International Rice Research Institute vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not a just cause for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime and the facts and circumstances surrounding its commission.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights, and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired Nestor B. Micosa as a laborer, who became bound by IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which state that an employee who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from service.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) hired Nestor B. Micosa as a laborer in 1977. Micosa became bound by IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which state that an employee who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from service.

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna. On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe, expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess.

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance. Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law. On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code."

On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual, wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide. On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his life." On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI. On April 22, 1990, J.K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude; and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him. On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee, who recommended to the Director General his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.

The facts on record show that at the time of the incident, Micosa was urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist into Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored; and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim, who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person.

• Just Cause for Dismissal: Petitioner argued that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which it claimed is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations.
• Employer Prerogative: Petitioner claimed that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual.
• Legitimate Self-Defense: Petitioner justified its action as a legitimate act of self-defense, claiming that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur, considering that it is an international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country.
• Moral Turpitude of Homicide: Petitioner argued that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself, not merely prohibited by law, and that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

• Lack of Just Cause: Respondent Micosa argued that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression.
• Probation Grant: Respondent noted that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him.

• Just Cause for Termination: Whether conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
• Moral Turpitude of Homicide: Whether a conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that IRRI had no right nor authority to prescribe any other cause/s for dismissal if the same is not among those enumerated in the Labor Code, and in holding that there is no basis to apply the Institute Personnel Manual in dismissing the complainant on the sole ground that his conviction of homicide constitutes moral turpitude.

• Just Cause for Termination: No. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of the justifiable causes enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and neither may said ground be justified under Article 282(c) nor under 282(d) by analogy.
• Moral Turpitude of Homicide: No. The precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted, considering that the said crime resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim and has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. There is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the NLRC in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed.

• Just Cause for Termination: Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer under Article 282(c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. The breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282(d) refers to an offense against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer. In this case, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

• Moral Turpitude of Homicide: Moral turpitude has been defined in Can vs. Galing, citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng vs. Republic, as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. The facts on record show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance, demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished, and even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special separation and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to the status of a regular core employee. The employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction. Furthermore, Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of probation, meaning that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation.

• Moral Turpitude — Defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The Court applied this definition to determine whether homicide involves moral turpitude, holding that it does not automatically, and that the determination depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case.

• Just Causes for Termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code — The enumeration of just causes for termination under Article 282 is exclusive. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not among the enumerated just causes, and cannot be justified under Article 282(c) (fraud or willful breach of trust) or 282(d) (commission of a crime against the employer or his family) by analogy, because analogous causes must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated, particularly a relation to the employee's work or to his employer.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. The Court applied this standard in reviewing the NLRC's resolution, finding no abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision.

• "Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine of moral turpitude, which is central to the Court's analysis of whether homicide involves moral turpitude.

• "This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime." — This passage articulates the Court's holding that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

• "Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances." — This passage establishes that the determination of moral turpitude is a question of fact that depends on the surrounding circumstances, not a blanket classification based on the crime alone.

• Can vs. Galing, G.R. No. 54258, SCRA 663 (1987) — Cited as the source of the definition of moral turpitude, along with In Re Basa and Tak Ng vs. Republic.
• In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275 — Cited in the definition of moral turpitude.
• Tak Ng vs. Republic, 106 Phil. 727 — Cited in the definition of moral turpitude.
• Quezon Electric Cooperative vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 79718-22, 172 SCRA 88 (1989) — Cited for the proposition that breach of trust under Article 282(c) must be related to the performance of the employee's function.
• Re: Victorio Lanuevo, Administrative Case No. 1162, 66 SCRA 245 (1975) — Cited for the proposition that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.
• Panaligan vs. Adolfo, G.R. No. L-24100, 67 SCRA 176 (1975) — Cited for the standard of grave abuse of discretion in certiorari proceedings.
• Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Lucero, G.R. No. L-32550, 125 SCRA 337 (1983) — Cited for the requirement that abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.

• Article 282, Labor Code — Enumerates the just causes for termination of employment by an employer. The Court held that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not among these justifiable causes, and cannot be justified under Article 282(c) or 282(d) by analogy.
• Section 8, Probation Law — Requires evaluation of the offender's character, antecedents, environment, as well as mental and physical condition. The Court noted that Micosa was found worthy of probation, indicating that there existed no undue risk that he would commit another crime during his period of probation.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concurred.