In re Adoption of Emiliano Guzman

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, only minors may be adopted; the use of the term "minor" in Sections 765 to 769 precludes the adoption of adults, and Chapter XLI's status as a complete enactment on adoption impliedly repealed the Civil Code provisions that previously permitted adult adoption.

Spouses Petronilo Ramirez and Anacleta Camandre were childless. Emiliano Guzman was the natural son of Petronilo Ramirez with one Cristina Guzman. The petitioners had reared and brought up Emiliano until he finished his course as a forest ranger. The governing law at the time of filing was the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), as the petition was filed before July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. The Civil Code of the Philippines contained Article 178, which petitioners argued impliedly sanctioned the adoption of a person of age.

On May 20, 1940, spouses Petronilo Ramirez and Anacleta Camandre filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the adoption of Emiliano Guzman. Emiliano was of age and was the natural son of Petronilo Ramirez with one Cristina Guzman. The petition alleged that the petitioners were childless, that Emiliano had been reared and brought up by them until he finished his course as a forest ranger, and that both Emiliano and his natural mother consented to the adoption.

The lower court denied the petition, declaring that a person of age cannot legally be adopted under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioners appealed from this order of denial.

The applicable law was the old Code of Civil Procedure, the petition having been filed prior to July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure spoke only of a "minor" as the subject of adoption proceedings. Petitioners contended that Article 178 of the Civil Code, which impliedly sanctioned the adoption of a person of age, had not been repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and remained operative.

• Implied Repeal Not Applicable: Petitioners argued that the provisions of Article 178 of the Civil Code, which impliedly sanctions the adoption of a person of age, cannot be deemed repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Coexistence of Laws: Petitioners maintained that the Civil Code provisions on adoption could validly coexist with the Code of Civil Procedure's provisions on the subject.

• Statutory Construction — Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: Whether the use of the term "minor" in Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes the adoption of adults.
• Implied Repeal — Civil Code vs. Code of Civil Procedure: Whether Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, impliedly repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on adoption, including Article 178.

• Statutory Construction — Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: Yes. The use of the term "minor" in Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes the adoption of adults, pursuant to the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
• Implied Repeal — Civil Code vs. Code of Civil Procedure: Yes. Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure is a complete enactment on the subject of adoption and was intended as a substitute for the earlier Civil Code provisions, thereby impliedly repealing them.

• Statutory Construction — Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of a "minor" as the subject of adoption proceedings. In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the use of the term "minor" precludes the adoption of adults. The trial court correctly ruled on this basis, applying the statutory construction maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius — the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Since the Code of Civil Procedure expressly limited adoption to minors, adults were necessarily excluded from its coverage.

• Implied Repeal — Civil Code vs. Code of Civil Procedure: Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. Viewed as such, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter. While implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored as a general rule, the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, operating as a repeal of the earlier act. The Court relied on Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York and People vs. Thornton for the proposition that where the legislature frames a new statute intended to cover the whole subject and serve as a complete system, whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed.

• Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another. The Court applied this maxim to hold that the Code of Civil Procedure's use of the term "minor" in its adoption provisions necessarily excluded adults from being adopted.
• Implied Repeal by Complete Enactment — While implied repeal is not favored, a later statute that covers the whole subject of an earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute operates as a repeal of the earlier act. The Court held that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure was a complete enactment on adoption, thereby impliedly repealing the Civil Code's provisions on the matter, including Article 178.

• "Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of 'minor' as the subject of the adoption proceeding provided therein; and, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the use of the term 'minor' precludes, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the adoption of adults. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the statutory construction principle that the express reference to minors in the adoption provisions excludes adults from eligibility for adoption.

• "While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet 'if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.'" — This passage articulates the doctrine of implied repeal applied to hold that the Code of Civil Procedure superseded the Civil Code's adoption provisions.

• Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 — Cited as supporting authority for the doctrine that a later act covering the whole subject of an earlier one and intended as a substitute operates as a repeal of the earlier act.
• People vs. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 57 N.E. 841 — Cited for the proposition that where the legislature frames a new statute intended to cover the whole subject and make a revision of the whole subject, whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded.

• Sections 765–769, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) — These sections governed adoption proceedings and spoke only of a "minor" as the subject of adoption. The Court held that the use of "minor" precluded the adoption of adults.
• Article 178, Civil Code — Petitioners argued this provision impliedly sanctioned the adoption of a person of age. The Court held that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a complete enactment on adoption, had impliedly repealed this provision.

Avanceña, C.J., Laurel, and Horrilleno, JJ., concurred.

• Diaz, J. — The dissent argued that Chapter XLI of Act No. 190 could not have repealed all provisions of the Civil Code on adoption because it referred only to the manner in which a competent person may adopt a minor, and did not clearly state or permit the inference that an adult cannot be adopted even with consent. The dissent viewed adoption in cases such as this as a contract requiring judicial authorization, which should not be denied when not contrary to law, morals, or public order. The dissent emphasized that Article 178 of the Civil Code had not been repealed and could validly coexist with the Code of Civil Procedure provisions. The dissent further noted that the adoption sought was not merely the establishment of a fictitious paternity but a confirmation of a real paternity between Petronilo Ramirez and Emiliano Guzman, who was his natural son, and that the petitioners, being childless, had raised and educated Emiliano. The dissent voted to revoke the appealed order and to permit the adoption.