Ilusorio vs. Bildner

Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, and the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any material matter was made. The place where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn is immaterial; what matters is where the false statement was intentionally given or submitted in a judicial proceeding.

Petitioner Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed to be the bona fide chairman and president of Lakeridge Development Corporation (LDC), the registered owner of properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay City. Respondents, purporting to be corporate officers of LDC, filed petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of certificates of title over these properties after allegedly losing the originals. Petitioner opposed the petitions, alleging that she had possession of the titles. The dispute centered on whether respondents' statements in the petitions constituted perjury and where the offense was committed for purposes of venue.

Petitioner Erlinda K. Ilusorio charged respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueño with perjury before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. The charge arose from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati. The Information alleged that respondents falsely subscribed and swore to a petition before a notary public in Pasig City, claiming that the title was lost when in truth it was in the possession of petitioner. Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio, and Aurora Montemayor before the Pasig City MeTC, arising from their filing of three petitions on behalf of LDC before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 17010, 17011, and 17012 covering properties in Tagaytay City.

As purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles after the owner's copies thereof could no longer be found "despite earnest and diligent efforts" to locate the same. Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC, had possession of those titles, filed her opposition to respondents' petitions. Respondents forthwith amended their respective petitions, the amendments stating that they filed the petitions in the belief that the titles had been lost, that petitioner opposed on the ground that the titles were not lost and were in their possession, and that respondents had no authority or legal basis to take and continue to have possession of the titles.

Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and Tagaytay RTCs, petitioner filed charges of falsification of public documents and perjury against respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. By Resolution of April 6, 2000, the Investigating Prosecutor dismissed the falsification charges but found probable cause to indict respondents for perjury. Four Informations for perjury were accordingly filed before the MeTC Pasig. After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their quashal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged character of the pleadings.

• Misapplication of Precedents: Petitioner argued that the lower courts erred in relying on Flordelis vs. Himalaloan and People vs. Aquino in holding that statements made in pleadings, even if perjurious or false, are absolutely privileged and not subject to criminal prosecution.
• Inapplicability of Aquino: Petitioner contended that People vs. Aquino does not apply because that case involved a libel case, and there is no authority stating that the rules on absolute privileged statements in pleadings apply to both crimes of perjury and libel.
• Inapplicability of Flordelis: Petitioner posited that Flordelis vs. Himalaloan does not apply because the Court sustained the quashal of the information for perjury in that case since the answer to the complaint containing the alleged false allegations did not have to be under oath.

• Procedural Defect: Respondents argued that the petition should have been first filed with the Court of Appeals, pointing to the petitioner's apparent disregard of the established policy of judicial hierarchy of courts.
• Privileged Character of Pleadings: Respondents reiterated the congruent rulings of the MeTC and RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel in a pleading are privileged in nature.
• Effect of Amendment: Respondents contended that since they had amended the original petitions, there were no more bases for the charges of perjury.

• Venue: Whether the venue of the Informations for perjury was properly laid in Pasig City.
• Privileged Character of Pleadings: Whether the questioned petitions of respondents are absolutely privileged on the basis of Flordelis and Aquino, such that the Informations for perjury should be quashed.

• Venue: No. Venue of the Informations was improperly laid in Pasig. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, and the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any material matter was made — in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay, where the petitions were filed and where the alleged false statements found relevance or materiality.
• Privileged Character of Pleadings: No. The lower courts misappreciated the rulings in Flordelis and Aquino. The petitions-bases of the subject Informations for perjury are required by law to be under oath, unlike the answer in Flordelis which need not be under oath, and Aquino involved a libel case where the term "absolute privilege" has an established technical meaning in connection with civil actions for libel and slander.

• Venue: The Court found that the allegations in each of the Informations indicated Pasig as the situs of the offense charged only because the petitions were notarized there. However, the Informations did not mention that the petitions were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-Affidavits, which initiated the criminal actions, reflected such jurisdictional details. The Court held that the allegation in each Information that perjury was committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction. The purported perjurious petition quoted in each Information indicated that venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively. Citing Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court enumerated the four elements of perjury: (a) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. The Court emphasized that it is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires which is imperative in perjury. Venue in criminal cases being jurisdictional, the action for perjury must be instituted and tried where the deliberate making of the untruthful statement was made. It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner's duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may issue. Citing United States vs. Cañet, the Court held that it is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, swore to and knowingly submitted false evidence material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding. The gist of the offense is not the making of the affidavit in a particular place, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the proceeding is pending.

• Privileged Character of Pleadings: The Court addressed the sole issue raised by petitioner — whether the questioned petitions are absolutely privileged. Citing Choa vs. People, the Court clarified that Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases, and the term "absolute privilege" has an established technical meaning in connection with civil actions for libel and slander. The Flordelis case is likewise not in point because there, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified answer, and the Court held that no perjury could be committed because an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath, thus one element of the crime of perjury was absent — namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law. In the present case, respondents' petitions-bases of the subject Informations for perjury are required by law to be under oath. Thus, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated the Court's rulings in Flordelis and Aquino.

• Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional — Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, and the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any material matter was made. The Court applied this doctrine in denying the petition, holding that the Pasig MeTC had no jurisdiction over the Informations because the alleged perjurious statements were made in Makati and Tagaytay, where the petitions were filed, not in Pasig where they were merely notarized.

• Gist of Perjury — The gist of the offense of perjury is not the making of the affidavit in a particular place, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the proceeding is pending. It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, swore to and knowingly submitted false evidence material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding. The Court applied this doctrine, citing United States vs. Cañet, to hold that the place of notarization in Pasig was immaterial to the offense of perjury.

• Elements of Perjury — The four elements of perjury are: (a) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. The Court cited this enumeration from Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice in determining whether there is a prima facie case of perjury.

• Absolute Privilege in Pleadings — The term "absolute privilege" has an established technical meaning in connection with civil actions for libel and slander, not perjury. The Court applied this doctrine, citing Choa vs. People, to reject the lower courts' reliance on Flordelis and Aquino, clarifying that those cases involved an answer that need not be under oath and a libel case, respectively, unlike the petitions in the present case which are required by law to be under oath.

• "It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, 'swore to' and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit." — This passage from United States vs. Cañet articulates the controlling doctrine that the gist of perjury is the intentional giving of false evidence, not the place of subscription and swearing, and was central to the Court's ruling on venue.

• "Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional, the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that venue for perjury lies where the false statement was deliberately made, not where the affidavit was notarized.

• "The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because 'an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath,' thus, 'it is at once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law.'" — This passage from Choa vs. People, quoted by the Court, clarifies why Flordelis does not support the lower courts' ruling on the privileged character of pleadings, distinguishing the answer in that case from the petitions at issue which are required by law to be under oath.

• United States vs. Cañet, 30 Phil. 371 (1915) — Controlling precedent on the gist of perjury, holding that it is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn; the offense is the intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the proceeding is pending. The Court relied on this case to hold that venue was improperly laid in Pasig.

• Choa vs. People, 447 Phil. 230 (2003) — Controlling precedent clarifying that Sison and Aquino involve libel cases where "absolute privilege" has an established technical meaning, and that Flordelis is not in point because an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath. The Court relied on this case to reject the lower courts' application of Flordelis and Aquino.

• Flordelis vs. Judge Himalalaon, 173 Phil. 616 (1978) — Distinguished by the Court; the case involved perjury for false statements in a verified answer that need not be under oath, thus one element of perjury was absent. The Court held that this case does not apply to the present petitions which are required by law to be under oath.

• People vs. Aquino, 124 Phil. 1179 (1966) — Distinguished by the Court; the case involved libel, not perjury, and the term "absolute privilege" has an established technical meaning in connection with civil actions for libel and slander. The Court held that this case does not support the lower courts' ruling.

• Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993, 226 SCRA 438 — Cited for the enumeration of the four elements of perjury in determining whether there is a prima facie case.

• People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665 (1938) — Cited for the doctrine that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional.

• Cudia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 173 — Cited for the proposition that the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement was made.

• Article 183, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of false testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations, penalizing any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The Court applied this provision to determine the elements of perjury and the proper venue for the offense.

• Section 2(c), Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. The Court applied this provision to reject respondents' procedural objection based on the principle of hierarchy of courts, holding that the issue tendered was a question of law.

• Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson)
• Justice Dante O. Tinga
• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Justice Arturo D. Brion