Imutan vs. Court of Appeals

Certiorari does not lie against a Court of Appeals resolution denying a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial where the Special Division of Five's final 3-2 vote is clear and complies with Section 33 of the Judiciary Act; tentative votes during deliberation do not control, and no grave abuse of discretion is present. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained.

The case reaches the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari challenging a resolution of the Court of Appeals' Special Division of Five. Section 33 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, required the Presiding Justice to designate two additional Justices when the original three-Justice division failed to reach a unanimous vote, and made the concurrence of a majority of the five-Justice division necessary for the pronouncement of judgment. The dispute concerns how that majority requirement operates when the votes on a motion for reconsideration and an alternative motion for new trial are divided. Petitioner John A. Imutan had been convicted of bigamy, and the Court of Appeals had affirmed that conviction in a 3-2 decision before the motions at issue were filed.

John A. Imutan contracted marriage with Aurea Martin on June 25, 1956. While that marriage was still valid and subsisting, he contracted a second marriage with Leonida Limpiada on August 6, 1960. On the basis of these two marriages, Imutan was charged with bigamy before the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the costs. Imutan appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Before the Court of Appeals, Imutan's defense was that the second marriage was a "gunshot marriage" entered into under duress and intimidation. He also questioned the marriage applications and the marriage license, claiming that the applications were not public documents, lacked notarial details, and were sworn before Atty. Magin Dones, who was allegedly not a notary public at the time. The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this defense. The Court of Appeals found the "gunshot marriage" version inherently weak and improbable, noting among other things that the marriage license was applied for long before the marriage, that Imutan got his clothes from his first wife a few months after the second marriage, and that the annulment action was filed only on August 13, 1963, after the bigamy charge had already been filed on February 4, 1963. The Court of Appeals also observed that Leonida Limpiada's testimony in Imutan's favor was inconsistent with the natural behavior of a woman scorned, and that the force claimed by Imutan could have been his fear of prosecution for the offense imputed to him by Leonida.

On March 13, 1974, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of Five affirmed the conviction in a 3-2 decision. Justice de Castro wrote the majority opinion; Justices Lucero and Santos filed separate concurring opinions; Justice Gaviola dissented in an extended opinion concurred in by Justice Fernandez. Imutan filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1974. While that motion was pending, he filed on July 8, 1974 a motion to consider the motion for reconsideration in the alternative as a motion for new trial. During the deliberations on these motions, Justice de Castro initially voted to treat the motion for reconsideration as one for new trial, while Justices Lucero and Santos voted to deny outright and Justices Fernandez and Gaviola voted to acquit.

In the resolution of September 2, 1974, however, Justice de Castro categorically voted for an outright denial of the motions, incorporating the extended opinion of Justice Lucero as an integral part of the resolution. Justices Lucero and Santos concurred; Justices Gaviola and Fernandez dissented. The resolution denied both the motion for reconsideration and the alternative motion for new trial. Imutan then filed the present petition for certiorari, arguing that the Special Division's voting produced no majority for conviction—two votes for conviction, two for acquittal, and one for new trial—and that he should therefore be acquitted, or at least granted a new trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the final 3-2 vote denying the motions was clear and that no grave abuse of discretion attended the Court of Appeals' resolution.

• Majority Vote in Special Division of Five: Petitioner argued that for a judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, there must be a concurrence in the Special Division of Five of three unequivocal, clear-cut votes of conviction without qualifications or reservations. He maintained that where the voting is two for conviction, two for acquittal, and one for new trial, there is no concurrence of a majority vote for conviction, and the accused should be acquitted.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in maintaining the judgment of conviction on the basis of an equally divided and inconclusive vote on the motion for reconsideration.
• New Trial: Petitioner contended that, at the very least, his motion for new trial should have been granted. He asserted that the newly discovered evidence—documents showing that the second marriage was entered into under duress and intimidation and that the marriage application/license was defective—would establish his defense. He also argued that Justice de Castro's vote was really for the granting of a new trial and not an unconditional vote for conviction.

• Admissibility of Marriage Applications: The Solicitor General argued that Exhibits 2 and 2-A were correctly admitted in evidence irrespective of their characterization as public or private writings. He maintained that the objections to their defective jurats were not raised in the lower court and could not be raised for the first time on appeal, let alone in a motion for reconsideration, and that Imutan did not deny his signature on the documents.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and alternative motion for new trial.
• Majority Vote in Special Division of Five: Whether the Special Division of Five's voting produced a valid majority for the denial of the motions and the sustenance of the conviction, considering the alleged 2-2-1 split.
• Finality of Justice de Castro's Vote: Whether Justice de Castro's final vote in the September 2, 1974 resolution was for outright denial of the motions, rather than for new trial.
• New Trial: Whether the Court of Appeals should have granted petitioner's alternative motion for new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence regarding the defective marriage application/license and duress.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. Certiorari does not lie; grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals' resolution did not exhibit such abuse.
• Majority Vote in Special Division of Five: Yes. There was compliance with Section 33 of the Judiciary Act; three of the five Justices—Lucero, Santos, and de Castro—voted to deny the motions, constituting a majority of the Special Division.
• Finality of Justice de Castro's Vote: Yes. Justice de Castro's final and categorical vote in the September 2, 1974 resolution was for outright denial of the motions; his tentative vote during deliberation did not control.
• New Trial: No. The alleged newly discovered evidence would not alter the judgment; a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, and objections to the marriage applications were not raised below.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Abuse of discretion alone is insufficient; the abuse must be so grave, as where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative. The Court found that the September 2, 1974 resolution could not be tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The extended concurring opinion of Justice Lucero, incorporated into the resolution, detailed the reasons for denying the motions, discussed the main points raised, and was supported by existing jurisprudence. Thus, certiorari did not lie.

• Majority Vote in Special Division of Five: Section 33 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, provides that when the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. The Court found that three of the five members of the Special Division voted to deny the motion for reconsideration and the alternative motion for new trial: Acting Presiding Justice Lucero, who filed an extended opinion; Justice Santos, who concurred; and Justice de Castro, who likewise concurred and incorporated Justice Lucero's opinion as an integral part of the resolution. There was therefore compliance with Section 33. The petitioner could not insist on a 2-2-1 split when the final resolution showed a clear 3-2 vote against his motions.

• Finality of Justice de Castro's Vote: The Court held that Justice de Castro declared in no uncertain terms in the resolution under litigation that his vote was for an outright denial of the motions. He affirmed categorically that he was for outright denial, revising his original vote for new trial since it had no support even from Justices Fernandez and Gaviola, who insisted on acquittal and refused to vote in the alternative for a new trial if acquittal was not obtainable. Against this definitive contrary statement made after thorough deliberation, petitioner's insistence on the nature of Justice de Castro's vote, based largely on the configuration of and explanations accompanying the preliminary voting, could not stand. Positions initially taken when issues are yet under study and consideration do not decide cases; they are explanatory in nature, formulated to elicit full commentary, and are merely means by which a well-considered conclusion can be reached. They must change when dictated by the entire body of reasons and arguments tabled at the end of the study. Justice de Castro wholly adopted Justice Lucero's opinion detailing why the motions should be denied.

• New Trial: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in denying the alternative motion for new trial. Under Revised Rule 121, Sections 1 and 2, the grounds for new trial are that new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. The alleged newly discovered evidence concerned the defective marriage applications and the fact that Atty. Magin Dones was allegedly not a notary public when he administered the oath. The Court held that even if proven, this would not alter the conclusion that the motions were without merit because a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained. Only marriages solemnized without a marriage license are void under Article 80 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, the issue of the validity of the marriage applications was not raised in the lower court and could not be raised for the first time on appeal or in a motion for reconsideration. The Court also noted that petitioner's main defense of duress and intimidation had been rejected by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and the alleged new evidence on the marriage application/license would not alter the conclusion that the motions were without merit. The Court clarified that it was not ruling on the March 13, 1974 decision since it was not squarely before it, apart from the rule that it was bound by the findings and conclusions of fact made by the Court of Appeals.

• Grave abuse of discretion — Such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient; the abuse must be so grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court applied this standard to reject petitioner's certiorari challenge to the Court of Appeals' resolution.
• Special Division of Five under Section 33, Judiciary Act — When the three Justices of a division do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices. The concurrence of a majority of such division is necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. The Court found that three of the five Justices voted to deny the motions, satisfying the majority requirement.
• Final vote controls over tentative or deliberative votes — Positions initially taken when issues are yet under study and consideration do not decide cases; they are explanatory in nature and may change when dictated by the entire body of reasons and arguments tabled at the end of the study. The final vote of a Justice, as expressed in the resolution disposing of the motions, is controlling. The Court applied this to Justice de Castro's final vote for outright denial, notwithstanding his earlier tentative vote for new trial.
• New trial based on newly discovered evidence — Under Revised Rule 121, Sections 1 and 2, a new trial may be granted where new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. The Court held that the alleged newly discovered evidence on the defective marriage application/license would not alter the judgment.
• Marriage under a license wrongfully obtained — A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained. Only marriages solemnized without a marriage license are void under Article 80 of the New Civil Code. The Court applied this rule to hold that the alleged defect in the marriage application or the notary's authority would not invalidate the second marriage or change the bigamy conviction.
• Objections not raised below — Objections to the admissibility or characterization of evidence not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, let alone in a motion for reconsideration. The Court applied this to petitioner's objections to the marriage applications.

• "By 'grave abuse of discretion' is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." — This defines the threshold for certiorari and is the standard the Court applied to reject petitioner's challenge to the Court of Appeals' resolution.
• "It is therefore clear that there was compliance with the provisions of Section 33 of the Judiciary Act as amended which provides that '(I)n the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.'" — This states the Court's holding that the Special Division of Five validly denied the motions by a 3-2 vote.
• "Positions initially taken when issues are yet under study and consideration do not decide cases." — This is the ratio for treating Justice de Castro's final vote, not his tentative deliberation vote, as controlling.
• "A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained." — This supports the Court's conclusion that the alleged newly discovered evidence on the defective marriage application/license would not alter the bigamy conviction.

• Liwanag vs. Castro, 106 Phil. 375 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the controlling standard for the certiorari petition.
• People vs. Vallarta, No. L-32728, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 476 — Cited for the requirement that certiorari lies only upon a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, the antithesis of the judicial prerogative.
• Eduardo Eigenman vs. Marydeen Guerra and Froilan Guerra, 61 O.G. (31) 4722 — Cited for the rule that a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained; applied to reject the new trial motion.
• Melchor vs. Melchor, 102 Neb. 790, 169 NW 720 — Cited in Eigenman vs. Guerra for the same rule on the wrongful obtention of a marriage license.
• Associated Realty Development Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-18056, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 152 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court is bound by the findings and conclusions of fact made by the Court of Appeals.

• Section 33, Judiciary Act, as amended — Provides that when the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. Applied: the Court found that three of the five Justices voted to deny the motions, satisfying the majority requirement.
• Revised Rule 121, Sections 1 and 2 — Grounds for new trial: new and material evidence discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Applied: the alleged newly discovered evidence on the defective marriage application/license would not alter the judgment.
• Article 80, New Civil Code — Declares marriages solemnized without a marriage license void. Applied: only the absence of a marriage license renders a marriage void; a license wrongfully obtained does not invalidate the marriage.

• Barredo (Chairman), J. — concurred.
• Guerrero, J. — concurred.
• Abad Santos, J. — concurred.
• Aquino, J. — filed a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that Justice de Castro's tentative vote during deliberation was not controlling; his final and indubitable vote in the September 2, 1974 resolution denied the motions and reaffirmed the judgment of conviction.