In re: Canlas

The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute and must yield to the equally important public interest in maintaining the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice; publishing unverified allegations of bribery against members of the judiciary constitutes indirect contempt when it tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, regardless of the publisher's claim of good faith or civic duty.

On 8 March 2016, The Manila Times published a front-page article written by senior reporter Jomar Canlas alleging that certain Supreme Court justices were offered P50 million each to disqualify Senator Grace Poe from running in the May 2016 presidential elections. The article claimed that two separate attempts were made by individuals closely associated with President Benigno Aquino III and Liberal Party standard-bearer Mar Roxas to influence the Court's decision in the Poe disqualification cases, which were pending resolution at the time.

• On 8 March 2016, The Manila Times published an article by senior reporter Jomar Canlas on its front page and page 2 alleging that Supreme Court justices were offered P50 million each to disqualify Senator Grace Poe from the presidential race.
• The article claimed two attempts were made by persons "very close" to President Benigno Aquino III and Liberal Party standard-bearer Manuel "Mar" Roxas II to buy off the votes of the magistrates.
• The first attempt allegedly came from a female lawyer, former Malacañang official and Roxas supporter, working at a private law firm allegedly behind the special operation to disqualify Poe.
• The second attempt allegedly involved a Liberal Party member and his partner, a former businessman close to Aquino and Roxas.
• The article quoted an unnamed Justice stating that the Court "will not bow to any pressure to decide on the case in exchange for cash."
• The article compared the alleged bribery attempts to the P50 million offers during the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona.
• Canlas claimed he attempted to interview several justices but was unsuccessful, and did not elaborate on his attempts to verify the story.
• The article was published on the eve of an en banc session where justices were expected to vote on the disqualification case against Poe.

• The article contained statements and innuendoes tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
• The allegations of bribery were unverified and created a false impression against justices who did not vote in favor of Poe.
• The article sensationalized unverified claims and emphasized the bad aspects while giving only a short disclaimer that justices refused the bribe.
• Given the close voting in the Poe cases, the article created doubt in the minds of readers against some justices and the Court as a whole.

• The disqualification cases against Grace Poe generated national interest, and any attempt to bribe justices is a matter of public interest and legitimate subject for journalism.
• He was moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by responsibility as a newspaperman to expose and denounce perceived insidious attempts to sway the justices.
• He never made any accusation against the Court or any Justice, but only reported failed attempts to bribe certain Justices and how these were rebuffed.
• The article painted the Court in a positive light as incorruptible and unable to be swayed by those in powerful positions.
• Assuming the article caused unflattering innuendoes, he sincerely apologized, but his intention was to inform the public of failed attempts with good motives and for justifiable ends.
• The legitimate exercise of freedom of speech and of the press is a protected constitutional right under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
• Good faith or absence of intent to harm the courts is a valid defense in the application of the clear and present danger test.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court properly initiated indirect contempt proceedings against Canlas under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court for acts tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether publishing the news article constitutes indirect contempt of court.
  • Whether the article falls within the protection of freedom of speech and of the press under the Constitution.
  • Whether good faith and lack of intent to harm constitute valid defenses to contempt charges in this case.

• Procedural:
  • The Court properly initiated indirect contempt proceedings under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which sanctions acts that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
• Substantive:
  • Canlas is guilty of indirect contempt of court. While freedom of speech and of the press is protected under the Constitution, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the integrity of the administration of justice.
  • The "clear and present danger" and "dangerous tendency" tests apply, requiring that the substantive evil sought to be prevented must be serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
  • The article's legitimacy was misleading and not sufficiently established; it sensationalized unverified grave accusations, imputed bribery charges against specific individuals, and gave a false impression against justices who did not vote for Poe.
  • The unnamed Justice's statement did not confirm the bribery allegation but merely stated the Court would not bow to pressure.
  • The article created doubt in readers' minds about the integrity of some justices and the Court as a whole, thereby tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
  • Good faith is not a valid defense where the article was unverified, misleading, and intended to sensationalize; there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
  • The press cannot throw accusations without verifying truthfulness.
  • Canlas is severely reprimanded with a stern warning that repetition shall merit more severe sanction.

• Clear and Present Danger Rule — Requires that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished; the advocacy of ideas cannot be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The Court applied this to determine whether Canlas' article created a substantive evil of undermining judicial integrity.
• Dangerous Tendency Rule — Provides that if words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, such words are punishable; it is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil sought to be prevented. The Court used this to assess whether the article's natural tendency was to degrade the administration of justice.
• Balancing of Constitutional Freedoms and Judicial Integrity — Freedom of speech and expression, while guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute and must be adjusted to accommodate the requirements of equally important public interest, particularly the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
• Good Faith Defense in Contempt Proceedings — In the application of the clear and present danger test in relation to freedom of the press, good faith or absence of intent to harm the courts is a valid defense; however, this requires responsible reporting and verification of facts, not merely a perfunctory apology after publication of false or unverified statements.

• "The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life... As the fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against infringement."
• "[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice."
• "There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice."
• "False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution... there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact... Neither the intentional lie nor careless error materially advances society's interest in 'unhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues."
• "The Court is not immune from criticisms, and it is the duty of the press to expose all government agencies and officials... However, the press cannot just throw accusations without verifying the truthfulness of their reports."
• "A person's reputation is priceless, and so are the reputations of the Justices of this Court."

• In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007 — Cited for the recognition of the role of mass media as the fourth estate and watchdog in a democratic government, upholding the citizen's right to know and making public officials responsible for their deeds.
• Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the principle that freedom of expression is not absolute and must be adjusted to accommodate the requirements of equally important public interest, particularly the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
• Cabansag v. Fernandez — Cited for the discussion of the "clear and present danger" rule versus the "dangerous tendency" rule in determining the constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary.
• In Re Emil P. Jurado — Cited for the principle that false reports are not shielded by free speech, that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, and that neither intentional lie nor careless error advances society's interest in free debate.
• Bridges v. California — Cited for the standard that the substantive evil sought to be prevented must be serious and the degree of imminence extremely high to warrant restriction upon freedom of expression.
• People v. Godoy — Cited in relation to good faith as a defense in contempt proceedings.
• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan — Cited for the proposition that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact and that neither intentional lie nor careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited debate.
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire — Cited for the classification of certain utterances as not essential to exposition of ideas and of such slight social value that any benefit is outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

• Article III, Section 4, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, cited by Canlas as the constitutional basis for his reportage and by the Court as the protected right that must be balanced against judicial integrity.
• Section 3(d), Rule 71, Rules of Court — Defines indirect contempt as any act tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, the provision under which Canlas was charged and found guilty.