In re Filart

An attorney is not answerable for every error or mistake, but gross negligence in handling a client's cause is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with the client and a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court, warranting at least a reprimand and, in cases of gross negligence causing loss, liability for damages.

The proceedings were instituted by thirty-seven residents of Asingan, Pangasinan against attorney Anacleto Filart, who had previously served as deputy fiscal of Pangasinan and later engaged in private practice. The complainants were parties in Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540, a land registration matter in which Filart had been ordered by the court to defend their rights after their former retained attorney proved unable to do so. The governing statutory framework included section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1702, which enumerated officials prohibited from private practice, and sections 21 and 22 of the same Code, which governed disbarment and suspension of attorneys.

Thirty-seven residents of Asingan, Pangasinan filed a complaint against attorney Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in substance that while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received from them the sum of P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum in connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540, and that he was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting their appeal to the Supreme Court, having practically abandoned the case.

Filart denied receiving the P111, but the Court observed that even if he had received such a sum, the office of deputy provincial fiscal was not specifically included in section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 1702 as an official who shall not engage in private practice. It was also noted that Filart did not take up the case of his own volition but was ordered by the court to defend the rights of the petitioners because the attorney they formerly retained was almost always in a state of intoxication.

With respect to the appeal, Filart had resigned as deputy fiscal and engaged in the practice of law when the complainants asked him to prosecute the appeal of their case. Filart received sums of money from the complainants — P780 according to the complainants, and P160 according to Filart. The complainants were driven from their lands, and their houses were destroyed, by order of the court.

The facts supporting the allegation of fraud and negligence were: (1) the lapse of fifty-one days between receipt of notice of denial of the motion for a new trial (March 7, 1917) and the filing of the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917), when the statutory period was only thirty days under section 26 of Act No. 2347; (2) failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of exceptions after repeated amendments and re-amendments; (3) failure to file a bond in order to prevent execution; and (4) assurances made by Filart that all was right.

Filart explained that the delay was due to the record not being in the clerk's office, and that the date when the answers to his questions from the Land Registration Office reached him did not appear in the record; he also alleged that he made an oral motion to extend the period for filing the bill of exceptions, but that motion appeared to have been overlooked by the judge. The parties agreed that the bills of exceptions were voluminous, and Filart pleaded pressure of work in his law office. He said he believed execution would not be valid until after certiorari proceedings were decided. The exact nature of the assurances did not clearly appear in the record — possibly they were no more than what an attorney fairly confident of success would make to a client.

• Receipt of Fees While Deputy Fiscal: The complainants alleged that Filart received P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum in connection with their registration case while he was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan, implying that such receipt was improper.
• Fraud and Negligence in the Appeal: The complainants alleged that Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting their appeal to the Supreme Court, having practically abandoned the case, resulting in their being driven from their lands and their houses destroyed by order of the court.

• Denial of Fees: Filart denied receiving the P111 from the complainants while he was deputy fiscal.
• Explanation for Delay: Filart explained that the record was not in the clerk's office, that the date when the answers to his questions from the Land Registration Office reached him did not appear in the record, and that he made an oral motion to extend the period for filing the bill of exceptions which appeared to have been overlooked by the judge.
• Pressure of Work: Filart pleaded pressure of work in his law office, the parties having agreed that the bills of exceptions were voluminous.
• Belief on Execution: Filart said he believed execution would not be valid until after certiorari proceedings were decided, explaining his failure to file a bond to prevent execution.

• Receipt of Fees While Deputy Fiscal: Whether Filart's receipt of P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum while he was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan constituted malpractice.
• Negligence in Prosecuting the Appeal: Whether Filart's handling of the appeal — the delay in filing the bill of exceptions, failure to perfect it, failure to file a bond, and assurances to the clients — constituted fraud and negligence warranting disbarment or suspension.

• Receipt of Fees While Deputy Fiscal: No. The office of deputy provincial fiscal was not specifically included in section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 1702 as an official who shall not engage in private practice, and Filart was ordered by the court to take the case, not having done so of his own volition.
• Negligence in Prosecuting the Appeal: No, not warranting disbarment or suspension. Gross misconduct or negligence as would warrant disbarment or suspension pursuant to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not shown, but Filart was reprimanded for carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of poor clients.

• Receipt of Fees While Deputy Fiscal: The statutory prohibition on private practice enumerated specific officials who shall not engage in private practice, and the office of deputy provincial fiscal was not among them. Even admitting that Filart received the sum, which he denied, he had a legal right to receive compensation as an attorney. Moreover, Filart did not take up the case of his own volition but was ordered by the court to defend the rights of the petitioners because the attorney they formerly retained was almost always in a state of intoxication.

• Negligence in Prosecuting the Appeal: The Court agreed with the Acting Attorney-General that the facts were not sufficient to support the complaint and that gross misconduct or negligence warranting disbarment or suspension pursuant to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been shown. The delay in filing the bill of exceptions was explained by the record not being in the clerk's office and the unanswered questions from the Land Registration Office; the voluminous bills of exceptions and pressure of work were mitigating; Filart's belief that execution would not be valid until after certiorari proceedings were decided was a plausible explanation for the failure to file a bond; and the exact nature of the assurances did not clearly appear in the record. However, the Court expressed strong disapproval of the carelessness, noting that many appeals have been dismissed because of the lack of diligence of counsel. The lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. Clients whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or delay of an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings may recover damages, as held in Drais vs. Hoggan, where an attorney who neglected to file an appeal until the time for appeal expired was guilty of gross negligence and liable for the loss sustained by the client.

• Attorney's Liability for Negligence — An attorney is not answerable for every error or mistake, but gross negligence in handling a client's cause is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with the client and a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. The Court applied this doctrine by declining to disbar Filart because gross misconduct was not shown, yet reprimanding him because the lack of due care was nonetheless a breach of his professional undertaking.
• Standard of Care for Attorneys — Attorneys are not bound to know all the law, and are not liable for mere errors or mistakes made in the exercise of reasonable skill and judgment. The Court quoted Lord Mansfield and Chief Justice Abbott to establish that attorneys ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge, but that criminal carelessness and unprofessional tactics render them unworthy of the trust reposed in them.
• Client's Remedy for Attorney's Negligence — A client who has suffered damages as a result of his attorney's negligence or misconduct may recover therefor. The Court cited Drais vs. Hoggan for the proposition that an attorney who neglects to file an appeal within the prescribed period is guilty of gross negligence and liable for the loss sustained by the client.

• "That part of the profession which is carried on by attorneys is liberal and reputable, as well as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honor and integrity; and they ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge. But every man is liable to error; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake." — Lord Mansfield's statement in Pitt vs. Yalden, quoted by the Court to establish the standard that attorneys are not liable for every error or mistake, but are protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge.
• "No attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law." — Chief Justice Abbott's statement in Montorious vs. Jeffreys, quoted to reinforce the principle that attorneys are not expected to be infallible in their knowledge of the law.
• "The lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court." — The Court's own statement establishing that negligence in handling a client's cause constitutes a breach of professional duty, forming the basis for the reprimand.
• "Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it does become our solemn duty to reprimand him for carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of poor clients." — The Court's reprimand of Filart, noting that his dereliction was not isolated but representative of a class of attorneys, and warning that more severe punishment would follow repetition.

• Pitt vs. Yalden, 4 Burr., 2060 (1767) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that attorneys are not answerable for every error or mistake and ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge.
• Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113 — Cited for the principle that no attorney is bound to know all the law, reinforcing the standard that attorneys are not expected to be infallible.
• Drais vs. Hoggan, 50 Cal., 121 (1875) — Cited for the principle that an attorney who neglects to file an appeal until the time for appeal expires is guilty of gross negligence and is liable for the loss sustained by the client, supporting the Court's notice to clients of their remedy.

• Section 36, Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1702 — The provision enumerating officials who shall not engage in private practice; the Court held that the office of deputy provincial fiscal was not specifically included, so Filart had a legal right to receive compensation as an attorney.
• Section 26, Act No. 2347 — The provision fixing the statutory period of thirty days for filing a bill of exceptions; Filart's lapse of fifty-one days between receipt of notice of denial of the motion for a new trial and the filing of the bill of exceptions was measured against this period.
• Sections 21 and 22, Code of Civil Procedure — The provisions governing disbarment and suspension of attorneys; the Court found that gross misconduct or negligence warranting disbarment or suspension under these provisions was not shown.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concurred.