither did it find petitioners entitled to backwages for the period of their preventive suspension, as they were “not exonerated of the charges against them.” Hence, this petition.

As to Jacinto, she sought exoneration based on a certification dated December 19, 1990 issued by her school principal that she met her class on September 20, 1990 but failed to sign in the attendance logbook. The CSC found the certification belatedly submitted only with her motion for reconsideration of the CSC resolution promulgated September 21, 1993, and rejected it as newly discovered evidence; it also noted that the certification contradicted her allegation that she filed an application for leave. In a sworn explanation submitted to Secretary Cariño, Jacinto claimed that she left the school premises on the day in question because she was emotionally and mentally depressed and went to see a physician. Before the CSC, however, she submitted the certification to the effect that she was not absent. The CSC found that the records were bereft of any showing that Jacinto asked permission from school authorities to go out of the school premises and seek medical attention outside, nor did she file an application for sick leave.

• Exercise of Constitutional Rights: Petitioners argued that their absences during certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances; they insisted that their gathering was not a strike and therefore their participation therein did not constitute any offense.
• Jacinto's Security of Tenure: Petitioner Jacinto maintained that the penalty against her had no basis and violated her right to security of tenure; she asked the Court to reexamine and give due weight to the certification issued by her school principal that she met her class on September 20, 1990 but failed to sign in the attendance logbook, and she invoked Section 15, Rule XVI of the Civil Service rules to argue that the filing of an application for vacation leave need not always be in advance of the effective date thereof.
• Backwages: Petitioners claimed backwages covering the period when they were illegally not allowed to teach, anchoring their claim on the supposed illegality of their preventive suspension upon the filing of the charges against them and of the immediate execution of the DECS Secretary's decisions ordering their dismissal.

• Right to Peaceful Assembly and Petition: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission that penalized petitioners, except Jacinto, whose only offense was allegedly the exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
• Security of Tenure / Basis for Jacinto's Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission that penalized Petitioner Jacinto for an alleged offense which has no basis, thereby violating her right to security of tenure.
• Backwages: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission that denied petitioners their right to backwages covering the period when they were illegally not allowed to teach.

• Right to Peaceful Assembly and Petition: No. The mass actions were strikes, and government employees have no right to strike; petitioners were penalized for unauthorized absences that disrupted public services, not for exercising assembly and petition rights.
• Security of Tenure / Basis for Jacinto's Penalty: No. The CSC's finding that Jacinto violated reasonable office rules and regulations was supported and affirmed by the Court of Appeals; the penalty of reprimand was proper.
• Backwages: No as to petitioners generally, because they were not exonerated and had given cause for suspension; yes as to Jacinto, who did not join the illegal mass action and was granted backwages from suspension until actual reinstatement, not exceeding five years.

• Right to Peaceful Assembly and Petition: The Constitution guarantees the rights to peaceful assembly, petition, and self-organization, but the right to strike is qualified by the phrase “in accordance with law,” which allows the State to regulate or deny that right to certain sectors. Executive Order No. 180 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 enjoin government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts, and other mass actions that result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Jurisprudence, including Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment and SSSEA vs. Court of Appeals, holds that government employment terms are fixed by law and that government workers may not resort to strikes, walkouts, and temporary work stoppages to pressure the Government. A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute, and a labor dispute includes controversies over terms and conditions of employment. Petitioners' mass action resulted in the non-holding of classes; their grievances concerned material benefits and national issues. Under Balingasan vs. Court of Appeals, the substance of the situation controls, so the absence of the word “strike” is insignificant. Petitioners, except Jacinto, were not penalized for assembly or petition but for unauthorized absences that caused non-holding of classes and deprivation of students' education. Had they exercised their rights during free time, they would not have been liable. The temporary stoppage disrupted public services, the evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition on strikes by government workers.
• Security of Tenure / Basis for Jacinto's Penalty: Findings of administrative agencies with expertise, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect and finality absent arbitrariness or want of rational basis. The Court found no sufficient reason to reverse the CSC. The certification dated December 19, 1990 was belatedly submitted only with Jacinto's motion for reconsideration of the CSC resolution promulgated September 21, 1993, and was correctly rejected as newly discovered evidence. It also contradicted her allegation that she filed an application for leave; if she was present on September 20, 1990, there would have been no need for a leave application. Her assertions were contradictory: in her sworn explanation to Secretary Cariño, she claimed she left because she was emotionally and mentally depressed and went to see a physician; before the CSC, she submitted a certification that she was not absent. Her invocation of Section 15, Rule XVI on vacation leave was inconsistent with her illness justification, which implicated Section 16 on sick leave. The records showed no permission to leave or application for sick leave. The CSC's conclusion that she violated reasonable office rules and regulations was sustained; the penalty for first offense is reprimand.
• Backwages: The charges against petitioners warranted preventive suspension under Section 51, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code, which allows preventive suspension for dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or reasons to believe the respondent is guilty of charges warranting removal. The DECS Secretary had legal authority to suspend them. The immediate execution of the Secretary's decisions imposing dismissal had legal basis in Section 47(2) of the Civil Service law, under which the department secretary's decision confirming removal is executory even pending appeal. Backwages are granted only to those illegally dismissed and reinstated or acquitted of the charge. A finding of liability for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration, as held in Balingasan and Yacia vs. City of Baguio. Petitioners had given cause for their suspension—unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their students—and although found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, they were not fully innocent. Jacinto, however, was found culpable only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for not asking permission to leave and not filing an application for sick leave; there was no proof she joined the mass actions. Under Balingasan, where Rodolfo Mariano was absent due to attending the wake and burial of his grandmother without approved leave but was exonerated of participation in the unlawful mass actions, denial of backwages would punish him after exoneration. Accordingly, Jacinto was granted back salaries because she did not join the illegal activity, from suspension until actual reinstatement, not exceeding five years.

• No right to strike for government employees — The Constitution guarantees government employees the right to organize, to assemble peaceably, and to petition for redress of grievances, but does not expressly grant them the right to strike; the right to strike is qualified by the proviso “in accordance with law,” allowing the State to regulate or deny it to certain sectors. Government employment terms are fixed by law, and government workers may not use strikes, walkouts, mass leaves, or work stoppages to pressure the Government. Applied: public school teachers' mass actions were strikes and their unauthorized absences were validly penalized.
• Substance over form in determining a strike — A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; the label used by participants is not controlling, and the substance of the situation governs. Applied: the mass actions were strikes even if not called such.
• Administrative findings accorded respect and finality — Findings of administrative agencies with specialized expertise, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are respected and may be considered final absent arbitrariness or want of rational basis. Applied: the Court declined to reexamine Jacinto's belated certification and sustained the CSC's finding of violation of reasonable office rules.
• Backwages require exoneration or illegal dismissal — Backwages may be granted only to those illegally dismissed and thereafter ordered reinstated, or to those acquitted of the charge against them. A finding of liability for a lesser administrative offense does not amount to exoneration where the employee gave cause for suspension. Applied: petitioners were denied backwages; Jacinto was granted backwages because she did not join the illegal mass action and was exonerated of the charge that caused dismissal.
• Preventive suspension and executory administrative decisions — Under Section 51, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code, preventive suspension is proper when the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or reasons to believe the respondent is guilty of charges warranting removal. Under Section 47(2) of the Civil Service law, a department secretary's decision confirming removal is executory even pending appeal. Applied: the DECS Secretary's preventive suspension and immediate execution of dismissal decisions were lawful.

• "Although the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done in accordance with law." — States the core holding that public school teachers and other government employees have no right to strike despite their constitutionally protected rights to organize, assemble, and petition.
• "Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time — recess, after classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court — could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights." — Distinguishes protected assembly and petition from the unauthorized absences that caused class stoppages and disrupted public service.
• "The rule is settled that backwages may be granted only to those who have been illegally dismissed and thenceforth ordered reinstated, or to those acquitted of the charge against them." — States the controlling backwages doctrine applied to deny relief to petitioners who were not exonerated.
• "Therefore, in line with Balingasan, we likewise grant back salaries to Petitioner Jacinto who did not join the illegal activity." — Articulates the exception for Jacinto, who was not involved in the unlawful mass actions and was granted backwages.

• MPSTA vs. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323, August 6, 1991 — Cited for the ruling that the mass actions staged by public school teachers from September 17 to 19, 1990 were “to all intents and purposes a strike,” supporting the denial of the petition.
• Balingasan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997 — Followed for the rule that substance controls over the label “strike,” that participants in unlawful mass actions are not completely exonerated, and that an employee not involved in the mass actions was entitled to backwages.
• Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1, August 3, 1983 — Cited to rationalize the proscription on public sector strikes because government employment terms are fixed by law and not subject to collective bargaining.
• Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, July 28, 1989 — Cited for the rule that government employees may petition Congress or negotiate with agencies but may not resort to strikes, walkouts, and temporary work stoppages.
• Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr., 170 SCRA 190, February 9, 1989 — Cited for the rule that pardon does not automatically restore public office or entitle the pardonee to backpay.
• Sabello vs. DECS, 180 SCRA 623, December 26, 1989 — Cited for reinstatement without backwages where the employee was lawfully separated from government service.
• City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785, February 27, 1990 — Cited for the rule that back salaries may be ordered only if the employee is exonerated and the suspension or dismissal is illegal.
• Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356, September 14, 1993 — Cited for the rule that acquittal based on innocence entitles the employee to backwages.
• Yacia vs. City of Baguio, 33 SCRA 419, May 29, 1990 — Cited for denying backwages despite reduction of penalty to a fine, because the employee was not exonerated.
• U.S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, February 7, 1907 — Cited as early jurisprudence upholding the right to assembly and petition.
• Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, November 9, 1983 — Cited for the clear and present danger test as the standard for limiting assembly and petition rights.
• Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189, June 5, 1973 — Cited for the primacy of human rights, including peaceful assembly and petition, over property rights.
• Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 203 SCRA 596, November 15, 1991 — Cited for recognizing the right of civil servants to organize, subject to allowable limitations.

• Article III, Section 4, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees freedom of speech, expression, press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The Court recognized the right but held petitioners were penalized for unauthorized absences, not for exercising it.
• Article III, Section 8, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people, including those in public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law. The Court recognized this right of government employees to organize.
• Article IX, Section 2(5), 1987 Constitution — Provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The Court acknowledged this right while distinguishing it from the right to strike.
• Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees workers' rights to self-organization, collective bargaining, negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. The Court held the right to strike is qualified and may be denied to government employees.
• Article 212(o), Labor Code — Defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The Court applied this definition to the teachers' mass actions.
• Executive Order No. 180 (June 1, 1987) — Provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize and states that Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. The Court cited it to support the prohibition on mass actions by government employees.
• CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 (April 21, 1987) — Enjoins all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The Court cited it as a basis for the prohibition.
• Section 51, Chapter 7, Administrative Code — Authorizes preventive suspension when the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or reasons to believe the respondent is guilty of charges warranting removal. The Court found the charges against petitioners warranted preventive suspension.
• Section 47(2), Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, E.O. 292) — Provides that the department secretary's decision confirming removal is executory even pending appeal. The Court used this to uphold the immediate execution of the DECS Secretary's dismissal decisions.
• Section 15, Rule XVI, Civil Service Rules — Requires applications for vacation leave of absence for one full day or more to be submitted on the prescribed form for action by the proper chief of agency in advance, whenever possible. Jacinto invoked this, but the Court found it inapplicable because her justification was illness.
• Section 16, Rule XVI, Civil Service Rules — Requires applications for sick leave for one full day or more to be on the prescribed form and filed immediately upon the employee's return, with notice of absence to the immediate supervisor or office head. The Court applied this to Jacinto, who failed to comply.
• Section 21, paragraph 4(c), Rules Implementing the Administrative Code — Provides that violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, on first offense, carries the penalty of reprimand. The Court upheld Jacinto's reprimand under this provision.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Allows a petition for review raising only questions of law. The Court treated the petition as filed under Rule 45 and the allegations of grave abuse of discretion as reversible errors.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides the remedy for lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court noted this but decided the petition under Rule 45 in the interest of substantial justice.
• Revised Administrative Circular 1-95 — Basis for the Supreme Court's referral of the initial petitions to the Court of Appeals. The Court cited it in the procedural history.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.