In re: Bermudez

The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief, and a suit seeking to question the identity or legitimacy of the incumbent President is barred by presidential immunity and failure to state a cause of action, as the constitutional provision in question is clear and a matter of public record.

The case arose during the period following the 1986 EDSA Revolution, when a new Constitution was being drafted by the Constitutional Commission. The proposed 1986 Constitution contained transitory provisions addressing the terms of the incumbent executive officials to synchronize future elections. The petitioner, a lawyer, sought to challenge the clarity of these provisions regarding the identity of the incumbent officials.

Petitioner Saturnino V. Bermudez, a lawyer, filed a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents. He quoted the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provided that the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election was extended to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Claiming that the provision was not clear as to whom it referred, he asked the Court to declare whether it referred to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel, or to elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino. The petition was filed while the proposed Constitution was pending ratification.

• Ambiguity of the Provision: Petitioner claimed that the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution was not clear as to whom it referred regarding the "incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election."
• Declaratory Relief: Petitioner sought the Court's declaration on the construction and definiteness of the provision, asking whether it referred to Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel or Ferdinand E. Marcos and Arturo M. Tolentino.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
• Presidential Immunity: Whether the petition, in effect, constitutes a suit against the incumbent President.
• Cause of Action: Whether the petition states a cause of action given the alleged ambiguity of the constitutional provision.

• Jurisdiction: No. The Supreme Court does not assume jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
• Presidential Immunity: Yes. The petition amounts to a suit against the incumbent President, who is immune from suit during their incumbency and tenure.
• Cause of Action: No. The petition states no cause of action because the constitutional provision is clear and a matter of public record, referring to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel.

• Jurisdiction: It is elementary that the Supreme Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Additionally, the petitioner lacks the personality to sue or bring the action.
• Presidential Immunity: The petition effectively constitutes a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino. It is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during their incumbency and tenure.
• Cause of Action: Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness is manifestly gratuitous. It is a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission referred to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons. The provision merely extends their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for election synchronization. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where the people have made the judgment, accepting it as a de jure government recognized by the community of nations.

• Presidential Immunity from Suit — Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition, as it effectively constituted a suit against President Corazon C. Aquino.
• Political Question Doctrine — The legitimacy of the Aquino government was held not to be a justiciable matter but a political question. The people accepted the government, which is in effective control of the entire country, making it a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.

• "it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure." — This passage articulates the doctrine of presidential immunity, which served as one of the grounds for dismissing the petition that effectively targeted the incumbent President.
• "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge." — This defines the political question doctrine as applied to the legitimacy of the Aquino government, emphasizing that the people's acceptance and effective control establish a de jure government.

• Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 — Cited to support the dismissal based on the petitioner's lack of personality to sue or bring the action.
• Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. — Cited in a Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986, holding that the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter and that the government is de jure.

• Section 5, Article XVIII, 1986 Constitution (Transitory Provisions) — Provided the extension of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election to noon of June 30, 1992. The Court held this provision was clear and referred to President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, and Paras, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurred, stating that the Court has no original jurisdiction over declaratory relief and that the declaration of who was elected should be addressed to other departments of government. Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurred. Feliciano, J., concurred, adding that the Court cannot assume the function of officially declaring who was elected in the absence of a legislature. Cruz, J., concurred on the ground that the Constitution had not yet been ratified and there was no actual conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination.