Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals

Eight separate informations for estafa, each charging a single offense against a different offended party, are not duplicitous and properly charge eight distinct crimes, because estafa against a corporate principal through abuse of confidence and estafa against individual buyers through deceit arise from different criminal intents, modes of commission, acts, occasions, and injured parties, constituting concurso real rather than delito continuado.

Petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon, and Rosendo Piñon were respectively the President, Finance Manager, and Sales Director of Apple Realty and Development Corporation, which had been appointed agent of Hometrust Development Corporation under a Contract of Agency dated July 30, 1990 to sell lots and houses on a commission basis, with the express restriction that the agents could not receive any form of payment from buyers or issue receipts therefor. Despite this prohibition, petitioners collected payments from several lot buyers and failed to remit the amounts to Hometrust, prompting the filing of criminal complaints for estafa.

On July 30, 1990, Hometrust Development Corporation appointed Apple Realty and Development Corporation as its agent to sell lots and houses on a commission basis, under an express restriction that the agent could not receive any form of payment from buyers or issue receipts therefor. Petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon, and Rosendo Piñon, as President, Finance Manager, and Sales Director respectively of Apple Realty, were bound by this prohibition.

Notwithstanding the restriction, petitioners represented to several prospective lot buyers that they were authorized to collect payments and issue receipts. Relying on these representations, seven buyers—Erlinda Sayasa, Rogelio Damasco, Gina G. Teston, Filomena Lanozo, Natividad Diaz, Florida Gargoles, and Marcelita Ranara—delivered various sums to petitioners as reservation fees or downpayments on their purchases, totaling at least ₱353,500.00 across all transactions. Petitioners did not remit these collections to Hometrust but instead misappropriated and converted the amounts to their own personal use. Despite repeated demands, they failed and refused to restitute the sums.

On July 21, 1992, eight informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kalookan City. Criminal Case No. C-40482 charged petitioners with estafa against Hometrust Development Corporation, alleging the aggregate amount of ₱353,500.00 collected from the seven buyers and misappropriated to the damage and prejudice of the corporation. Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 each charged estafa against one of the seven individual lot buyers, alleging that petitioners, by falsely pretending to possess authority to collect payments, induced each buyer to deliver sums which were then misappropriated to the damage and prejudice of the respective complainant.

On July 30, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 on the ground of duplicity of offenses, contending that the same acts charged in Criminal Case No. C-40482 were the same acts charged individually in the seven other cases. The trial court denied the motion on December 10, 1992, holding that each information charged only one offense and that the rule on duplicitous informations did not apply. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari and prohibition, raising the same sole ground of duplicity. The appellate court dismissed the petition on June 22, 1993, sustaining the trial court's reasoning and explaining that the eight cases involved different parties, amounts, and dates, with each information charging only one offense.

• Duplicity of Informations: Petitioner argued that the informations were duplicitous because the acts alleged in Criminal Case No. C-40482, covering the period July 1990 to December 1991, were the same acts charged individually in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489, and that the complainants in all eight cases were effectively one and the same.
• Identity of Offense: Petitioner maintained that since the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 also stated that petitioners had defrauded respondent corporation, the allegations of damage to the individual complainants should be treated as superfluities, and all seven cases should be deemed integrated into Criminal Case No. C-40482.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in filing eight separate informations for what was, according to their theory, only one offense of estafa against respondent corporation.

• Non-Duplicity: Respondent corporation argued that the informations were not duplicitous, each charging only one offense of estafa, and that the abuse of certiorari was being employed for unnecessary delay in the resolution of a mere interlocutory order.
• Separate Offenses: Respondent countered that the eight cases involved different parties, amounts, and dates, and that each information charged only one offense, as correctly held by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

• Duplicity of Informations: Whether the eight informations were duplicitous for charging the same offense in multiple informations.
• Identity of Offense: Whether the estafa charged against respondent corporation in Criminal Case No. C-40482 was the same offense as those charged against the seven individual lot buyers in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489.
• Concurso de Delitos: Whether the seven acts of defraudation against the lot buyers constituted a delito continuado (one continuous crime) or concurso real (material plurality of seven separate crimes).
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in filing eight separate informations.

• Duplicity of Informations: No. Each information charged only one offense of estafa, and the rule on duplicitous informations under Section 3(e), Rule 117 did not apply.
• Identity of Offense: No. The estafa against the corporation was committed through abuse of confidence under Article 315(1)(b), while the estafas against the lot buyers were committed through deceit under Article 315(2)(a), involving different criminal intents, modes, acts, occasions, and injured parties.
• Concurso de Delitos: The seven acts against the lot buyers constituted concurso real—seven juridically independent crimes of estafa—not delito continuado, because each originated from a separate criminal intent committed on different dates and in separate places.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. There was no grave abuse of discretion in filing eight separate charges, as eight distinct crimes were actually committed; and the ground of double jeopardy was never raised in the motion to quash and could not be the basis for attributing grave abuse of discretion to the prosecutor.

• Duplicity of Informations: A duplicitous information is one that charges more than one offense in a single information, except where the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. Section 3(e), Rule 117 governs this ground. Each of the eight informations here alleged only one offense of estafa, involving different parties, amounts, and dates. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly denied the motion to quash on this basis. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 117 mandatorily provides that the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Since petitioners raised only duplicity, no other ground—including double jeopardy—could be entertained.

• Identity of Offense: The estafa against respondent corporation was committed through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence under Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, the operative act being the failure to turn over or deliver to the corporation the amounts collected despite a duty to do so. The felony was consummated on the dates when such amounts were to be delivered under the agency agreement, and the aggrieved party was the corporation, which suffered damages to the extent of the unremitted sums. In contrast, the estafas against the lot buyers were committed by deceit or false pretenses under Paragraph 2(a) of the same article, the accused having falsely pretended to possess the power to collect payments despite the express prohibition imposed by their principal. The offense was consummated upon receipt of the amounts from each buyer, and the aggrieved parties were the individual buyers, who were deprived not only of their money but primarily of their property rights over the lots they purchased. The requisite elements differed: abuse of confidence and damage for the corporation; deceit and damage for the buyers. Prior demand is required in estafa through abuse of confidence but not in estafa through deceit, further underscoring the distinction. The mention of the seven buyers' names and amounts in Criminal Case No. C-40482 served only to explain the source and quantum of damage to the corporation, while the statement in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 that the accused "defrauded and deceived" the corporation was surplusage.

• Concurso de Delitos: The series of acts against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each buyer on different dates and in separate places, originating from separate criminal intents and resulting in separate felonies. Even assuming an identical design, the defraudations were committed over approximately one and a half years at substantial intervals in time and distance. More conclusively, after committing one estafa, the accused could not have foreknown when or whether they could replicate the same felony against another still-unknown victim, proving that the criminal intent in a preceding swindle could not operate as the same criminal intent in futuro as regards a subsequent estafa. The seven cases thus fall under concurso real, yielding seven juridically independent crimes, for a total of eight crimes of estafa.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Since eight distinct crimes were committed, the prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in filing eight separate charges. The ground of double jeopardy was never raised in the motion to quash, and there is no existing rule on double jeopardy governing the situation petitioners described; it would be absurd to claim that the prosecutor's non-application of a non-invoked and non-existent rule constituted grave abuse of discretion. However, petitioners are not foreclosed from raising the defense of double jeopardy under Section 8, Rule 117 at trial, should the evidence and developments establish a supervenient factual basis therefor.

• Duplicity of Information — An information is duplicitous when it charges more than one offense in a single information, except where the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. Each information must charge only one offense; where it does, a motion to quash on the ground of duplicity must fail. The Court applied Section 3(e), Rule 117, finding that each of the eight informations charged only one offense of estafa.

• Estafa Through Abuse of Confidence vs. Estafa Through Deceit — Estafa under Article 315(1)(b) is committed through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, where an agent fails to turn over collections to the principal despite a duty to do so; prior demand by the offended party is required. Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) is committed through deceit or false pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with the fraud; no prior demand is required. The Court held that these are separate felonies when committed against different parties, even if arising from the same transactions.

• Concurso Real (Material Plurality) — Where a series of felonious acts against different victims originates from separate criminal intents, committed on different dates and in separate places, they constitute concurso real—materially separate and juridically independent crimes—rather than a single continuous offense. The Court ruled that the seven defraudations against the lot buyers constituted seven separate crimes of estafa.

• Delito Continuado — A continuous crime requires a single criminal intent producing a series of acts. The Court rejected the application of delito continuado because the accused could not have foreknown when or whether they could replicate the same felony against another still-unknown victim, proving separate criminal intents for each act.

• Exclusivity of Grounds in Motion to Quash — Under Section 2, Rule 117, the court shall consider no grounds other than those distinctly specified in the motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Court enforced this rule by declining to consider double jeopardy, which was never raised in the motion to quash.

• Damage in Estafa — Actual damage is not necessary in estafa as long as it is capable of pecuniary estimation; mere temporary disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage. The Court applied this to hold that the lot buyers suffered damage through deprivation of their property rights over the lots they purchased.

• "The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused injury to different parties." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi distinguishing estafa against a principal from estafa against third-party buyers, establishing that different criminal intents, modes, acts, occasions, and parties yield separate felonies.

• "The series of acts committed against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different dates and in separate places, hence they originated from separate criminal intents and consequently resulted in separate felonies." — This defines the test for concurso real and explains why the seven defraudations did not constitute a delito continuado.

• "More conclusive is the fact that, after the commission of one estafa, the accused could not have had the foreknowledge as to when or whether they could replicate the same felony against another victim still necessarily unknown. This lack of prevision on their part definitely proves that the criminal intent entailed in a preceding swindle could not operate as the same criminal intent in futuro as regards another subsequent estafa." — This passage provides the decisive reasoning for rejecting delito continuado, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on continuous crimes.

• U.S. vs. Lim, 36 Phil. 682 (1917) — Cited for the proposition that estafa can be committed with both abuse of confidence and deceit against the same victim, and the accused may be charged under either mode.
• Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, etc., et al., L-38544, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 729 — Cited for the holding that estafa involving both abuse of confidence and deceit is more properly categorized as one committed through abuse of confidence.
• U.S. vs. Bleibel, 34 Phil. 227 (1916) — Cited for the rule that prior demand is required in estafa through abuse of confidence before criminal charges may be filed.
• U.S. vs. Asensi, 34 Phil. 750 (1916) — Cited for the rule that no prior demand is required where estafa is committed through deceit.
• People vs. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 (1938) — Cited for the principle that separate criminal intents arising from acts committed on different dates and in separate places result in separate felonies.
• People vs. Dichupa, L-16943-44, October 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 327 — Cited jointly with Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals for the principle that lack of prevision as to future victims proves separate criminal intents, negating delito continuado.
• U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil. 118 (1907) — Cited for the long-standing rule that actual damage is not necessary in estafa as long as it is capable of pecuniary estimation, and mere temporary disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage.

• Article 315, Paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, where an agent fails to turn over or deliver money received in behalf of the principal. Applied to the estafa against Hometrust Development Corporation in Criminal Case No. C-40482.
• Article 315, Paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa through deceit or false pretenses, where the offender falsely pretends to possess power or qualities to defraud another. Applied to the estafas against the seven individual lot buyers in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489.
• Section 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) — Mandates that a motion to quash shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor, and that the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Applied to bar consideration of double jeopardy, which was never raised in the motion to quash.
• Section 3(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Defines duplicity of information as a ground for a motion to quash, where a complaint or information charges more than one offense except where the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. Applied to reject the claim that the eight informations were duplicitous.
• Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Allows the accused to raise the defense of double jeopardy if the evidence at trial establishes a supervenient factual basis therefor. Cited to preserve petitioners' right to raise double jeopardy at trial despite its absence from the motion to quash.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred. Quiason, J., filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing that the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 did not allege the same offense charged in Criminal Case No. C-40482, emphasizing that the offense in C-40482 was the agents' failure to turn over collections to the principal, while the offenses in C-40483 to C-40489 were the unauthorized collection of payments from buyers without informing them of the lack of authority, causing disturbance of their property rights. Mendoza, J., took no part. Feliciano, J., was on leave.