Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC

A resignation, once accepted by the employer, may not be unilaterally withdrawn by the employee, and the employer's refusal to accept the withdrawal does not constitute illegal dismissal, the employer having the sole prerogative to determine whether to continue the employee's service.

Petitioners Intertrod Maritime, Inc. (as agent) and Troodos Shipping Company (as principal) are maritime shipping entities that employed private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz as Third Engineer under a shipboard employment contract approved by the National Seamen Board (now POEA) pursuant to Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, which requires POEA approval and verification of overseas employment contracts. The contract was governed by Philippine overseas employment regulations and contained specific provisions on termination, notice, and repatriation.

On May 10, 1982, Ernesto de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with Troodos Shipping Company as principal and Intertrod Maritime, Inc. as agent, to serve as Third Engineer on board M/T "BREEDEN" for a period of twelve months with a basic monthly salary of US$950.00. The contract was approved by the National Seamen Board. De la Cruz eventually boarded a sister vessel, M/T "AFAMIS," and proceeded to work as Third Engineer under the same terms and conditions of his employment contract.

On August 26, 1982, while the ship was at Port Pylos, Greece, de la Cruz requested relief due to "personal reason." According to de la Cruz, his request was made in order to take care of a Filipino crew member who had been hospitalized on August 25, 1982 in Athens, Greece. The Master approved the request but informed de la Cruz that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty days' notice pursuant to Clause 5 of the employment contract, so that a replacement could be arranged. Petitioners, for their part, maintained that the contract was cut short because of de la Cruz's own request for relief, making it proper that he should pay his repatriation expenses in accordance with the contract.

On August 30, 1982, while the vessel was at Port Said, Egypt — only four days after de la Cruz's request for relief — the Master signed him off and paid him in cash all amounts due, less US$780.00 for repatriation expenses, as evidenced by the wages account signed by de la Cruz. De la Cruz protested his disembarkation in Egypt, contending that because the Master had refused to let him immediately disembark in Greece, the reason for his request for relief had ceased to exist. He signified his intention to continue working, but the Master nevertheless required him to step out. De la Cruz claimed this constituted illegal dismissal and that he had no recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense.

Upon returning to the Philippines, de la Cruz filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board (now POEA) charging petitioners with breach of employment contract and violation of NSB rules and regulations. The POEA Administrator dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed, ordering petitioners to pay US$780.00 representing plane fare from Egypt to Manila and US$6,300.00 representing unearned salary for nine months, the unexpired portion of the contract. The NLRC reasoned that the Master's failure to allow disembarkation in Greece nullified the request for relief and its approval, such that de la Cruz's subsequent disembarkation in Egypt was no longer his doing but an illegal dismissal on the part of the Master.

• Contractual Validity: Petitioners argued that the employment contract, having been approved by the NSB, is the law between the contracting parties and contains nothing contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, or public order.
• Voluntary Resignation: Petitioners maintained that de la Cruz voluntarily requested relief for personal reasons, and under Clause 5 of the contract, he was required to give thirty days' notice and to shoulder his own repatriation expenses.
• No Waiver of Contractual Provisions: Petitioners contended that the Master's approval of the request for relief did not constitute a waiver of the contract provisions, as the Master explicitly informed de la Cruz that the thirty-day notice and repatriation expense requirements would be enforced.
• No Illegal Dismissal: Petitioners argued that de la Cruz's resignation, once accepted, could not be unilaterally withdrawn, and that their refusal to accept his withdrawal was their sole prerogative, not illegal dismissal.

• Cessation of Reason for Relief: Respondent argued that his request for relief was solely to care for a hospitalized Filipino crew member, and when the Master refused to let him disembark in Greece, the reason for the request ceased to exist.
• Illegal Dismissal: Respondent maintained that being forced to sign off in Egypt despite his protestations and his intention to continue working constituted illegal dismissal, leaving him no recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense.

• Illegal Dismissal: Whether private respondent's termination from employment was illegal.

• Illegal Dismissal: No. The termination was not illegal because de la Cruz voluntarily resigned, his resignation was accepted by the Master, and he could not unilaterally withdraw it; the employer's refusal to accept the withdrawal was its sole prerogative.

• Illegal Dismissal: The employment contract, approved by the NSB pursuant to Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, is the law between the contracting parties, and where nothing in it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, or public order, its validity must be sustained. Clause 5 of the contract required a seaman who decides to terminate his contract prior to expiration without due cause to give thirty days' notice and to agree to deduction of repatriation expenses from wages due. When de la Cruz requested relief for personal reasons and the Master approved, the Master explicitly required compliance with the thirty-day notice and repatriation expense provisions — the approval did not constitute a waiver of contractual terms. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of service. Once accepted, a resignation may not be withdrawn without the employer's consent. De la Cruz's resignation was already approved when the Master accepted it; his subsequent intention to continue working constituted an attempt to withdraw his resignation, which required the employer's approval. The employer's refusal to accept the withdrawal was its prerogative and did not constitute illegal dismissal, for the employer has the right to determine who its employees will be. Furthermore, Clause 4 of the contract gave the Master discretion to determine where a seaman requesting relief may be signed off, making de la Cruz's claim that his resignation was effective only in Greece erroneous. To sustain the NLRC's ruling would authorize undue oppression of the employer, as the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

• Validity of Approved Employment Contracts — A contract approved by the NSB (now POEA) is the law between the contracting parties; where nothing in it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, or public order, its validity must be sustained. The Court relied on this principle to enforce the contractual provisions on notice and repatriation expenses against de la Cruz.

• Irrevocability of Accepted Resignation — Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of service. Once accepted, a resignation may not be withdrawn without the employer's consent. If the employee changes his mind, he must seek approval of the withdrawal as if re-applying for the job. The employer has the sole prerogative to determine whether to continue the employee's service; refusal to accept the withdrawal does not constitute illegal dismissal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that de la Cruz could not unilaterally withdraw his resignation after the Master had accepted it.

• Employer's Prerogative to Hire — The employer has the right to determine who its employees will be. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. The Court invoked this principle to reject the NLRC's finding of illegal dismissal.

• "Resignations, once accepted and being the sole act of the employee, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the doctrine that an accepted resignation is irrevocable without employer consent, which disposed of the illegal dismissal claim.

• "To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them." — This articulates the employer's prerogative principle underlying the ruling, frequently cited in subsequent labor jurisprudence on resignation and dismissal.

• "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." — This states the balancing principle between labor protection and employer rights, invoked to justify reversal of the NLRC ruling as authorizing undue oppression of the employer.

• Consolidated Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Reparations Commission, G.R. No. L-23859, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 717 — Cited for the principle that an approved contract is the law between the parties, supporting enforcement of the employment contract's terms.

• Dosch vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 51182, July 5, 1983, 123 SCRA 296 — Cited for the definition of resignation as the voluntary act of an employee who believes personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of service.

• San Miguel Brewery Sales vs. Ople, G.R. No. 53615, Feb. 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 25 — Cited for the proposition that the notification requirement was devised to ensure no disruption of work and that business enterprises endeavor to increase profits.

• Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Phil. Airlines Employee Association, G.R. No. L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489 — Cited for the principle that the law protects labor rights without authorizing oppression or self-destruction of the employer.

• Article 21(c), Labor Code — Requires the POEA (formerly NSB) to approve and verify contracts for overseas employment. Applied to establish that the employment contract between the parties was valid and binding as the law between them.

• Clause 5, Employment Contract — Provides that if a seaman decides to terminate his contract prior to expiration without due cause, he must give the Master thirty days' notice and agree to deduction of repatriation expenses from wages due. Applied to determine de la Cruz's obligations upon requesting relief for personal reasons.

• Clause 4, Employment Contract — Provides that the service period is twelve months provided the vessel is in a convenient port for repatriation, otherwise at the Master's discretion, on the vessel's arrival at the first port where repatriation is practicable, provided continued service shall not exceed three months. Applied to establish the Master's authority to determine where de la Cruz could be signed off.

Melencio-Herrera, J., Paras, J., and Regalado, J., concurred. Sarmiento, J., was on leave.