Ismael vs. People

The failure to remit GSIS contributions is a mala prohibita offense under RA No. 8291 that does not require criminal intent, but conviction under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, which cannot be presumed from mere nonfeasance. The non-inclusion of co-conspirators in an information does not violate the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and mere delay in proceedings does not automatically constitute a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the delay is attributable to the accused's own actions.

The Municipality of Lantawan in Basilan had been distressed with arrearages on unremitted GSIS premiums since 1997, with the outstanding balance inflating due to accumulated penalties. Tahira S. Ismael assumed office as Municipal Mayor in 2001, while Aida U. Ajijon served as Municipal Treasurer. The failure to remit GSIS contributions resulted in the suspension of the members' loan privileges, prompting Vice Mayor Felix B. Dalugdugan and other municipal officials and employees to lodge a complaint for malversation of public funds before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman subsequently charged the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, Rule III of the IRR of RA No. 8291.

Since 1997, the Municipality of Lantawan in Basilan was distressed with arrearages on unremitted GSIS premiums. When Ismael assumed office as Municipal Mayor in 2001, the outstanding balance inflated due to accumulated penalties. Collection letters corresponding to arrears from January 1999 to June 2001 and July 2001 to February 2003 were sent to the mayor's office, but the obligation remained unsettled. The failure of the municipality to remit its GSIS contributions resulted in the suspension of the members' loan privileges, prompting Vice Mayor Felix B. Dalugdugan, along with other municipality officials and employees, to lodge a complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioners before the Ombudsman on June 28, 2004.

The Ombudsman charged petitioners before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, Rule III of the IRR of RA No. 8291. Criminal Case No. 28278 alleged that petitioners, conspiring and confederating with each other, through evident bad faith, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused undue injury to the officials and employees of the Municipal Government of Lantawan by failing, refusing, withholding, and delaying the turnover and remittance of GSIS premiums and contributions in the aggregate amount of PHP 3,118,005.07, resulting in the suspension of their loan privileges. Criminal Case No. 28279 similarly alleged that petitioners failed, refused, withheld, and delayed the turnover or remittance of GSIS contributions in the same aggregate amount.

Petitioners argued that the Informations were insufficient because they alleged conspiracy but failed to implead the municipal accountant and budget officer, who were indispensable in consummating the offenses charged. They claimed they could not be expected to discharge their duties without the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds and remittance vouchers by these officers. Petitioners also argued that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated since the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August 2, 2017, particularly pointing to the length of time the Sandiganbayan took to resolve their Motion for Transfer of Markings and their formal offer of evidence.

On the merits, petitioners maintained that their failure to remit was due to factors beyond their control: the terrorism activities in the area which disparaged their municipality for years, the arrearages left by the previous administration which inflated due to penalties, and the limited resources of the municipality to meet its fiscal demands. They pointed out that the municipal accountant failed to issue remittance vouchers and the budget officer failed to issue a certificate of availability of funds, making it impossible for Ajijon to prepare and issue checks and for Ismael to approve disbursements. Petitioners also cited their efforts to settle the obligation, including Ismael calling a meeting in 2003, coordinating with the GSIS, and forging a Memorandum of Agreement in 2006 wherein the GSIS condoned 20% of the interest and the municipality agreed to pay PHP 2,000,000.00 as down payment.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners, finding that they acted with evident bad faith because they were in breach of their respective sworn duties. The court traced the proximate cause of non-remittance to Ismael's failure to exercise her power of general supervision and control, and to Ajijon's failure to advise the mayor about the unremitted contributions.

• Insufficiency of Informations: Petitioners argued that the Informations were invalid because they alleged conspiracy but failed to implead the municipal accountant and budget officer, who were indispensable in consummating the offenses charged. The failure to state their participation in the alleged conspiracy violated petitioners' constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.

• Violation of Right to Speedy Disposition: Petitioners argued that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated since the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August 2, 2017, citing in particular the length of time the Sandiganbayan took to resolve their Motion for Transfer of Markings and their formal offer of evidence.

• Lack of Criminal Intent: Petitioners maintained that their failure to remit was due to factors beyond their control, such as terrorism activities in the area, arrearages left by the previous administration which inflated due to penalties, and the limited resources of the municipality. They argued that these circumstances warrant their exemption from liability.

• Blame on Subordinate Officers: Petitioners argued that it was not possible for Ajijon to prepare and issue checks to pay the GSIS contributions, and there was no disbursement for Ismael to approve, since the municipal accountant failed to issue remittance vouchers and the budget officer failed to issue a certificate of availability of funds.

• Efforts to Settle Obligation: Petitioners cited their efforts to settle the municipality's obligation, including Ismael calling a meeting, instructing officers to reconcile records, coordinating with the GSIS in 2003, and forging a Memorandum of Agreement in 2006, as evidence of lack of criminal intent.

• Sufficiency of Informations: The prosecution maintained that the Informations sufficiently alleged the acts constituting the offense, and the non-inclusion of other conspirators did not violate petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

• Attribution of Delay to Petitioners: The prosecution showed that petitioners contributed to the delay in the proceedings by filing a Motion for Transfer of Markings instead of their formal offer of evidence, asking for additional time to comply with orders, and failing to present competent copies of their evidence.

• Liability Under RA No. 8291: The prosecution maintained that petitioners' failure to remit GSIS contributions constituted a violation of RA No. 8291, and their defenses of prior arrearages, terrorist activities, and blame-shifting did not constitute absolutory causes.

• Sufficiency of Informations: Whether petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them was violated by the non-inclusion of other alleged conspirators in the Informations.

• Speedy Disposition of Cases: Whether petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated by the delay in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

• Violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted petitioners of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

• Violation of RA No. 8291: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted petitioners of violation of Section 3.3.1, in relation to Section 17.2.3 of the IRR of RA No. 8291.

• Sufficiency of Informations: No. The non-inclusion of other conspirators in the indictment did not violate petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, as the Informations sufficiently alleged the acts constituting the offense specifically imputed against them.

• Speedy Disposition of Cases: No. The delay was mainly attributable to petitioners' own actions, and they failed to show that the delay caused significant prejudice to their cause, nor did they timely invoke their right.

• Violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019: No. Petitioners were acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, mere failure to discharge a statutory duty being insufficient for conviction under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

• Violation of RA No. 8291: Yes. Petitioners were liable under RA No. 8291 for non-remittance of GSIS contributions, as the offense is mala prohibita, and their defenses did not constitute absolutory causes. The penalties were modified: Ajijon under Section 52(d) in relation to Section 17.2.3 of the IRR, and Ismael under Section 52(g) in relation to Section 17.2.6 of the IRR.

• Sufficiency of Informations: The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not violated if the complaint or information sufficiently alleges the facts and circumstances constituting the offense. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires: (1) the accused's name; (2) the statute's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the approximate date of the offense's commission; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. The two Informations clearly and sufficiently stated that petitioners were being charged for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality's GSIS contributions. A conspiracy indictment need not aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed. In Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that "an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information." The discretion on who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment, and prosecuting officers enjoy the presumption that they regularly performed their duties.

• Speedy Disposition of Cases: The Court adopted the "balancing test" from Barker vs. Wingo through Martin vs. Ver, assessing the conduct of both prosecution and defense in light of four factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. In Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down definitive guidelines: the determination of whether delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through examination of the facts and circumstances. Here, the Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, and petitioners completed their presentation of evidence on July 3, 2008. However, instead of filing their formal offer of evidence, petitioners filed a Motion for Transfer of Markings on August 9, 2008, requesting that exhibits be formally marked since these documents were only provisionally marked during trial for being mere photocopies. More than five years elapsed before the Sandiganbayan acted on the motions, and in a Resolution dated June 13, 2014, Exhibits "7" and "11" were disallowed because the new copies submitted remained unverifiable. The proximal cause of the delay was petitioners' failure to present and submit competent copies of their evidence. Petitioners showed no remonstration and actively participated in the proceedings by complying with the delayed resolutions without raising any constitutional infraction, indicating their acquiescence to the delay. The delay did not result in any significant prejudice to petitioners, and the anxiety and embarrassment they experienced were not of such nature and degree that they became oppressive, unnecessary, and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge.

• Violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019: The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 are: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his or her action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners acted with evident bad faith solely because they failed to discharge their duty to remit contributions under RA No. 8291. However, sheer failure to discharge a statutory duty does not automatically serve as basis for conviction under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Bad faith is never presumed, especially in criminal cases where its existence is an element. Bad faith is not simple "bad judgment or negligence"; it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence; it must be characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences. No evidence supported the conclusion that evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence attended the failure to remit. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in equating petitioners' failure to discharge their duties under RA No. 8291 to evident bad faith. Violations of RA No. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption, which entails dishonest or fraudulent actions for acquisition of gains.

• Violation of RA No. 8291: Section 52(d) and (g) of RA No. 8291 penalize specific persons who fail, refuse, or delay the remittance of GSIS contributions. The provision punishes the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause to fully and timely remit the required contributions. These acts are recognized as mala prohibita, and as such, their commission as defined under the special law, not the character or its effect, determines whether the provision has been violated. Criminal intent or the intent to perpetrate the crime is not necessary when the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, but it must be shown that there was an intent to perpetrate the act or that the prohibited act was done freely and consciously. In People vs. Talaue, the Court noted that while intent to perpetrate the act may be more easily discernible in cases of refusal or delay, such intention is not readily apparent in cases of failure and must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Petitioners admittedly failed to fully and timely remit GSIS contributions. Their evidence merely disclosed reactive and belated efforts in performing their duty under the law, and proved no more than a string of blame-shifting. The existence of arrearages before their assumption of office cannot excuse them, as Ismael assumed mayorship in 2001 but only called a meeting in 2003. The terrorist activities in the area do not suffice since members' shares were consistently collected but not fully remitted, and no proper accounting was given. The claim that municipality funds were used for rehabilitation is unacceptable because Section 6(b) of RA No. 8291 categorically states that remittance by the employer of the contributions to the GSIS takes priority over and above the payment of any and all obligations, except salaries and wages of its employees. Petitioners cannot pass the buck to the municipal accountant and budget officer since the task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor and the treasurer as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the collection of premium contributions. The settlement through the MOA finds relevance only to the civil liability of the municipality and of the accused, as criminal liability can neither be mitigated nor extinguished by any arrangement that the GSIS may enter into with an employer.

• Evident Bad Faith under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 — Bad faith is never presumed, especially in criminal cases where its existence is an element. It is not simple "bad judgment or negligence" but contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. It is characterized as having a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will." The Court applied this doctrine in acquitting petitioners, holding that the Sandiganbayan erred in equating their failure to discharge their duties under RA No. 8291 to evident bad faith.

• Gross Inexcusable Negligence under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 — Gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. The imputed negligence must be "characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation wherein there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." In cases involving public officials, it takes place only when the breach of duty is flagrant and devious.

• Mala Prohibita under RA No. 8291 — The failure, refusal, or delay to fully and timely remit GSIS contributions are recognized as mala prohibita, and as such, their commission as defined under the special law, not the character or its effect, determines whether the provision has been violated. Criminal intent or the intent to perpetrate the crime is not necessary when the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, but it must be shown that there was an intent to perpetrate the act or that the prohibited act was done freely and consciously.

• Balancing Test for Speedy Disposition of Cases — Adopted from Barker vs. Wingo through Martin vs. Ver, the test compels an ad hoc approach where the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are assessed in light of four factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements is either a necessary or sufficient condition on their own as they are related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances.

• Guidelines from Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan — The determination of whether delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.

• Waiver of Right to Speedy Disposition — The rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial may be waived. If proven through established jurisprudential standards that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked. The actual intention to relinquish the right must be shown, but active participation in the proceedings by complying with delayed resolutions without raising any constitutional infraction indicates acquiescence to the delay.

• "Sheer failure to discharge a statutory duty does not automatically serve as basis for conviction under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. As an element of the offense, the prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt that the officer's act or omission is accompanied with the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence to justify the conviction." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the acquittal under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, establishing that mere nonfeasance is insufficient for conviction under the anti-graft law.

• "Bad faith is never presumed, especially in criminal cases which have its existence as an element. Despite apparent non-feasance, the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence and shall remain so until all the elements of the crime charged are proven beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage defines the standard for proving bad faith in criminal cases under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

• "The provision punishes the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause to fully and timely remit the required contributions. These acts are recognized as mala prohibita, and as such, their commission as defined under the special law, not the character or its effect, determines whether the provision has been violated." — This passage establishes the nature of the offense under RA No. 8291 as mala prohibita, which does not require criminal intent for conviction.

• "While the Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases, this constitutional right is not a magical invocation which can be cunningly used by the accused for his or her advantage. This right is not a last line of remedy when accused find themselves on the losing end of the proceedings." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, emphasizes that the right to speedy disposition cannot be invoked as an afterthought when the delay was attributable to the accused's own actions.

• Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 354 Phil. 463 (1998) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that "an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information."

• Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) — Cited as the landmark ruling from which the "balancing test" for determining violations of the right to speedy trial was adopted.

• Martin vs. Ver, 208 Phil. 658 (1983) — Cited as the case where the Court first adopted the "balancing test" in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and/or speedy disposition of cases has been violated.

• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, 837 Phil. 815 (2018) — Cited as the more recent case where the Court laid down definitive guidelines in resolving issues involving the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases.

• People vs. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021 — Cited as edifying authority on the distinction between failure, refusal, and delay in the context of non-remittance of GSIS contributions, and the determination of intent to perpetrate the prohibited act.

• Martel vs. People, G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2, 2021 — Cited for the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and the proposition that violations of RA No. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption, which entails dishonest or fraudulent actions for acquisition of gains.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020 — Cited for the proposition that the right to speedy disposition of cases is not a "magical invocation" that can be cunningly used by the accused for his or her advantage.

• Sistoza vs. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117 (2002) — Cited for the definition of gross inexcusable negligence as characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act willfully and intentionally with conscious indifference to consequences.

• Section 3(e), RA No. 3019 — The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provision penalizing public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove these elements beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 52(d) and (g), RA No. 8291 — The GSIS Act provisions penalizing the treasurer, finance officer, disbursing officer, budget officer, or other official or employee who fails, refuses, or delays the remittance of GSIS contributions by more than thirty (30) days from the time such amount becomes due and demandable. Section 52(d) applies to the treasurer and prescribes imprisonment from six months and one day to six years and a fine of PHP 3,000.00 to PHP 6,000.00; Section 52(g) applies to heads of offices and prescribes imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 20,000.00.

• Sections 17.2.3 and 17.2.6, IRR of RA No. 8291 — The implementing rules provisions corresponding to Sections 52(d) and (g) of RA No. 8291, respectively, prescribing the same penalties for failure to remit GSIS contributions.

• Section 6(b), RA No. 8291 — Provides that remittance by the employer of the contributions to the GSIS shall take priority over and above the payment of any and all obligations, except salaries and wages of its employees. The Court applied this provision in rejecting petitioners' defense that municipality funds were used for rehabilitation of areas devastated by terrorism.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The Court held that this right was not violated by the non-inclusion of other conspirators in the Informations.

• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees all persons the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The Court held that this right was not violated because the delay was mainly attributable to petitioners' own actions.

• Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — States that public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. The Court cited this provision in affirming the conviction under RA No. 8291.

• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides the necessary allegations to a criminal information: (1) the accused's name; (2) the statute's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the approximate date of the offense's commission; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. The Court applied this provision in finding the Informations sufficient.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.