Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.

A common carrier is not liable for injuries to a passenger when its driver, confronted with a sudden emergency caused by a third party's negligence, exercised the care that an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances, even if the best judgment was not exercised; and a passenger who protrudes a body part outside a moving vehicle's window is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, barring or reducing recovery.

A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol provinces, operating inter alia a bus line connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur. The dispute arose under the newly enacted Civil Code of the Philippines, which introduced in Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 a regime of extraordinary diligence and a presumption of fault for common carriers in case of death or injury to passengers—a substantial modification of prior law on the liability of carriers to passengers.

A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. operates a bus line connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur. On May 31, 1951, plaintiff Cesar Isaac boarded Bus No. 31 as a paying passenger in Ligao, Albay, bound for Pili, Camarines Sur. Before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction. As a result, Isaac's left arm was completely severed, and the severed portion fell inside the bus. Isaac was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he received blood transfusion. After four days he was transferred to a hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he underwent treatment for three months, and was later moved to the Orthopedic Hospital for surgery and a further two-month stay. He incurred expenses of ₱623.40, exclusive of medical fees paid by the defendant.

Isaac filed an action for damages against the carrier, alleging that the collision was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the bus driver and that the defendant incurred culpa contractual arising from its failure to transport him safely to his destination. He prayed for medical expenses of ₱5,000 and ₱3,000 for an artificial arm, ₱6,000 for loss of earnings, ₱75,000 for diminution of earning capacity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and ₱10,000 as attorney's fees and costs. The defendant set up the special defense that the injury was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the pick-up driver and to Isaac's own contributory negligence, and further claimed the accident was one it could not foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable.

After trial, the lower court found that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the pick-up driver and not that of the bus driver, the latter having done everything within his power to avoid the accident but being unable to do so. The court dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. The evidence showed that Bus No. 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at moderate speed because it had just stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay, while the pick-up car was at full speed and running outside its proper lane. The bus driver, upon seeing the oncoming vehicle, swerved to the extreme right of the road until the bus's front and rear wheels went over a pile of gravel on the rampart; he could not move farther right without endangering his passengers. Notwithstanding these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was struck by the pick-up. Isaac disputed this, contending the bus was traveling at high speed and that the driver should have stopped and waited for the pick-up to pass. The trial court, however, found the bus driver's conduct to be that of a prudent person under the circumstances.

A critical factual circumstance borne out by the evidence was that when Isaac boarded the bus, he seated himself on the left side, resting his left arm on the window sill with his left elbow protruding outside the window—a position he maintained at the time of collision. Isaac was the only passenger injured, and the Court found this posture to be the direct cause of the severance of his arm.

• Contractual Liability: Petitioner maintained that once the contract of carriage is established and there is proof that it was breached by the carrier's failure to transport the passenger safely to his destination, the carrier's liability attaches, citing several Philippine cases in support.
• Driver Negligence: Petitioner contended that the bus driver was negligent in squeezing the bus between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel, arguing that the driver should have stopped and waited for the oncoming vehicle to pass before proceeding, given that he saw the pick-up approaching at a distance allowing the exercise of moderate care and prudence.

• Requiring Negligence as Proximate Cause: Respondent countered that petitioner's formulation of the rule was incorrect, asserting that the cases cited by petitioner did not warrant the construction sought, as the carrier's liability in those cases was predicated on a finding that its negligence was the direct or proximate cause of the injury.
• Inevitable Accident: Respondent argued that if there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier and the accident is due to causes which are inevitable and could not have been avoided or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of extraordinary diligence, neither the carrier nor the driver is liable.

• Carrier Liability: Whether a common carrier is liable for injuries to a passenger under a contract of carriage when the accident was caused by the negligence of a third party and the carrier's driver exercised due care under a sudden emergency.
• Contributory Negligence: Whether the passenger was guilty of contributory negligence that bars or reduces recovery.

• Carrier Liability: No. The carrier is not liable where its driver, confronted with a sudden emergency not of his making, exercised the care that an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances. The sudden emergency doctrine excuses the driver's failure to exercise the best judgment possible.
• Contributory Negligence: Yes. The passenger was contributorily negligent in protruding his left elbow outside the window of the moving bus, which is negligence per se and the direct cause of his injury. While contributory negligence does not relieve the carrier of liability entirely, it entitles the carrier to a reduction of damages under Article 1762 of the Civil Code.

• Carrier Liability: The Court first restated the principles governing carrier liability under the new Civil Code: (1) the liability is contractual and arises upon breach of the obligation to exert extraordinary diligence; (2) the carrier must carry passengers with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; (3) the carrier is presumed at fault or negligent in case of passenger injury, with the burden on the carrier to prove extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel. The Court then examined the factual findings of the trial court, which it found supported by the evidence: the bus was traveling at moderate speed after stopping at a school zone, the pick-up was at full speed and outside its lane, and the bus driver swerved to the extreme right until the bus wheels went over a pile of gravel but could go no farther without endangering passengers. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the driver should have stopped, holding that the matter was one of credibility and evidence evaluation within the trial court's province. Applying the sudden emergency doctrine, the Court reasoned that a person suddenly placed in a predicament without sufficient time for deliberation cannot be expected to exercise the same coolness or accuracy of judgment required under ordinary circumstances. Because the driver did what a prudent person could have done under the emergency, the carrier was relieved of liability.

• Contributory Negligence: The Court found that Isaac seated himself on the left side of the bus with his left elbow protruding outside the window, and that this was the reason his arm was severed while no other passenger was injured. Citing authority that it is negligence per se for a passenger to protrude any part of the body through the window of a moving vehicle beyond the outer edge so as to come in contact with objects near the track, the Court held Isaac guilty of contributory negligence. The Court acknowledged that under Article 1762 of the new Civil Code, contributory negligence does not entirely relieve the carrier of liability but only reduces the damages; however, this circumstance further militated against the petitioner's position and reinforced the affirmance of the dismissal.

• Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers — Under Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers, carrying them as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. In case of death or injury to passengers, carriers are presumed to have been at fault or negligent, unless they prove they observed extraordinary diligence. The Court applied this framework but found that the carrier had discharged its duty, the bus driver having acted prudently under a sudden emergency.

• Sudden Emergency Doctrine — A carrier's employee confronted with a sudden emergency, obliged to act quickly without chance for deliberation, is held only to the degree of care that an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions. Failure to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill rendering the company liable. The Court applied this doctrine to excuse the bus driver's split-second decision to swerve rather than stop, holding it relieved the carrier of liability.

• Contributory Negligence in Protruding Body Parts from Vehicle Windows — It is negligence per se for a passenger voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other body part through the window of a moving vehicle beyond the outer edge, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the road. No recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained. The Court applied this rule to find Isaac contributorily negligent, as his protruding elbow was the direct cause of his arm's severance.

• Presumption of Fault Against Common Carriers — Under Article 1756, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of or injuries to passengers, unless they prove extraordinary diligence. The Court acknowledged this presumption but found that the carrier had rebutted it by showing the driver's prudent conduct under the emergency.

• "From the above legal provisions, we can make the following restatement of the principles governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel." — This passage provides the Court's canonical four-part restatement of common carrier liability under the new Civil Code, frequently cited in subsequent transportation law jurisprudence.

• "One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care and precaution as in the latter." — This articulates the rationale of the sudden emergency doctrine as applied to common carrier drivers, explaining why a lower standard of care is warranted when a driver must act instantaneously without opportunity for deliberation.

• "It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained." — This states the rule on passenger contributory negligence through bodily protrusion from vehicle windows, applied to bar or reduce the passenger's recovery.

• Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. — Cited by petitioner in support of the rule that recovery in a contract of carriage action requires only proof of the contract and its breach. The Court found these cases did not support petitioner's construction, as liability in those cases was predicated on the carrier's negligence as the proximate cause of injury.
• Castro vs. Arco Taxicab Co. — Similarly cited by petitioner for the contractual liability rule; treated by the Court as not supporting the proposition that breach alone, without negligence, suffices for recovery.
• Layda vs. Court of Appeals — Cited by petitioner alongside the above cases; the Court distinguished these as cases where carrier negligence was found to be the direct or proximate cause of injury.
• Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89 A. 337 — Cited as authority for the rule that a passenger who thrusts his hand beyond the side line of a moving car, resulting in injury from contact with a roadside object, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

• Article 1733, Civil Code of the Philippines — Requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods and for the safety of passengers according to all circumstances of each case. The Court relied on this provision as the foundational standard for carrier liability.
• Article 1755, Civil Code of the Philippines — Requires a common carrier to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. The Court applied this standard and found the bus driver's conduct satisfied it under the sudden emergency doctrine.
• Article 1756, Civil Code of the Philippines — Establishes the presumption that common carriers are at fault or negligent in case of death or injury to passengers, unless they prove extraordinary diligence. The Court acknowledged this presumption but found it rebutted by the evidence of the driver's prudent conduct.
• Article 1762, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that contributory negligence of the passenger does not entirely relieve the carrier of liability but only entitles the carrier to a reduction of damages. The Court cited this provision in connection with its finding of Isaac's contributory negligence.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concurred.