In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822

A lawyer may be disbarred for making unfounded imputations of bribery against a member of the Court and for knowingly using confidential and internal court records obtained through unexplained means, in violation of Canons 8, 10, and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Administrative liability for submitting a falsified document does not require proof of criminal falsification beyond reasonable doubt; the ethical question is whether the lawyer was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty about the genuineness of his submissions.

Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña was a lawyer and litigant in consolidated petitions involving Urban Bank, Inc. and related parties, docketed as G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818, and 145822. Those petitions were handled by the Supreme Court’s First Division, and the Court’s internal processes—including its Agenda, minutes, and internal resolutions—were governed by strict confidentiality rules. The present administrative case, A.C. No. 6332, was initiated by the Court’s resolution directing the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate Peña’s submission of an allegedly falsified internal document in support of a motion to inhibit. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court supplied the ethical and procedural standards against which his conduct was measured.

Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña was a lawyer and respondent in consolidated petitions involving Urban Bank, Inc., its directors and officers, and the De Leon Group, docketed as G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818, and 145822. Those petitions questioned Court of Appeals rulings affirming the grant of execution pending appeal. Justice Antonio T. Carpio was the ponente of the consolidated petitions in the First Division, while Atty. Manuel R. Singson was counsel for Urban Bank.

On January 30, 2003, Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion against Justice Carpio. He alleged that on November 19, 2002, Atty. Singson called him and bragged about securing an order from the Court suspending the redemption period and consolidation of ownership over Urban Bank properties sold during execution sale. Peña claimed that when he teased Singson about bribing the ponente, Singson did not deny it and instead explained that they had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties. Peña also alleged that he received anonymous mail containing two copies of the First Division Agenda for November 13, 2002, marked as Annexes “B” and “C,” and an internal Resolution dated September 4, 2002, marked as Annex “D.” According to Peña, the Agenda showed that Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification was merely noted, while the questioned November 13, 2002 Resolution granted it; he therefore called the Resolution falsified and imputed bribery and special interest to Justice Carpio. He attached these documents to his motion.

On March 3, 2003, the Court held an Executive Session. The members of the First Division informed Peña that the handwritten notations on Annex “B” did not belong to any of them. Justice Carpio stated that his recommended action on Item No. 175(f) was “a & f, see RES,” meaning that a separate resolution would govern the matter. The Court explained that each Justice has his own copy of the Agenda with personal notations, but the official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions. Peña insisted that Annex “B” was authentic, said he was 100% certain, and manifested willingness to accept the consequences if it turned out to be forged. He claimed the documents came by ordinary mail to his residence in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, during the second or third week of January 2003, but he failed to produce the envelopes and had no logbook or record of receipt. Atty. Singson admitted faxing the November 13, 2002 Resolution to Peña but denied bragging about bribery or exerting extraordinary efforts. Peña admitted that his bribery remark was a joke. The Court required Peña to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action.

Peña submitted his Compliance on April 3, 2003, apologizing for any distress his statements caused but maintaining that the documents were authentic and that he had a duty to bring them to the Court’s attention. He claimed his motion was based primarily on Atty. Singson’s statements, with the Agenda copies merely corroborative. On April 28, 2003, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to conduct a formal investigation of Peña for submitting falsified document Annex “B.” During the Office of the Bar Confidant proceedings, Peña and Singson submitted their respective affidavits. The De Leon Group filed additional contempt charges, alleging malicious imputations by Peña. Peña denied using abrasive language and argued that his statements were privileged; he also accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of forum shopping by filing three separate petitions.

The Office of the Bar Confidant conducted hearings and submitted its Report and Recommendation. It found that Peña’s language in the Motion to Inhibit was not malicious but an expression of concern based on documents he had obtained; that he did not make a direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio; and that his remark about the Mercedes Benz was made in a private telephone conversation. It recommended dismissal of the charges with a warning or admonition, dismissal of the falsification charge because criminal proof beyond reasonable doubt was not established, dismissal of the contempt charge, and re-docketing of the forum shopping counter-charge as a separate administrative case. The Court rejected the recommendations on the first two charges.

The Court also noted Peña’s continued access to confidential documents. In his February 20, 2010 Motion to Vacate/Recall, he attached a photocopy of the still-unreleased and confidential Office of the Bar Confidant Report. Earlier, in 2001, he had attached 58 pages of confidential Minutes of the Court to a pleading. He had also attached the internal Resolution dated September 4, 2002, which transferred the consolidated petitions from the Third Division to the First Division. The Court found his explanation that these documents arrived anonymously by ordinary mail, and that the envelopes were lost, incredible. It also found his apologies insincere because he persisted in imputing ill motives to Justice Carpio and repeatedly sought the inhibition or re-raffle of eleven Justices.

• No Malicious Imputation: Respondent Peña argued that his statements in the Motion to Inhibit were not malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based on documents he had discovered and on his own discoveries.
• Bribery Remark as Joke: Respondent maintained that his remark about bribery and Justice Carpio’s new Mercedes Benz was a joke made in a private telephone conversation between lawyers, not in the presence of the court or in public.
• No Administrative Falsification: Respondent argued that he could not be held administratively liable for falsification because falsification is a criminal act under the Revised Penal Code requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, which was not established; the administrative proceedings should await the outcome of a criminal case.
• Authenticity of Documents: Respondent claimed he had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the documents he received anonymously, and that he had a duty to bring leaked confidential documents to the Court’s attention.
• Privileged Statements: Respondent denied using abrasive, insulting, or intemperate language in his pleadings and argued that his statements were privileged and could not be used as a basis for liability.
• Forum Shopping Counter-Charge: Respondent accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by dividing themselves into separate groups and filing three separate petitions against the same Court of Appeals decision with the same causes of action and prayers.

• Gratuitous Imputations: Whether respondent Peña made gratuitous allegations and imputations against members of the Court.
• Falsified Internal Documents: Whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly “falsified documents” consisting of internal documents of the court.
• Contempt Charges: Whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges leveled against him in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group.
• Forum Shopping: Whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of forum shopping.

• Gratuitous Imputations: Yes. Peña is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and wrongdoing against a member of the Court, in violation of Canons 8, 10, and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Falsified Internal Documents: Yes. He is administratively liable for submitting a falsified internal court document and for knowingly using confidential and internal court records obtained through unexplained means; administrative liability does not require proof of criminal falsification beyond reasonable doubt.
• Contempt Charges: Not resolved. The Court declined to rule squarely on the third charge because the disbarment already imposed made any additional administrative liability a mere superfluity.
• Forum Shopping: Dismissed without prejudice. The counter-charge of forum shopping is beyond the scope of the present administrative case; prudence and equity require separate proceedings where all parties may be heard.

• Gratuitous Imputations: The Court rejected the Office of the Bar Confidant’s recommendation to dismiss this charge. Lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain respect due to courts and judicial officers, abstain from offensive or menacing language, and refrain from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record. Peña insinuated that Justice Carpio had been bribed in exchange for the November 13, 2002 Resolution. His defense that the accusation was a “joke” failed because he himself brought the private remark into his public Motion to Inhibit and persisted in the accusation in subsequent pleadings and an ethics complaint. The Court explained that the handwritten notations on the Agenda were personal to each Justice; the official action of the First Division was contained in the approved minutes and resolutions. Justice Carpio’s recommendation was “a & f, see RES,” and the First Division approved the recommended resolution granting Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification. A mere adverse ruling does not justify imputations of bias or bribery absent verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Peña’s apologies were insincere, and his pattern of attacking members of the Court—having sought the inhibition or re-raffle of eleven Justices—warranted indefinite suspension for this charge, and ultimately disbarment when considered with the second charge.
• Falsified Internal Documents: The Court likewise rejected the Office of the Bar Confidant’s recommendation to dismiss this charge. Peña submitted Annex “B,” which he claimed with absolute certainty was a copy of the ponente’s Agenda. The original of that document did not exist in the records of any member of the First Division. The administrative issue was not whether Annex “B” was criminally falsified, but whether Peña was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty about its genuineness and authenticity. Lawyers owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court; they must not mislead or allow the Court to be misled. Peña failed to explain satisfactorily how he obtained internal and confidential court documents. His story that the documents arrived anonymously by ordinary mail, and that the envelopes were lost, was incredible. The Agenda, minutes, and internal resolutions are confidential and accessible only to court officers bound by strict confidentiality. Peña later attached the still-unreleased Office of the Bar Confidant Report to his February 20, 2010 Motion to Vacate/Recall, and earlier attached 58 pages of confidential Minutes of the Court. Even if the documents were sent to him, his ethical recourse was to disclose the matter to the Court for investigation, not to use them as proof to further his case. His actions merited disbarment.
• Contempt Charges: The Court found Peña’s allegations of collusion between previous members of the Court and counsel for the De Leon Group unfounded and contrary to his ethical duties to the Court and fellow lawyers. However, because disbarment had already been imposed, the Court no longer found the need to rule squarely on the third charge; any possible administrative liability on that matter would be a mere superfluity.
• Forum Shopping: The counter-charge of forum shopping was made by Peña in his defense and was beyond the scope of the present administrative case. Other interested parties did not participate in the Office of the Bar Confidant investigation. Prudence and equity dictated that judgment be reserved until the subject was fully ventilated and all parties were given an opportunity to argue. The charges were dismissed without prejudice to the filing or hearing of separate administrative complaints against Urban Bank, its directors and officers, and their counsel. Petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr. were excluded due to death, and Ben Y. Lim, Jr. was mistakenly impleaded.

• Duty of Respect to Courts and Judicial Officers — Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers, abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior, and refrain from attributing to a judge motives unsupported by the record or immaterial to the case. The Court applied this to Peña’s unfounded bribery insinuations against Justice Carpio.
• Candor and Truthfulness — Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 require lawyers to owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court and to commit no falsehood, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The Court applied this to Peña’s submission of Annex “B,” which he claimed with absolute certainty to be a genuine copy of the ponente’s Agenda even though no such copy existed in the records.
• Administrative Liability for Falsified Documents Does Not Require Criminal Proof — Administrative proceedings for submitting a falsified document are confined to whether the lawyer transgressed ethical standards of truthfulness; they do not determine criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court used this to reject the Office of the Bar Confidant’s recommendation to dismiss the falsification charge.
• Confidentiality of Internal Court Records — The Agenda, minutes, internal resolutions, and reports of the Supreme Court are confidential and accessible only to court officers bound by strict confidentiality. Lawyers who receive leaked internal documents must make a candid and immediate disclosure to the Court for investigation, not use them as proof to advance their case. The Court applied this to Peña’s repeated use of confidential Agenda copies, internal resolutions, Minutes, and the unreleased Office of the Bar Confidant Report.
• Improper Imputation of Bias or Bribery — Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough; clear and convincing evidence, including extrinsic evidence, is required to prove bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of the Court are grave accusations that cannot be treated lightly or made jokingly by counsel in pleadings or motions. The Court applied this to Peña’s accusation against Justice Carpio.
• Forum Shopping Through Successive Inhibition — Unnecessary inhibition of judges opens the floodgates to forum shopping; litigants cannot successively ask for inhibition to shop for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause. The Court applied this doctrine to Peña’s multiple and successive motions for inhibition and re-raffle against eleven Justices.
• Disbarment for Incorrigibility — While an indefinite suspension opens the possibility of future reinstatement upon a clear showing of remorse and change of ways, repeated violations, persistent lack of remorse, and continued unethical conduct may warrant the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Court applied this to Peña after finding him incorrigible and no longer deserving of compassion.

• "A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions." — This passage states the standard for inhibition and condemns grave bribery insinuations made even as a joke.
• "The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the Court by presenting a document that was not what he claimed it to be." — This passage defines the administrative falsification charge as a breach of candor, not as criminal falsification.
• "Regardless of whether or not Annex "B" was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and authenticity of his submissions." — This passage distinguishes administrative liability from criminal liability and frames the controlling ethical question.
• "The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession." — This passage articulates the Court’s disapproval of unfounded accusations made to support motions for inhibition.

• Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 159486-88, 25 November 2003, 416 SCRA 465 — Cited as controlling precedent where Atty. Alan Paguia was indefinitely suspended for imputing devious motives and questioning the impartiality of members of the Court; the Court compared Peña’s similar disrespectful attitude.
• Chin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144618, 15 August 2003, 456 Phil. 440 — Cited for the warning against successive inhibitions and forum shopping, where litigants shop for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause.
• Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz — Cited in Chin vs. Court of Appeals for the rule that an invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not always be heeded and may be an instrument for forum shopping.
• Saberon vs. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, 16 April 2008, 551 SCRA 359 — Cited for the principle that lawyers may be vigorous and courageous but must use forceful yet dignified, emphatic yet respectful language.
• Samala vs. Valencia, A.C. No. 5439, 22 January 2007, 512 SCRA 1 — Cited for the duty of lawyers to correctly inform the court of the law and facts and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.
• Sinnott vs. Barte, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1453, 14 December 2001, 423 Phil. 522 — Cited for the rule that mere suspicion of judicial partiality is insufficient; clear and convincing evidence, including extrinsic evidence, is required to prove bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.
• Sebastian vs. Bajar, A.C. No. 3731, 07 September 2007, 532 SCRA 435 — Cited for the meaning of “noted,” which means the Court has merely taken cognizance of an act or declaration without rendering a decision or implying approval.

• Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their professional colleagues. The Court found Peña violated this canon through his unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers and members of the Court.
• Canon 10 and Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Require a lawyer to owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court and to commit no falsehood, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The Court applied these to Peña’s submission of Annex “B.”
• Canon 11, Rule 11.03, and Rule 11.04, Code of Professional Responsibility — Require lawyers to observe and maintain respect due to courts and judicial officers, abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior, and refrain from attributing to a judge motives unsupported by the record. The Court applied these to Peña’s bribery imputations.
• Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended), Rule 11, Sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 — Govern the preparation of the Agenda, the minutes of sessions, the release of resolutions, and strict confidentiality of court actions prior to approval. The Court used these to explain that official actions are in approved minutes and resolutions, not in personal handwritten notations.
• Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended), Rule 2, Section 9 — Provides that upon reorganization of Divisions, cases assigned to a Member-in-Charge are transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves. The Court used this to show that the transfer of the consolidated petitions to the First Division was regular and not evidence of undue interest by Justice Carpio.
• Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC), Canon II, Section 1 — Prohibits court personnel from disclosing confidential information acquired while employed in the judiciary. The Court cited this to underscore the confidentiality of the Agenda, internal resolutions, and minutes.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 229 — Punishes revelation of secrets. The Court mentioned this as a possible criminal liability arising from the unauthorized disclosure of confidential court documents.
• Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(k) — Punishes divulging valuable confidential information acquired by office or official position to unauthorized persons or releasing it before its authorized release date. The Court mentioned this as a possible criminal liability for the leak of internal court documents.
• Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 5 — Governs forum shopping. The Court cited this in connection with Peña’s counter-charge against Urban Bank and its directors and officers.

The Decision was issued per curiam. The following Justices concurred: Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. took no part.