In Re: Felix P. David

A lawyer suspended from practice who performs acts constituting the practice of law during the suspension—including filing pleadings, briefs, and motions and collecting rentals as attorney—violates the suspension order; acting ostensibly as an agent does not change the professional character of those acts and warrants complete disqualification and cancellation of the attorney’s certificate.

Felix P. David was a member of the Philippine Bar. In Adm. Case No. 35, he was suspended from the practice of law for five years beginning November 9, 1949, for malpractice. The present administrative case concerns his alleged continued practice during that suspension. Rule 127, Article 31, governs appearances before courts and requires a party to appear personally or through a duly authorized member of the Bar; Article 33 of the same Rule provides a remedy for collecting attorney’s fees.

Felix P. David was a member of the Philippine Bar who had been suspended from practice for five years in Adm. Case No. 35, from November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954, for malpractice. He admitted the suspension in a written report filed on March 17, 1951. Notwithstanding the suspension, he continued to render services in several cases.

In CA G.R. No. 4792-R, Tan Tek Sy vs. Maliwanag, David filed a brief on February 28, 1950 (Exhibit J), not as attorney but “for and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy.” On January 26, 1951, notice of the decision affirming the Court of First Instance was mailed to him (Exhibit G). On March 13, 1951, after the record had been returned, he filed a motion in the lower court for execution of judgment, signed “TAN TEK SI By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID, c/o Atty. Felix P. David, Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St., Filipinas Saw Mill & Construction, Manila.” He also filed a memorandum in the Court of Appeals on September 25, 1950, signed in the same manner as the brief.

In Civil Case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. vs. Tolentino, David filed Exhibit A on September 25, 1950, asking for an order of demolition of the defendants’ houses; Exhibit B on October 10, 1950, asking that the Sheriff of Manila be authorized to pay “the amount or such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time”; and Exhibit C on November 13, 1950, asking for another demolition order. He signed all three pleadings as attorney for the plaintiff. Exhibits B to B-34 showed that he received payments from various defendants as attorney for the plaintiff, with the oldest receipt dated February 12, 1950 and the last dated December 7, 1950.

In defense, David stated that he had appeared as attorney for Tan Tek Sy since 1948 in the Manila Municipal Court; that after his suspension he advised his client to hire another lawyer to prepare the brief for the Court of Appeals; that when only two or three days remained and the client could not file the brief, he drafted and filed it at the client’s request; and that he intended the client to sign it, but because the client was in Dagupan and only one day remained, he signed it as “Felix P. David, for and in behalf of the appellee.” He claimed that, to show he did not intend to disregard the suspension, he did not identify himself as attorney for the appellee and signed in good faith without designating himself as practicing attorney. As to the Malayan Saw Mill motions, he claimed good faith and said he filed them not to disobey the Court but to collect his fees. He also said that his March 2, 1950 appearance in Civil Case No. 7679, Juan de la Torre vs. Philippine Trust Co., was upon the request of his brother-in-law Juan de la Torre and that he did not charge fees because he knew he was suspended.

The record showed that these professional services were rendered during the period of his suspension.

• Agency, Not Law Practice: Respondent maintained that he filed the brief and memorandum in Tan Tek Sy vs. Maliwanag “for and in behalf of” Tan Tek Sy, not as attorney, and did not identify himself as attorney for the appellee, to show he did not intend to disregard the suspension.
• Deadline and Client Request: Respondent argued that he had advised his client to employ another lawyer; when only two or three days remained and the client could not file the brief, he drafted and filed it at the client’s request, intending the client to sign it, but signed it himself because the client was in Dagupan and only one day remained.
• Good Faith in Collecting Fees: Respondent claimed that he filed the motions in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. vs. Tolentino in good faith, not to disobey the Court, but to collect his attorney’s fees.
• No Fees in Juan de la Torre: Respondent asserted that his March 2, 1950 appearance in Juan de la Torre vs. Philippine Trust Co. was upon his brother-in-law’s request and without fees because he knew he was suspended.

• Practice of Law During Suspension: Whether Felix P. David, while suspended from the practice of law, engaged in acts constituting the practice of law.
• Claim of Agency: Whether his claim that he acted merely as an agent or employee, rather than as an attorney, altered the nature of his services.
• Penalty for Violation: Whether he should be completely disqualified from practicing law in the Philippines and his attorney’s certificate cancelled for continuing to practice during suspension.

• Practice of Law During Suspension: Yes. Preparing and filing motions for execution, demolition, and delivery of collected amounts, filing briefs and memoranda before the Court of Appeals, and collecting rentals from 109 defendants while issuing receipts as attorney for plaintiff are acts of law practice.
• Claim of Agency: No. The label of agent does not alter the professional nature of the services; concealment of his attorney role aggravates his situation.
• Penalty for Violation: Yes. A suspended lawyer who practices during suspension must be completely disqualified from practice in the Philippines, and his attorney’s certificate must be cancelled and returned to the Clerk of Court.

• Practice of Law During Suspension: Practice of law was defined as performing acts proper to the legal profession. The record showed that respondent filed Exhibit J brief in CA G.R. No. 4792-R on February 28, 1950; filed a motion for execution on March 13, 1951 signed as “TAN TEK SI By Felix P. David”; filed Exhibits A, B, and C in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. vs. Tolentino as attorney for plaintiff; and collected payments from various defendants as attorney, as shown by receipts B to B-34 dated February 12, 1950 to December 7, 1950. These acts formed part of the exercise of law practice. Because he was suspended from November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954 and admitted the suspension in his March 17, 1951 report, the acts constituted intentional disobedience of the September 30, 1949 decision in Adm. Case No. 35. Under Article 31, Rule 127, a party may appear personally or through a duly authorized member of the Bar; an agent, attorney-in-fact, or suspended member cannot appear for a litigant. His filings therefore violated the suspension.
• Claim of Agency: The defense that he acted merely as an agent was rejected. Even if he signed “for and in behalf” and did not designate himself as attorney, the services were professional legal services. Knowing he was suspended, he should not have filed them either as agent or as attorney; he was obliged to stop serving his client before the Court of Appeals, warn the client of the suspension, and advise the client to employ another lawyer if representation was desired. He could not contravene the express order of the Court. His claim that he filed the Malayan Saw Mill motions in good faith to collect fees was also rejected: as an officer of the Forum, a lawyer must comply with the Court’s decision above any other consideration, and he could collect fees by suing his client directly or under Article 33, Rule 127. The Juan de la Torre appearance, even if disregarded, did not save him because of the other professional services.
• Penalty for Violation: The evidence showed intentional disobedience of the September 30, 1949 decision in Adm. Case No. 35. Complete disqualification from practice, cancellation of the certificate, and return of the certificate to the Clerk of Court were therefore warranted.

• Practice of Law — Practice of law consists of performing acts proper to the legal profession. In this case, preparing and filing motions for execution of judgment, demolition of defendants’ houses, and delivery of amounts collected by the sheriff; filing a brief and memorandum before the Court of Appeals; and collecting rentals from 109 defendants while issuing 35 receipts signed as attorney for the plaintiff all constituted practice of law.
• Suspension from Law Practice — A lawyer under suspension is barred from all acts constituting practice of law. The suspended lawyer cannot appear for a litigant as an agent, attorney-in-fact, or suspended member of the Bar; only a duly authorized member of the Bar may appear for a party before courts other than a justice of the peace court. The suspended lawyer must advise the client to employ another lawyer.
• Concealment of Practice as Aggravating — A suspended lawyer’s claim that he acted merely as an agent or employee does not alter the professional character of his services. Concealing that he was acting as an attorney while appearing to be only an agent aggravates the violation.
• Duty of a Lawyer as Officer of the Court — As an officer of the Forum, a lawyer must comply with the decision of the Supreme Court above any other consideration, including the collection of attorney’s fees. He may instead sue the client directly or claim fees under Article 33, Rule 127.
• Penalty for Practice During Suspension — A lawyer who practices during the period of suspension must be completely disqualified from practicing law in the Philippines, and the certificate issued to him as a lawyer must be cancelled.

• "Ejercer la profesion de abogado es practicar los actos propios de dicha profesion." — Defines practice of law as the performance of acts proper to the legal profession; this definition anchors the finding that respondent’s acts during suspension constituted practice.
• "El preparar y presentar mociones pidiendo la ejecucion de la sentencia, la demolicion de las casas de los demandados, pidiendo al juzgado que ordenase al Sheriff que le entregase las cantidades cobradas, son actos que forman parte del ejercicio de la profesion de abogacia; el presentar alegato y memorandum ante el Tribunal de Apelacion es ejercer la profesion de abogado, porque un agente no puede hacerlo; el cobrar alquileres de los 109 demandados expidiendo 35 recibos y firmandolos como abogado de la demandante, es ejercer la profesion." — Enumerates the specific acts that the Court treated as practice of law, including filing motions, briefs, memoranda, and collecting rentals as attorney.
• "pero, ocultando que actuaba como abogado de Tan Tek Sy y aparentando que era solamente un agente, se agrava su situacion: es mas culpable el que, cubierto con un antifaz, dispara contra su enemigo que aquel que lo hace a cara descubierta y a la vista del publico; de ahi que la ley penal impone pena mas severa en el primer caso." — Explains that concealing the attorney role behind an agency label aggravates the violation.
• "Por tanto, se le inhabilita para ejercer la profesion de abogado en Filipinas, se declara cancelado el certificado expedido a su favor para ejercer la profesion y se le ordena a que lo devuelva al Escribano de este Tribunal." — States the dispositive penalty: permanent disqualification, cancellation of the attorney’s certificate, and return of the certificate to the Clerk of Court.

• Article 31, Rule 127 — Provides that in courts other than the justice of the peace court, a party may conduct litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and appearance must be personal or through a duly authorized member of the Bar. The Court applied it to hold that an agent, attorney-in-fact, or suspended member of the Bar cannot appear for a litigant, so respondent’s filings violated the rule.
• Article 33, Rule 127 — Cited by the Court as a remedy for collecting attorney’s fees. The Court noted respondent could have collected his fees by suing his client directly or claiming them under this provision instead of practicing law during suspension.

Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Angelo Bautista, and Labrador concurred.