In Re: Justice Reynato S. Puno

The Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 is a new and distinct entity from the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to the 1986 revolution, such that appointments to the new court carry no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and the seniority-retention provision refers only to prospective situations.

Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno was first appointed to the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General since 1974. On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Puno was appointed Appellate Justice in its First Special Cases Division. On 7 November 1984, Puno accepted an appointment as Deputy Minister of Justice, ceasing to be a member of the Judiciary. The EDSA Revolution of February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary, effected through Executive Order No. 33 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 28 July 1986. A Screening Committee recommended Puno's return to the reorganized Court of Appeals with a seniority rank of No. 11, but when appointments were signed by President Aquino, his ranking was changed to No. 26.

Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno was first appointed to the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980, though he took his oath of office only on 29 November 1982, having served as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974. On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Puno was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division. On 7 November 1984, Puno accepted an appointment as Deputy Minister of Justice and thereby ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

The EDSA Revolution of February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created with then Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 on 28 July 1986 to govern the reorganization. The Screening Committee recommended Puno's return as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of No. 11 in the roster. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino, however, Puno's seniority ranking was changed to No. 26.

On 14 November 1990, Puno wrote a letter to the Supreme Court seeking correction of his seniority ranking, alleging that the change could only be attributed to inadvertence, as it would otherwise run counter to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which provided that any member reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment. Puno pointed to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, who had been transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Commission of Land Registration and was reappointed in 1986 without adversely affecting his seniority ranking. On 29 November 1990, the Court en banc granted Puno's request without any written opposition or comment having been filed, directing the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to correct Puno's rank from No. 12 to No. 5.

A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two of the justices affected by the ordered correction. They contended that the present Court of Appeals is a new court with fifty-one members and that Puno could not claim reappointment to a prior court that had ceased to exist. In their reply, they further argued that Puno's request should have been filed with the Office of the President rather than the Supreme Court, and that the non-approval of a similar request Puno had earlier filed with Malacañang confirmed that his ranking was deliberate, not inadvertent. The Court en banc required Puno to comment, and thereafter required Campos and Javellana to reply, before ultimately resolving the motion for reconsideration on 29 June 1992.

• Inadvertent Error: Puno argued that the change in his seniority ranking from No. 11 to No. 26 could only be attributed to inadvertence, as it would otherwise run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which mandated that a reappointed member retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment.
• Presidential Intent: Puno maintained that President Aquino was presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order No. 33, such that correction of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President and the spirit of the Executive Order, without provoking any constitutional confrontation between the President and the Supreme Court.
• Precedent of Justice Victoriano: Puno pointed to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, who was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Commission of Land Registration and was reappointed in 1986 without his seniority ranking being adversely affected, arguing that Executive Order No. 33 was correctly applied in Victoriano's case and should likewise apply to his.
• Statutory Construction: Puno argued that since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Section 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandated the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute.
• Freedom Constitution: Puno averred that under Proclamation No. 3 (the Freedom Constitution), no right provided under the 1973 Constitution was absent, further supporting his claim to retained seniority.
• Regulation of Appointment Power: Puno contended that although the power of appointment is executive in character, such power can be regulated by the Constitution and by appropriate law — in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 — and cannot be wielded in violation of law.

• New Court Doctrine: Justices Campos and Javellana contended that the present Court of Appeals is a new court with fifty-one members and that Puno could not claim a reappointment to a prior court, nor could he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed had ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
• Wrong Forum: They argued that Puno's request for correction was addressed to the wrong party, since he himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the President; accordingly, he should have filed his request with the Office of the President and not directly with the Supreme Court.
• Prior Denial by Malacañang: They pointed out that Puno had indeed filed a request for correction of his ranking with the Office of the President, but the same was not approved, such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before the proper court impleading all parties concerned. The non-approval by the Office of the President should be respected by the Supreme Court on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, and it confirmed that Puno's ranking was deliberate and not an inadvertent error.

• Nature of the Present Court of Appeals: Whether the present Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 is a new entity distinct from the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order, or merely a continuation thereof.
• Applicability of the Seniority-Retention Provision: Whether the seniority-retention provision in Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 (re-enacting Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129) applies retroactively to preserve Puno's precedence from his prior appointment to the abolished courts, or only prospectively.
• Propriety of Judicial Correction: Whether the Supreme Court may correct or set aside the seniority ranking established by the President in the exercise of her revolutionary powers when she made appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.

• Nature of the Present Court of Appeals: Yes. The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, having been created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino after the 1986 EDSA revolution.
• Applicability of the Seniority-Retention Provision: No. The reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations, not retroactive ones, because appointments to the new Court of Appeals have no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts.
• Propriety of Judicial Correction: No. Even assuming arguendo that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish prior precedence, President Aquino as head of the revolutionary government could disregard or set aside such precedence when she made her appointments, and since the appointment extended to Puno was a valid exercise of revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court to question or correct that exercise.

• Nature of the Present Court of Appeals: The Court grounded its holding on the nature of the 1986 EDSA revolution as a genuine revolution that overthrew the existing legal order. A revolution was defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as a sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system. Drawing on Kelsen's theory, the Court explained that a revolution occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order in a way not prescribed by the first order itself. The Aquino government came into existence in defiance of the existing legal processes — the 1973 Constitution — and its mandate was derived from a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people. The organization of the Aquino government, met by little resistance, and her control of the state through appointment of Cabinet and key officers, the departure of Marcos officials, and the revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the prior legal system had ceased to be operative. The Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 were phased out as part of the abolished legal system, and the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court.

• Applicability of the Seniority-Retention Provision: Because the old courts were abolished and the new Court of Appeals was a distinct entity, appointments thereto had no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts. The seniority-retention provision — "Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment" — refers to prospective situations: a member of the new Court of Appeals who leaves for another government position and later returns to the same new Court of Appeals. It does not contemplate a member of the old, abolished court claiming precedence in the new court. Justice Feliciano's concurrence reinforced this reading, noting that the provision contemplates a member of the new Court of Appeals accepting appointment elsewhere and then returning to that same new Court of Appeals — not a member of the defunct Intermediate Appellate Court claiming precedence in a court that did not exist when he last served in the Judiciary.

• Propriety of Judicial Correction: Even assuming arguendo that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority resulting from previous appointments, the Court held that President Aquino, as head of the revolutionary government exercising both executive and legislative powers, could amend, modify, or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. At the time she issued the 1986 appointments, she was still exercising revolutionary powers and could disregard the seniority-retention rule for reasons known only to her. Because the appointment extended to Puno, with its implicit ranking, was a valid appointment anchored on the President's exercise of revolutionary powers, the Court could not question or correct that exercise. The motion for reconsideration was granted, and the seniority rankings of all members of the Court of Appeals as appointed by the President in 1986 were recognized and upheld.

• Revolutionary Government and Legal Order — A revolution occurs when the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order in a way not prescribed by the first order itself. The Aquino government, having come into existence through the 1986 EDSA revolution in defiance of the 1973 Constitution, was a revolutionary government whose mandate was derived from the direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people. The prior legal system, including the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court, was abolished as part of the overthrown legal order, and the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court.

• Seniority-Retention Provision — Prospective Application — The provision that "any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment" applies prospectively — to a member of the new Court of Appeals who leaves for another government position and later returns to the same new Court of Appeals — and not retroactively to a member of the abolished prior court claiming precedence in the new court.

• Revolutionary Powers and Appointments — A revolutionary government exercising both executive and legislative powers may amend, modify, or repeal existing laws or its own executive orders. Appointments made by the revolutionary President, including the order of seniority established thereby, constitute a valid exercise of revolutionary powers that cannot subsequently be questioned or corrected by the courts.

• "It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986." — This is the ratio decidendi, articulating the central holding that the present Court of Appeals is a new court and not a continuation of the prior courts.

• "The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones." — This passage synthesizes the Court's conclusions on both the nature of the new Court of Appeals and the prospective-only application of the seniority-retention provision.

• "Since the appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the President's exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time to question or correct that exercise." — This states the alternative ground: even if the seniority provision survived, the President's revolutionary appointment power could not be judicially corrected.

• Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State — Cited as legal-theoretical authority for the definition of revolution as occurring "whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself," providing the conceptual foundation for the Court's characterization of the 1986 EDSA revolution as a genuine revolution that overthrew the prior legal order.

• Section 2, Executive Order No. 33 (1986) — Amended Section 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129 to create the Court of Appeals consisting of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices, with precedence according to dates of appointment, and providing that any member reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment. The Court held that this provision applies prospectively only, not to appointments to the abolished prior courts.
• Section 3, Chapter 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Created the Intermediate Appellate Court with a similar seniority-retention provision. The Court found that this court was abolished by the 1986 revolution and that the provision was re-enacted, not merely carried over, by Executive Order No. 33.
• Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Constitution, 1986) — The Provisional Constitution promulgated by President Aquino on 25 March 1986, which declared that the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. Cited by the Court to establish the revolutionary character of the Aquino government and, in the dissent, to argue that the President was bound by existing laws not inconsistent with the Proclamation.
• Section 1, Article IV, Proclamation No. 3 — Provided that all existing laws, decrees, executive orders, and other issuances not inconsistent with the Proclamation shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed. The dissent invoked this to argue that B.P. Blg. 129's seniority-retention provision remained in force.

• Paras, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ. — Concurred with the majority opinion.
• Feliciano, J. — Wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing that the Court of Appeals established by Executive Order No. 33 is a new court, not merely the old Intermediate Appellate Court with a new label. He emphasized that Executive Order No. 33 re-enacted Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 rather than merely relabeling the old court, and that the seniority-retention provision contemplates a member of the new Court of Appeals who leaves for another government position and later returns to the same new court — not a member of the abolished prior court claiming precedence in the new court.
• Bellosillo, J. — Wrote a separate concurring opinion narrating personal observations at the 1 August 1986 oath-taking ceremony at Malacañang, where Puno was ranked No. 26 and had himself sought clarification from then Justice Secretary Gonzales without success. He noted that Puno's earlier request for correction with Malacañang was not granted, that President Aquino's letter-appointment of 31 July 1986 categorically specified the order of seniority, and that the lapse of more than four years before Puno turned to the Supreme Court was unreasonable. He further warned that sustaining the view that the present Court of Appeals is a continuation of the old court could open the door to requests for reinstatement of justices not reappointed in 1986, which would be unsettling and disruptive.

• Gutierrez, Jr., J. — Dissented, arguing that the seniority-retention provision had been in continuous existence from 1968 to 1992, was never repealed, and bound even the appointing power. He contended that President Aquino's government ceased to be revolutionary upon promulgation of the Freedom Constitution on 25 March 1986, making her bound by its provisions and by Executive Order No. 33, which she herself issued pursuant to constitutional authority. He argued that the 1986 appointments were not personal acts of a revolutionary President but followed the recommendations of the Screening Committee, which had ranked Puno at No. 11. He cited the September 17, 1986 letter of Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo stating that "the President had nothing to do with the order of seniority," which he interpreted to mean the change from No. 11 to No. 26 was an inadvertence, not a deliberate presidential act. He voted to reiterate the Court's 29 November 1990 resolution.

• Cruz, J. — Joined Justice Gutierrez's dissent, adding that the seniority-retention provision was not repealed but merely re-enacted by Executive Order No. 33, and that the canon of construction requiring harmonization of apparently conflicting provisions should have been applied to give effect to both Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33. He noted that Section 8 of Executive Order No. 33 provides that the term "Intermediate Appellate Court" shall hereafter mean "Court of Appeals," further supporting continuity.

• Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, and Nocon, JJ. — Concurred with the dissenting opinions of Justices Gutierrez and Cruz.