Jabon vs. Alo

A judgment that merely declares ownership of land does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident thereof, and a court may not amend its final and executory judgment to add an order of ejectment or delivery of possession not originally included in the dispositive portion.

Saturnino alias Catalino Ytem filed a civil action against Juan Jabon and three other persons in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, praying that he be declared owner of a parcel of land of approximately four hectares. Defendants, in turn, prayed that Juan Jabon be declared owner of the property and that plaintiff's claim for damages be denied. The dispute centered on competing claims of ownership over adjoining portions of land, with defendants occupying a portion adjudicated to the plaintiff and maintaining residential structures thereon.

Saturnino alias Catalino Ytem instituted a civil action against Juan Jabon and three other persons before the Court of First Instance of Bohol, seeking to be declared owner of a parcel of land containing approximately four hectares. Defendants countered with a prayer that Juan Jabon be declared owner of the property and that plaintiff's claim for damages be denied. After trial, Judge Jose Querubin rendered judgment on March 13, 1950, the dispositive portion of which declared Juan Jabon owner of a portion of land described in tax declaration No. 13439, having an extension of 2 hectares 07 ares and 36 centares, as indicated in the commissioner's report and sketch (Exhibits X and X-1) bounded by angles A, B, C, D, and back to A, while the rest of the portions covered by tax declarations Exhibits D, E, and F were adjudged to belong exclusively to the plaintiff. No order for the delivery of possession or ejectment of the defendants was included in the dispositive portion.

The decision became final for lack of appeal. On May 8, 1950, a writ of execution was issued ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of land adjudicated to the plaintiff. When defendants resisted execution, plaintiff moved to have them declared in contempt. Judge Jose Veluz, then presiding, denied the motion, ruling that the writ of execution was not in accordance with the dispositive part of the decision, as the judgment contained no directive for the defendants' ejectment.

On August 6, 1951, more than a year after the decision had become final, plaintiff moved that the dispositive portion be amended to include an order directing defendants to vacate the land and deliver possession to him. Despite vigorous opposition from defendants, respondent Judge Hipolito Alo entered an order on August 11, 1951, which in effect amended the final judgment by directing defendants to vacate and deliver possession of the land to plaintiff. It later developed that a portion of the land adjudicated to plaintiff was occupied by defendants, who had their houses built thereon, and because the original decision contained no directive for their ejectment, they had resisted execution.

• Excess of Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in amending a final and executory judgment more than a year after it had become final, by adding a relief — the order to vacate and deliver possession — that was not originally included in the dispositive portion of the decision.

• Amendment of Final Judgment: Whether a final and executory judgment declaring ownership of land may still be amended after the lapse of more than a year to include an order directing defendants to vacate and deliver possession of the land to plaintiff.
• Ownership and Possession: Whether a judgment that merely declares ownership necessarily includes possession as a necessary incident thereof.

• Amendment of Final Judgment: No. The respondent Judge's order dated August 11, 1951 was null and void, having been issued in excess of jurisdiction, because a court may not amend a final and executory judgment to add a relief not originally adjudged.
• Ownership and Possession: No. A judgment for ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident, because ownership is distinct from possession — a person may be declared owner but not entitled to possession, as possession may be in the hands of another who has rights that must be respected.

• Amendment of Final Judgment: Rule 39, Section 45 provides that only that which appears upon the face of the former judgment to have been adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto, is deemed to have been adjudged. The original decision of March 13, 1950 contained only a declaration of ownership in favor of the plaintiff over certain portions of the land; it awarded no other relief. Because more than a year had lapsed since the judgment became final, the trial court was without authority to amend the dispositive portion to add an order of ejectment and delivery of possession. The order of August 11, 1951, which in practical effect amended the final judgment, was therefore issued in excess of jurisdiction and was null and void. The Court relied on its prior ruling in Talens vs. Garcia, where it held that a judgment absolving a defendant — which in effect declared the validity of a sale and ownership of a lot — did not include an order for delivery of possession, because the actual possessor may have rights that must be respected or defined.

• Ownership and Possession: Ownership is different from possession. A person may be declared owner but may not be entitled to possession, as possession may be held by another as lessee or tenant. The possessor may have improvements on the land for which he is entitled to compensation and of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A mere declaration of ownership, in the absence of any other directive, cannot be construed as necessarily including an order of possession. The Court found the situation analogous to Talens vs. Garcia, where it observed that although an owner is generally entitled to possession, there may be cases where the actual possessor has rights which must be respected, such as a claim for necessary improvements, and an order of possession without prior hearing would deprive the possessor of the opportunity to claim and prove the value of such improvements.

• Distinction Between Ownership and Possession — Ownership and possession are distinct legal concepts; a judgment declaring ownership does not necessarily include an award of possession, because possession may be in the hands of another who has independent rights (e.g., as lessee, tenant, or builder in good faith) that must be respected and adjudicated in a separate proceeding. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the original judgment, which merely declared ownership, could not be construed as necessarily including an order for delivery of possession.

• Scope of Former Judgment (Rule 39, Section 45) — Only that which appears upon the face of a former judgment to have been adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto, is deemed to have been adjudged. The Court applied this rule to determine that because the original judgment contained only a declaration of ownership and no order for possession or ejectment, such relief was not deemed included in the former judgment and could not be supplied by amendment after the judgment had become final.

• Finality of Judgments — Limits on Amendment — A court may not amend its final and executory judgment, after the lapse of the period allowed by law, to add a relief not originally included in the dispositive portion. An order purporting to do so is null and void as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this principle to nullify respondent Judge's order of August 11, 1951.

• "We, therefore, hold that a judgment for ownership, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the doctrinal distinction between ownership and possession in the context of execution of judgments.

• "A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee of which tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession." — This passage articulates the rationale for distinguishing ownership from possession, enumerating circumstances where a possessor's rights survive a declaration of ownership in another.

• "Although it is true that the owner is generally entitled to possession, it is equally true that there may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected or defined. A lessee is not the owner; yet a declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily mean his ouster." — Quoted from Talens vs. Garcia, this passage was adopted by the Court to reinforce the principle that possession is not an automatic incident of a declaration of ownership.

• Talens vs. Garcia, 47 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 12), pp. 358, 360-361 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case as directly analogous: there, a judgment absolving a defendant (effectively declaring the validity of a sale and ownership of a lot) was held not to include an order for delivery of possession, because the actual possessor might have rights (such as claims for necessary improvements) that must be respected. The Court applied the same reasoning to hold that the judgment declaring ownership in favor of Ytem did not include an order of ejectment.

• Rule 39, Section 45, Rules of Court — Provides that "that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." The Court applied this provision to determine that because the original judgment contained only a declaration of ownership and no order for possession, the relief of ejectment was not deemed included in the former judgment and could not be supplied by amendment after finality.

• Paras, C.J. — Concurred.
• Bengzon, J. — Concurred.
• Montemayor, J. — Concurred.
• Labrador, J. — Concurred.
• Padilla, J. — Concurred separately, stating that he concurred for the same reasons given in his concurring opinion in Contreras et al. vs. Felix et al., 44 Off. Gaz. 4306, 4315.

• Tuason, J. — Justice Tuason dissented, arguing that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed. He maintained that a court may amend its judgment as truth and justice require to make it conform to what was actually decided or intended, and that this power is inherent and independent of statute. He contended that the omission of an order for delivery of possession was a mere clerical oversight, since the plaintiff's complaint had expressly prayed for possession and the defendants had defended solely on the basis of ownership without asserting any independent right to possession. He argued that possession was the immediate objective of the suit and was inseparably linked to title on the pleadings, and that requiring the plaintiff to file a new action would result in retrial of the same issues already finally adjudicated. He distinguished Talens vs. Garcia on the ground that in that case the party seeking execution was the defendant who had sought no affirmative relief for possession, whereas here the plaintiff had expressly prayed for possession in the complaint.