Infante vs. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental

A conditional pardon that does not state the time for observance of its conditions is strictly construed most favorably to the grantee and its conditions are limited to the period of the original sentence, unless a contrary intention to extend beyond that period is manifest from the nature of the condition or its language.

Antonio Infante was a convicted prisoner under the custody of the Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental after executive clemency in the form of a conditional pardon. Philippine law provided parallel mechanisms for breach of such pardon — presidential authority under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to order arrest and recommitment to serve the unexpired sentence, and punishment for evasion or violation under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Antonio Infante was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, which he commenced serving on June 21, 1927. After serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days, he was granted conditional pardon and released on March 6, 1939, the condition being that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The unserved portion of the sentence thus remitted was 1 year and 11 days. During confinement his conduct had been described as excellent, meriting classification as trustee or penal colonist.

On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a jeep without license and sentenced to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Thereafter, on July 13, 1950, by virtue of authority conferred upon the President by Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Executive Secretary ordered Infante rearrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the pardon condition. Infante filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental challenging the recommitment.

The trial court sustained the petition on the grounds that Section 64 (i) had been abrogated and that the 1-year-and-11-day penalty, corresponding to prision correccional, had prescribed after ten years under Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Abrogation of Recommitment Authority: Petitioner maintained that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the order for re-incarceration rested, had been abrogated and could no longer support arrest and recommitment for breach of the conditional pardon.
• Prescription of Remitted Penalty: Petitioner argued that the remitted penalty of 1 year and 11 days had prescribed, more than ten years having elapsed, extinguishing criminal responsibility arising from violation of the conditional pardon.

• Preservation of Presidential Authority: Whether Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code authorizing recommitment for violation of a conditional pardon remained in force alongside Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Prescription of Penalty: Whether the unserved 1 year and 11 days of sentence had prescribed by lapse of more than ten years after the pardon.
• Duration of Pardon Condition: Whether the condition not to violate penal laws remained operative when Infante committed the Motor Vehicle Law violation years after the original sentence period would have expired.

• Preservation of Presidential Authority: Yes. Section 64 (i) was preserved, not repealed by the Revised Penal Code, and could stand together with Article 159, proceedings under one not necessarily precluding action under the other.
• Prescription of Penalty: No. Prescription did not run because evasion of service of sentence, required by Article 93 to commence prescription, was absent and computation could not begin before the rearrest order.
• Duration of Pardon Condition: No. The condition was no longer operative at the time of the 1949 violation, the pardon being silent on duration and strictly construed to last only during the original sentence period.

• Preservation of Presidential Authority: The Revised Penal Code's repealing clause in Article 367 expressly repealed Sections 102, 2670, 2671 and 2672 of the Administrative Code but not Section 64 (i). Section 9 of Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, subsequent to the Code, expressly preserved presidential authority under Section 64 (i). Legislative intent to retain the power to authorize arrest and reincarceration for violation of pardon conditions, notwithstanding Article 159, was therefore clear, following Sales vs. Director of Prisons.
• Prescription of Penalty: Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, prescription of penalties commences only from evasion of service of sentence, making evasion an essential element. No such evasion occurred, Infante having lived at liberty under pardon rather than evading service. Even if prescription were applicable on an evasion theory, its basis would be evasion of the unserved sentence and computation could not have started earlier than the rearrest order.
• Duration of Pardon Condition: Limitations on a pardon, an act of grace, are strictly construed and, where susceptible of more than one interpretation, resolved most favorably to the grantee, particularly as prisoners are generally unfamiliar with legal implications of conditions subsequent. Adopting Huff vs. Dyer, duration of conditions subsequent was limited to the prisoner's sentence absent manifest intention to extend beyond, from the nature of the condition or its language. The pardon stated no period for observance. To hold the threat of recommitment hanging for life in exchange for remission of a small fraction for a slight misdemeanor would convert mercy into oppression, repugnant to reason and the spirit of penal laws, which even grants immunity after hiding to an escaped convict.

• Strict Construction of Conditional Pardon — Limitations upon the operation of pardon, an act of grace, are strictly construed; where susceptible of more than one interpretation, the pardon is construed most favorably to the grantee. Applied to confine a condition silent on duration, considering the benevolent nature of pardon and grantees' unfamiliarity with legal intricacies.
• Duration of Conditions Subsequent in Pardon — The duration of conditions subsequent annexed to a pardon is limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend beyond that time is manifest from the nature of the condition or the language imposing it. Applied to hold the condition not to violate penal laws inoperative when the later traffic offense occurred after the sentence period.
• Coexistence of Recommitment Power and Punishment for Violation — Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing violation of conditional pardon as an offense and presidential power under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize recommitment to serve the unexpired portion can stand together, neither proceeding necessarily precluding the other. Reaffirmed from Sales vs. Director of Prisons to reject abrogation.
• Prescription of Penalties Requires Evasion — Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of penalties runs from evasion of service of sentence, evasion being essential. Applied to reject prescription where the pardonee remained at liberty under pardon and was not an evader, with computation in any event not predating the rearrest order.

• "Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee." — States the interpretive rule governing ambiguous pardon conditions and anchors the limitation of duration to the sentence period.
• "We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. . . ." — Restates the Sales vs. Director of Prisons doctrine rejecting abrogation and allowing parallel remedies for breach.
• "According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence." — Defines the trigger for prescription and defeats the claim that mere lapse of time after pardon extinguished the remitted portion.
• "Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same, instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression and injustice." — Expresses the policy against lifelong threat of recommitment for a minor post-sentence misdemeanor in exchange for a small remission.

• Sales vs. Director of Prisons, 48 Off. Gaz., 560 — Controlling precedent followed to hold Section 64 (i) unrepealed, expressly preserved by Act No. 4103, and compatible with Article 159.
• Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595 — Persuasive authority adopted for the rule limiting duration of conditions subsequent to the sentence period absent manifest contrary intent, resulting in discharge on habeas corpus.

• Section 64 (i), Revised Administrative Code — Vests the President with authority to authorize arrest and recommitment of a conditional-pardon violator to serve the unexpired sentence; held preserved and applicable as basis for the Executive Secretary's order, though unavailing here due to inoperative condition.
• Article 159, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes violation of conditional pardon as a distinct offense; held capable of standing together with Section 64 (i), with neither remedy necessarily precluding the other.
• Article 367, Revised Penal Code — Repealing clause expressly repealing specified Administrative Code sections but not Section 64 (i); relied upon to negate abrogation.
• Section 9, Act No. 4103, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Expressly preserves presidential authority under Section 64 (i); relied upon as subsequent legislative confirmation of intent to retain recommitment power.
• Articles 92 and 93, Revised Penal Code — Govern prescription periods and commencement upon evasion of service; Articles 92 invoked below for ten-year prescription of prision correccional, rejected under Article 93 for absence of evasion.

Pablo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Paras, C.J., with Feria, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concurred in the result, with Paras noting reference to his dissent in Sales vs. Director of Prisons and the view that Section 64 (i) and Article 159 cannot stand and be enforced together because their custodial consequences differ and joint enforcement would twice penalize a single violation.

• Montemayor, J. (concurring and dissenting, joined by Bengzon and Padilla, JJ.) — Agreed that Section 64 (i) remains in force and that the penalty had not prescribed for lack of evasion, but dissented from limiting the pardon condition to the sentence period. Maintained that weight of authority and this Court's rulings in People vs. Sanares and Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons keep conditions operative for life when no limit is stated; that the condition was a valid, non-illegal, non-immoral contractual undertaking voluntarily accepted; and that extending escape-based prescription by strict construction was judicial legislation without parity between a hunted escapee and a pardonee living in comfort.