Intod vs. Court of Appeals

When an offender performs all acts intended to cause a specific injury to a person but fails to produce the felony because the victim is physically absent (a fact unknown to the offender), the act constitutes an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, not attempted murder. The phrase "inherent impossibility" in Article 4(2) encompasses both legal and factual impossibility, and the absence of the victim constitutes a physical impossibility that renders the intended crime inherently impossible of accomplishment.

The case arose from a land dispute between Aniceto Dumalagan and Bernardina Palangpangan. Dumalagan harbored a grudge against Palangpangan and sought to have her killed. He enlisted Salvador Mandaya and the petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, along with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig, to carry out the killing, threatening Mandaya with death if he refused to cooperate. This background illustrates a premeditated conspiracy to commit murder, which set the stage for the legal question regarding the classification of the crime when the intended target was fortuitously absent.

• On the morning of February 4, 1979, petitioner Sulpicio Intod, along with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig, approached Salvador Mandaya and demanded he accompany them to Bernardina Palangpangan's house.
• The group met with Aniceto Dumalagan, who instructed them to kill Palangpangan due to a land dispute and threatened to kill Mandaya if he did not cooperate.
• At approximately 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the petitioner, Mandaya, and the three other men, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
• Mandaya pointed out the location of Palangpangan's bedroom at the instance of his companions.
• Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig fired their firearms at the designated room.
• Unknown to the accused, Palangpangan was in another city at the time; her house was occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was inside the targeted room, and consequently, no one was injured by the gunfire.
• Witnesses positively identified the petitioner and his companions, and testified that the group shouted threats upon leaving, stating they would return to kill Palangpangan.

• The petitioner contends that he should be held liable only for an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, not attempted murder.
• He argues that Bernardina Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night of the shooting constituted an "inherent impossibility" of accomplishing the intended crime of murder.
• He asserts that since the victim was objectively impossible to kill due to her physical absence, the acts performed could not legally amount to attempted murder, which requires that the failure to consummate the crime be due to an accident or cause other than the actor's own spontaneous desistance.

• The People of the Philippines argue that the facts constitute attempted murder, not an impossible crime.
• Respondent contends that there was clear intent to kill and that the crime was not consummated not due to inherent impossibility, but due to a supervening cause or accident independent of the petitioner's will—specifically, the fact that Palangpangan did not sleep at her house that night.
• Respondent maintains that had Palangpangan been present, the crime would have been possible, and therefore the impossibility was not inherent but factual and extraneous, falling under the definition of an attempted felony under Article 6 of the RPC.

• Procedural Issues:
  • N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder or an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
  • Whether "inherent impossibility" under Article 4(2) includes factual or physical impossibility (where extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor prevent the consummation of the intended crime), or is limited only to legal impossibility.

• Procedural:
  • N/A
• Substantive:
  • The crime committed is an impossible crime, not attempted murder. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner performed an act which would be an offense against persons (murder) were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment.
  • The Court distinguished between legal impossibility (where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime) and factual impossibility (where extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor prevent consummation).
  • The Court held that Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual and legal impossibility (ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos). The phrase "inherent impossibility" is broad enough to cover physical impossibility, such as the absence of the intended victim.
  • The Court rejected reliance on American jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Lee Kong, Strokes vs. State), which treats factual impossibility merely as a defense to a charge of attempt, because American law does not recognize impossible crimes as distinct offenses, whereas the Philippine RPC explicitly penalizes them.
  • The Court reasoned that if the absence of the victim were treated as an "accident" or extraneous cause under Article 6 (attempted felonies), the provision on impossible crimes in Article 4(2) would be rendered useless.
  • Applying Article 59 of the RPC, the Court sentenced the petitioner to six (6) months of arresto mayor, considering the social danger and degree of criminality shown.

• Impossible Crime (Article 4(2), RPC) — An act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. In this case, the Court clarified that "inherent impossibility" includes factual or physical impossibility (e.g., shooting at an empty room where the intended victim is absent), not merely legal impossibility.
• Distinction Between Attempted and Impossible Crimes — An attempted felony requires that the offender commence the commission of the felony by overt acts but fail to perform all acts of execution due to an accident or cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. An impossible crime occurs when the act, by its nature or due to physical circumstances unknown to the actor, cannot possibly produce the intended injury, punishing the criminal tendency itself as inspired by the Positivist School.
• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos — Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Applied here to assert that since Article 4(2) does not distinguish between factual and legal impossibility, courts must treat both as qualifying circumstances for an impossible crime.

• "The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies."
• "The phrase 'inherent impossibility' that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos."
• "The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime."
• "To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4..."

• People vs. Lee Kong — American case with similar facts (accused fired at a spot where he believed the victim was, but the victim was elsewhere). Cited by the respondent but distinguished by the Court because American law treats such acts as attempts, whereas Philippine law recognizes impossible crimes as a distinct offense.
• Strokes vs. State — American case where the accused was held liable for attempted murder because the victim did not pass by the location. Distinguished as it reflects the American view that factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt charge, contrary to the Philippine statutory scheme.
• U.S. vs. Berrigan — Cited to illustrate the concept of legal impossibility in American law (accused performed an act that was factually criminal but legally consented to by the warden, thus no crime existed), which the Court noted is a defense in the U.S. but falls under impossible crimes in the Philippines.
• U.S. vs. Wilson — Cited to show the American rule that factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of attempt.

• Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code — Defines criminal responsibility for acts constituting impossible crimes (inherent impossibility or inadequate/ineffectual means). This was the basis for the modified conviction.
• Article 59, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for impossible crimes (arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos). Applied by the Court to impose the sentence of six months of arresto mayor.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted and frustrated felonies. The Court distinguished this from Article 4(2), noting that treating the victim's absence as an "accident" under Article 6 would nullify Article 4(2).
• Article 3, Revised Penal Code — Definition of a felony (quoted in the context of the respondent's argument regarding desistance and independent causes).

• Feliciano, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ. — Concur in the result.

• N/A (Narvasa, C.J., was on leave).