In re Basa

A conviction for abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, warranting disciplinary action; however, the Court may impose suspension rather than disbarment when mitigated by the respondent's youth and professional promise.

Carlos S. Basa was an attorney approximately twenty-nine years of age, admitted to the bars of both California and the Philippine Islands. The disbarment proceeding was initiated by the Attorney-General pursuant to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the Supreme Court to remove or suspend a member of the bar upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Pedro Guevara appeared as counsel for the respondent, while Attorney-General Feria represented the Government.

Carlos S. Basa was a young attorney of about twenty-nine years, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. He was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, as defined and punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code. Judge M.V. del Rosario presided over the trial and rendered a decision finding Basa guilty, sentencing him to imprisonment for two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correccional.

Basa appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court. The Second Division affirmed the lower court's judgment in a decision dated August 10, 1920, docketed as G.R. No. 15398, which was not published. Following the affirmance of his conviction, the Attorney-General initiated disbarment proceedings before the Supreme Court En Banc, requesting an order for Basa's removal from the legal profession. The request was grounded on Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The sole legal question thus presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent involves moral turpitude.

• Ground for Disbarment: The Attorney-General argued that Basa, having been convicted of abduction with consent, should be disbarred pursuant to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes removal or suspension of a lawyer upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Appropriate Sanction: Whether disbarment or a lesser penalty is warranted under the circumstances.

• Moral Turpitude: Yes. Abduction with consent inherently involves moral turpitude, being contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, and good morals, and thus falls within the scope of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Appropriate Sanction: Suspension, not disbarment. While the conviction could not be lightly passed over, the Court exercised its discretion to impose a one-year suspension rather than removal, in consideration of the respondent's youth and promising career.

• Moral Turpitude: The Court adopted the definition of moral turpitude as including "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," as drawn from Bouvier's Law Dictionary and cited by numerous courts. Although no prior decision had ruled on the precise question of whether abduction with consent constitutes moral turpitude, the Court found no doubt that crimes of this character fall within the definition. The inherent nature of the act of abduction with consent is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. This conclusion was supported by American and Spanish authorities, including In re Hopkins (1909), Pollard vs. Lyon (1875), opinions of the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.

• Appropriate Sanction: Having established that the crime involved moral turpitude, the Court acknowledged its duty to act but expressed reluctance. On one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney could not be lightly passed over. On the other hand, the Court stated it was willing to strain the limits of compassion to the uttermost so that a promising career might not be utterly ruined. Balancing these considerations, the Court ordered that Basa be suspended from the office of lawyer for one year, to begin from the day of his discharge from prison, rather than imposing the more severe penalty of disbarment sought by the Attorney-General.

• Moral Turpitude — Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The test is the inherent nature of the act: if the act is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct, the crime involves moral turpitude. The Court applied this definition to abduction with consent under Article 446 of the Penal Code and concluded that the crime inherently involves moral turpitude, notwithstanding the absence of prior precedent on the exact question.

• Discretion in Disciplinary Sanctions — While conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude authorizes the Supreme Court to remove or suspend a lawyer under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court retains discretion to determine the appropriate sanction. Disbarment is not automatically mandated; the Court may impose a lesser penalty such as suspension when mitigating circumstances such as the respondent's youth and professional promise warrant compassion.

• "Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." — This is the Court's adopted definition of moral turpitude, drawn from Bouvier's Law Dictionary and applied to determine whether abduction with consent falls within the statutory ground for disbarment or suspension under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• "Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the Court resolved a question of first impression by looking to the inherent nature of the criminal act rather than relying on direct precedent.

• "On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined." — This passage reflects the Court's balancing of the duty to discipline against mitigating considerations, justifying the imposition of suspension rather than disbarment.

• In re Hopkins (1909), 54 Wash. 569 — Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that crimes of the character in question involve moral turpitude, being contrary to good morals and accepted standards of right conduct.
• Pollard vs. Lyon (1875), 91 U.S. 225 — Cited as supporting authority for the definition and application of moral turpitude to criminal acts.
• 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P.I. 46, 185 — Cited as an administrative opinion supporting the conclusion that the act in question involves moral turpitude.
• Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895 — Cited as further authority supporting the characterization of the crime as contrary to good morals, reflecting the Spanish legal heritage underlying the Penal Code provisions.

• Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from the office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This provision was the statutory basis for the disbarment proceeding and the Court's exercise of disciplinary authority.
• Article 446, Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of abduction with consent, for which Basa was convicted and sentenced to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correccional. The Court examined the inherent nature of this offense to determine whether it constitutes moral turpitude.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña, and Villamor, JJ., concurred.