Intod vs. Court of Appeals

An act performed with criminal intent that is inherently impossible of accomplishment due to physical or factual circumstances beyond the actor's control constitutes an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, not an attempted felony.

Sulpicio Intod and his companions, acting on a contract to kill Bernardina Palangpangan due to a land dispute, went to her house at night. At the direction of a co-conspirator, they fired multiple gunshots into what they believed was her bedroom. Unbeknownst to them, Palangpangan was not in the house at the time, and the room was empty. No one was injured. The petitioner was charged with and convicted of attempted murder by the lower courts.

• Nature of the Action: Criminal prosecution for attempted murder.
• The Contract and Conspirators: Petitioner Sulpicio Intod, together with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig, were engaged by Aniceto Dumalagan to kill Bernardina Palangpangan due to a land dispute. They coerced Salvador Mandaya to accompany them by threatening his life.
• The Shooting Incident: On the evening of February 4, 1979, the group, all armed, proceeded to Palangpangan's house. Mandaya pointed out the location of her bedroom. The petitioner and his three companions then fired shots into that room.
• The Victim's Absence: Palangpangan was not in her bedroom at the time; she was in another city. The room was unoccupied, and no one was hit by the gunfire.
• Threats and Identification: Before leaving, the group shouted threats, specifically naming Palangpangan. They were positively identified by witnesses.

• Impossibility of the Crime: Petitioner argued that the crime was inherently impossible of accomplishment because the intended victim was not present in the targeted room. He contended that this factual circumstance brought the act within the purview of Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes impossible crimes, and that he should only be liable for such.

• Attempted Murder Established: Respondent People of the Philippines countered that all elements of attempted murder were present: the intent to kill was manifest, and the execution of the crime was commenced by firing at the bedroom. The crime was not consummated only due to a cause independent of the petitioner's will—the victim's accidental absence—which is the defining characteristic of an attempted felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, not an impossible crime.

• Proper Classification of the Offense: Whether the act of firing into a room where the intended victim was absent constitutes an attempted murder or an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Proper Classification of the Offense: The act constitutes an impossible crime. The victim's absence created a physical impossibility that prevented the accomplishment of the intended felony of murder. The phrase "inherent impossibility" in Article 4(2) encompasses such factual or physical impossibility. To classify the act as attempted murder would render the provision on impossible crimes nugatory, as any failure to consummate a crime due to external circumstances could be construed as an "accident" independent of the offender's will.

• Impossible Crime (Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code) — An impossible crime exists when an act would be an offense against persons or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the use of inadequate or ineffectual means. The impossibility may be physical or factual (e.g., the intended victim is not where the offender believed). This doctrine punishes the criminal tendency or formidability of the offender, even though the intended result could not occur. The Court applied this by finding that the victim's absence made the killing physically impossible, thus qualifying the act as an impossible crime rather than an attempt.

• "The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime."
• "To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act 'which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment...'"

• People vs. Lee Kong, 21 L.R.A. 626 (1898) — An American case with similar facts where the accused fired at a spot he believed the victim to be. The U.S. court convicted the accused of attempt. The Supreme Court distinguished this and other American cases, noting that U.S. law does not have a statutory provision for impossible crimes and treats impossibility only as a defense to an attempt charge, unlike Philippine law.
• U.S. vs. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (1973) — Cited to illustrate the American legal distinction between factual impossibility (not a defense) and legal impossibility (a defense). The Court used this to contrast with the Philippine legal framework, where inherent impossibility is itself a penalized act.

• Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal responsibility shall be incurred by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment. This was the central provision applied to classify the petitioner's act as an impossible crime.
• Article 59, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for impossible crimes: arresto mayor or a fine, at the discretion of the court. The Court sentenced the petitioner to six (6) months of arresto mayor pursuant to this article.

• Justice Florenz D. Regalado
• Justice Ricardo J. Francisco (Nocon, J., per the decision text, but records indicate Nocon)
• Note: Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was on leave.