Interadent Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc. vs. Atty. Francisco-Simbillo

A lawyer may not be disbarred on the ground of moral turpitude unless he or she has been convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; the mere filing, pendency, or even dismissal of criminal charges involving moral turpitude is insufficient to warrant disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. was the former employer of respondent Atty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo, who had worked for the company for four years until her dismissal, which she claimed was illegal and which prompted her to file a labor case against the complainant. The complainant, in turn, filed criminal charges against the respondent—estafa and qualified theft before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City, and violation of Article 291 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. At the time the complainant notified the Office of the Bar Confidant, the respondent had just passed the 2011 Bar Examinations and was in the process of admission to the Philippine Bar.

Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. employed respondent Atty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo for four years. Her employment ended upon what she characterized as illegal dismissal, prompting her to institute a labor case against the complainant. The complainant thereafter filed criminal charges against the respondent: estafa and qualified theft before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-12-INV-11-J-03189), and violation of Article 291 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-03-INV-11-J-08553). The complainant asserted that the charges for estafa and qualified theft involved moral turpitude.

On March 12, 2012, the complainant's counsel sent a letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) informing it of the pending criminal cases. The timing was critical: the results of the 2011 Bar Examinations had just been released, and the respondent was among those who had passed. The OBC formally notified the respondent of the letter and required her to file a comment within fifteen days from notice. She was informed that she could participate in the mass oath-taking for new lawyers but would not be allowed to enroll her name in the Roll of Attorneys until the charges were resolved. The OBC advised her of an alternative: she could sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that the complainant's letter would be automatically converted into a disbarment complaint. The respondent chose the latter course and signed the Roll of Attorneys on May 3, 2012.

In her comment, the respondent denied the charges and asserted that the criminal complaints were intended to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to pressure her into abandoning her labor case. She stated that at the time of filing her comment, the criminal complaints were still pending determination of probable cause before the respective Offices of the City Prosecutor. On June 8, 2012, she filed a manifestation reporting that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had already dismissed the charge docketed as XV-12-INV-11-J-03189. The complainant countered that it had timely appealed that dismissal to the Department of Justice (DOJ), arguing the criminal case should still be considered pending.

On February 18, 2015, the respondent filed a motion seeking resolution of the disbarment case, alleging that the DOJ had denied the complainant's appeal regarding XV-12-INV-11-J-03189, and that as to XV-03-INV-11-J-08553, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had filed an information in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City, but Branch 33 had eventually dismissed the information upon the Prosecution's own motion for withdrawal with leave of court. Thus, all criminal cases that formed the sole basis of the disbarment complaint had been dismissed.

• Moral Turpitude Ground: The complainant argued that the criminal charges for estafa and qualified theft against the respondent involved moral turpitude and warranted her disbarment, pointing to the existence and pendency of such charges as sufficient basis.
• Continued Pendency: The complainant contended that even after the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City dismissed the charge for estafa and qualified theft, the criminal case should still be considered pending because it had timely appealed the dismissal to the DOJ.

• Harassment Motive: The respondent maintained that the criminal charges were intended to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force her to desist from pursuing the labor case she had filed against the complainant for illegal dismissal.
• Dismissal of Charges: The respondent asserted that the criminal complaints had been dismissed—the Parañaque City Prosecutor dismissed XV-12-INV-11-J-03189, the DOJ denied the complainant's appeal thereon, and the MeTC Quezon City Branch 33 dismissed the information for XV-03-INV-11-J-08553 upon the Prosecution's own motion for withdrawal.

• Ground for Disbarment: Whether the disbarment complaint against the respondent may prosper based on the filing or pendency of criminal charges involving moral turpitude, absent any conviction by final judgment.

• Ground for Disbarment: No. The disbarment complaint was dismissed, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly requiring conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for disbarment—not merely the filing or pendency of charges.

• Ground for Disbarment: The administrative case began as a complaint to prevent the respondent's admission to the Bar under Section 2, Rule 138, which requires that an applicant for admission show that no charges for crimes involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. However, the case was converted into a disbarment proceeding when the respondent signed the Roll of Attorneys. Under Section 27, Rule 138, a lawyer may be disbarred on several enumerated grounds, including "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." The language of the provision is express: it requires that the lawyer "must have been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude." The complainant did not allege or prove that the respondent had been convicted by final judgment of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude. On the contrary, all criminal cases that were the sole bases for the complaint had been dismissed after due proceedings. Although the complainant could have availed itself of remedies to review or reverse the dismissals, the Court found it proper to terminate the case, because the mere existence or pendency of criminal charges for crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment or suspension of an attorney.

• Conviction by Final Judgment as Requisite for Disbarment on Moral Turpitude Ground — Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by reason of his or her conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The provision expressly requires that the lawyer must have been found guilty by final judgment of the crime involving moral turpitude. The mere filing, pendency, or dismissal of criminal charges involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine by dismissing the disbarment complaint because the respondent had not been convicted by final judgment—indeed, all criminal cases against her had been dismissed.

• "A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorney's alleged moral turpitude cannot prosper after the criminal cases charging him with offenses involving moral turpitude were dismissed by the competent trial courts." — This opening statement of the resolution encapsulates the controlling principle: dismissal of the underlying criminal charges forecloses a disbarment proceeding predicated on moral turpitude.

• "[I]n order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral turpitude against him or her, because Section 27 of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, clarifying the statutory requirement of final conviction as distinguished from mere pendency of charges.

• Nuñez vs. Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 361-362 — Cited as supporting authority for the principle that the mere existence or pendency of criminal charges for crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment or suspension of an attorney.

• Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Requires that any applicant for admission to the Bar must show that no charges against him or her for crimes involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. This provision governed the initial stage of the case, when the complaint sought to prevent the respondent's admission to the Bar.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys, including "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." The Court applied this provision to require that the respondent must have been found guilty by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; the mere filing or pendency of charges being insufficient.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concurred.