In the Matter of the Changes of Name of Gertrudes Josefina del Prado vs. Republic of the Philippines

A petition for change of name filed on behalf of a minor illegitimate child may be granted where the change is clearly for the best interest of the child, and the stigma of illegitimacy borne by the surname of the illegitimate father constitutes a "proper and reasonable cause" under Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The rule in Article 367 of the Civil Code that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father does not prohibit such child from taking another surname with the father's consent and for justifiable reasons, and the change does not affect the child's existing family relations, legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship.

Gertrudes Josefina del Prado is the illegitimate child of Corazon Adolfo and Manuel del Prado, born out of a bigamous marriage subsequently annulled, and thereafter lived with her mother and her mother's new husband, Engineer Romeo C. Calderon, who supported her. The governing procedural framework is Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes a change of name upon a showing of "proper and reasonable cause," while Article 367 of the Civil Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father. The case called upon the Court to reconcile the statutory preference for the father's surname with the remedial rule permitting a judicial change of name, in the specific setting of a minor whose existing surname carried the stigma of illegitimacy.

Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on March 17, 1956, the illegitimate child of Corazon Adolfo and Manuel del Prado, whose marriage was bigamous. Manuel del Prado was convicted of bigamy on December 5, 1956, and the marriage was annulled on July 18, 1957. On December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo married Engineer Romeo C. Calderon, and the child thereafter lived with her mother and her foster father, who was the one supporting her.

On July 23, 1959, the child, through her mother and natural guardian, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." The petition alleged that the petitioner was an illegitimate child born out of the bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which she carried was a stigma of illegitimacy by reason of which she had become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname would constitute a handicap in her life in later years and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that she was living with her mother, now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it was her desire to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon," the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother. The order for the hearing of the petition was duly published.

On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition upon the ground that the change of surname was unwarranted, considering that the petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such had the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the law should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado, and that the change of surname would be prejudicial to the rights and interests she had by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao annulling her mother's marriage to Manuel del Prado, and would likewise be prejudicial to her rights as conferred upon her by law. Counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal filed a supplemental opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the supplemental opposition.

After hearing, the trial court found that the petitioner was born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo as a result of their bigamous marriage, which was annulled on July 18, 1957, after Manuel del Prado's conviction for bigamy on December 5, 1956; that on December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo married Romeo C. Calderon; that the petitioner was living with her mother and her foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon declared in open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his surname, especially because he was the one supporting her. The trial court considered the reasons adduced by the petitioner valid and conducive to the best interests of the minor, "who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate child," and granted the petition.

• Stigma of Illegitimacy: The petition alleged that the surname "Del Prado" carried by the petitioner was a stigma of illegitimacy by reason of which she had become the subject of unfair comments, and that it would constitute a handicap in her life in later years and a cause of constant irritation in her social relations with other people.
• Best Interest of the Minor: The petitioner maintained, through her mother and natural guardian, that the change of surname was for her best interest, the mother having considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity to promote the personality and enhance the dignity of her daughter by eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy.
• Consent and Support of the Foster Father: The petition alleged that the petitioner was living with her mother, who was then married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon, and that it was her desire to bear the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother, who had declared in open court his consent to her adopting his surname and who was supporting her.

• Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause: The Solicitor General contended that the lower court erred in finding as a proper and reasonable ground for the change of surname the reason that the petitioner's present surname carried the stigma of illegitimacy.
• Concealment of Illegitimacy: The Solicitor General averred that the evident purpose of the petitioner in seeking a change of her surname was to conceal her status as an illegitimate child, that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be motivated by good faith and an honest purpose, and that to authorize the change would be to sanction a misrepresentation by making the petitioner appear as if she were the daughter of Romeo C. Calderon.
• Article 367 of the Civil Code: The Solicitor General contended that the status of the petitioner was that of a natural child by legal fiction and that under Article 367 of the Civil Code she shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, so that the lower court erred in declaring that although the law is specific that the petitioner shall principally use the surname of the father, it does not follow that she is prohibited from using other surnames when justified.
• Prejudice to the Petitioner's Rights: The Solicitor General expressed the apprehension that because the petitioner was of tender age and could not as yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of her name, she might be prejudiced in her rights under the law.

• Proper and Reasonable Cause: Whether the lower court's order granting the petition for change of name was based upon "proper and reasonable cause" as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
• Article 367 of the Civil Code: Whether Article 367 of the Civil Code, providing that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, prohibits the petitioner from taking another surname with the father's consent and for justifiable reasons.
• Effect on Status and Rights: Whether the change of the petitioner's surname would prejudice her rights and status under the law.

• Proper and Reasonable Cause: Yes. The stigma of illegitimacy borne by the surname of the illegitimate father, together with the foster father's consent and support, constitutes proper and reasonable cause under Section 5 of Rule 103, the change being clearly for the best interest of the minor.
• Article 367 of the Civil Code: No. The rule that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father does not prohibit such child from taking another surname with the father's consent and for justifiable reasons.
• Effect on Status and Rights: No. A change of name under Rule 103 does not by itself define or affect a change in one's existing family relations or the rights and duties flowing therefrom, nor alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship.

• Proper and Reasonable Cause: The controlling standard under Section 5 of Rule 103 is "proper and reasonable cause," and a petition to change the name of an infant should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. The record showed that the mother, in filing the petition, had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child, considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon was the one supporting the child and was agreeable to the child's using his surname; the mother had considered her husband's generous attitude as an opportunity to promote the personality and enhance the dignity of her daughter by eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy that the child would continue to bear if her surname remained that of her illegitimate father. The Court rejected the Solicitor General's position that the evident purpose of the change was to conceal illegitimacy and therefore could not be motivated by good faith and an honest purpose, holding that the idea that a person must bear the stigma of illegitimacy for life should not be countenanced, since justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing so long as in doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name under Rule 103 is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests, and the facts and circumstances borne out by the record amply justified the change ordered by the lower court. Whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, and the court a quo exercised that discretion in a judicious way.
• Article 367 of the Civil Code: The Court agreed with the lower court that while the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law from taking another surname with the latter's consent and for justifiable reasons. If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings upon a showing of a "proper and reasonable cause," there is no reason why a natural child cannot do the same.
• Effect on Status and Rights: The Solicitor General's apprehension that the petitioner, being of tender age, might be prejudiced in her rights under the law was dispelled by the Court's pronouncement in the Joselito Yu case that a change of name authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define or affect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom, nor create new family rights and duties where none before existed; it does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him or in speaking of or dealing with him. This pronouncement was reinforced by the express caveat in the order appealed from that the order "shall not operate to deprive the petitioner of her status, rights and obligations as recognized by law."

• Change of Name — "Proper and Reasonable Cause" — Under Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name may be granted only upon a showing of "proper and reasonable cause." The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. In this case, the Court held that the stigma of illegitimacy attaching to the surname of an illegitimate father, coupled with the consent and support of the mother's husband who was willing to lend his surname, constituted proper and reasonable cause.
• Best Interest of the Child as the Standard for Minors — A petition to change the name of an infant should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court found this standard satisfied because the mother sought the change to promote the personality and enhance the dignity of her daughter by eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy, and because the child's foster father supported her and consented to her use of his surname.
• No Duty to Bear the Stigma of Illegitimacy — Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. The Court refused to countenance the proposition that a person born illegitimate must bear the stigma of illegitimacy for as long as he lives, and rejected the argument that a change of surname to conceal illegitimacy is necessarily in bad faith.
• Discretion of the Court in Change-of-Name Petitions — Whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court. The Court found that the court a quo exercised its discretion in a judicious way in granting the petition.
• Effect of a Change of Name — A change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
• Article 367, Civil Code, Does Not Bar a Change of Surname — The rule that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father does not prohibit such child from taking another surname with the latter's consent and for justifiable reasons. If a legitimate child may secure a change of name through judicial proceedings upon a showing of proper and reasonable cause, a natural child may do the same.

• "A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child." — This states the controlling standard governing petitions for change of name filed on behalf of minors, and supplies the test against which the trial court's exercise of discretion was measured.
• "Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people." — This is the ratio decidendi rejecting the Solicitor General's argument that a change of surname to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy is necessarily motivated by bad faith or amounts to a prohibited concealment.
• "... But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596)." — Quoted from the Court's pronouncement in the Joselito Yu case, this passage defines the legal effects of a change of name and disposes of the apprehension that the minor petitioner would be prejudiced in her rights.
• "The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests." — This articulates the rationale behind Rule 103 and supports the holding that the change of the minor's surname served a legitimate, legally cognizable purpose.

• In Re Petition for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966 — Quoted with approval, through Mr. Justice Makalintal, for the rule that a change of name under Rule 103 does not affect one's existing family relations, rights and duties, legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship, and alters only the name; cited to dispel the Solicitor General's apprehension that the minor petitioner would be prejudiced in her rights.
• Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965 — Cited as authority for the rule that whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court.

• Section 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court — Requires "proper and reasonable cause" for the grant of a petition for change of name. The Court held that this requirement was satisfied by the stigma of illegitimacy borne by the petitioner's surname, together with the consent and support of her mother's husband, the change being clearly for the best interest of the minor.
• Article 367, Civil Code — Provides that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father. The Court held that this provision does not prohibit such child from taking another surname with the father's consent and for justifiable reasons, and that a natural child, like a legitimate child, may secure a change of name upon a showing of proper and reasonable cause.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concurred.