Idul vs. Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 45, and the special civil action lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where the issues raised pertain to the wisdom or soundness of the Court of Appeals' decision rather than errors of jurisdiction, certiorari is beyond its province. Additionally, a seafarer's temporary total disability becomes permanent only when the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period, or when the physician fails to make such declaration after the lapse of that period; the seafarer's failure to secure the opinion of a third doctor renders the company-designated physician's assessment binding.

Petitioner Charlo P. Idul was employed by Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc. (Alster Shipping) on behalf of its principal, Johann Mkblumenthal GMBBH Reederei, for a period of 12 months. He boarded the vessel M/V IDA on April 14, 2008, to commence his services as a bosun. The employment was governed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC), which prescribes the rules on disability compensation for seafarers, including the role of the company-designated physician in assessing disability and the procedure for resolving conflicting medical assessments.

Petitioner Charlo P. Idul was employed by Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc. on behalf of its principal, Johann Mkblumenthal GMBBH Reederei, for a period of 12 months. On April 14, 2008, he boarded the vessel M/V IDA to commence his services as a bosun. On December 4, 2008, Idul figured in an accident while working when the lashing wires broke and hit his left leg, resulting in a fracture. He disembarked the vessel and underwent surgery in a hospital in France. Thereafter, he was repatriated back to the Philippines for further medical attention.

On December 11, 2008, he was referred by the company to Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) under the care of Dr. Robert Lim and orthopedic surgeon Dr. William Chuasuan Jr. He was given medication and instructed to undergo rehabilitation therapy, and was asked to come back for follow-up check-ups. The company-designated physician issued medical reports dated February 2, 2009, March 9, 2009, March 30, 2009, June 15, 2009, and July 6, 2009. In the medical report dated July 6, 2009, Dr. Chuasuan gave Idul a Grade 10 disability rating due to "immobility of ankle joint in abnormal position."

Prior to this, on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his own doctor of choice, Dr. Venancio P. Garduce Jr. After a single consultation, Dr. Garduce assessed Idul to be totally and permanently disabled. Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to pay Idul the amount of $10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the POEA SEC. However, Idul rejected the offer and insisted that he was entitled to full disability benefits.

On June 3, 2009, Idul filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with damages before the DOLE. During the preliminary mandatory conference, the parties failed to reach a settlement. In his Position Paper, Idul claimed that he was entitled to full disability benefits since the injury he suffered rendered him incapable of performing his grueling duties as a bosun. Due to the extent of his injury, he argued that he was entitled to a Disability Rating of Grade 1 or an equivalent of $60,000.00 in disability benefits. He posited that both doctors already concurred as to the extent and nature of his injury but Alster Shipping still failed to satisfy his claim. Additionally, he asked for sickness allowance and damages.

On the other hand, Alster Shipping denied liability for full disability benefits. It maintained that Idul was not eligible for full disability benefits considering that he was assessed by the company-designated physician to be suffering from a Grade 10 disability only. Thus, the parties are bound by such declaration of the company-designated physician in accordance with the POEA SEC. To support this assertion, it pointed out that Idul's condition did not even fall under Section 32 of the POEA SEC which enumerates Grade 1 disabilities. Moreover, the disability rating by Dr. Chuasuan was issued within the 240-day period, negating any claim that the temporary total disability developed into a permanent total disability. Additionally, Alster Shipping belied any claim against Mr. Almodiel, who was merely their VP for operations. Lastly, it contended that Idul is not entitled to damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Alster Shipping, giving more credence to the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan who were able to monitor and observe Idul while he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation, rather than Dr. Garduce's assessment which was made after a single consultation. On appeal, the NLRC reversed, explaining that it is the loss of earning capacity and not the mere medical significance of the injury that determines the gravity of disability. The CA, however, upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, holding that Idul's condition cannot be considered a permanent total disability that would entitle him to the maximum disability benefit of $60,000.00. The appellate court stressed that a temporary total disability becomes permanent only when the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period, or when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such declaration. Since there was no agreement on a third doctor, the CA held it was constrained to uphold the findings of Dr. Chuasuan with respect to Idul's disability.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed decision and resolution when it ruled that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
• Credence to Company Physician: Petitioner argued that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it solely gave credence to the certification of the company physician without considering the findings of petitioner's doctor of choice.
• Mode of Appeal: Petitioner manifested that the Court of Appeals was impleaded as public respondent in the petition conformably with Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, indicating reliance on the special civil action of certiorari.

• Disability Assessment: Respondent Alster Shipping maintained that Idul was not eligible for full disability benefits considering that he was assessed by the company-designated physician to be suffering from a Grade 10 disability only, and that the parties are bound by such declaration in accordance with the POEA SEC.
• Grade 1 Disability Not Applicable: Respondent pointed out that Idul's condition did not fall under Section 32 of the POEA SEC which enumerates Grade 1 disabilities.
• Timeliness of Assessment: Respondent argued that the disability rating by Dr. Chuasuan was issued within the 240-day period, negating any claim that the temporary total disability developed into a permanent total disability.
• Liability of Individual Respondent: Respondent belied any claim against Mr. Almodiel, who was merely their VP for operations.
• Damages and Attorney's Fees: Respondent contended that Idul is not entitled to damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.

• Procedural Remedy: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to assail the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution, given that an appeal under Rule 45 was available.
• Timeliness of Filing: Whether the petition was filed within the reglementary period for an appeal under Rule 45.
• Permanent Total Disability: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioner was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
• Conflicting Medical Assessments: Whether the company-designated physician's Grade 10 disability assessment should prevail over the seafarer's doctor of choice who assessed total and permanent disability.

• Procedural Remedy: No. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. The petition was improperly denominated and availed.
• Timeliness of Filing: No. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 3, 2013, and had 15 days or until October 18, 2013 to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The present petition was filed on November 15, 2013, way beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
• Permanent Total Disability: No. The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the NLRC Decision and reinstating the Labor Arbiter's Decision. A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when (1) the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or (2) when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such declaration.
• Conflicting Medical Assessments: No. Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of a Grade 10 disability, which was a result of months of consultations, examinations, and treatments, prevails over the findings of Dr. Garduce who only examined Idul once and based his medical assessment on the latter's previous medical history.

• Procedural Remedy: The Court clarified that while the caption of the pleading was denominated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner manifested that the CA was impleaded as public respondent conformably with Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 45, an appeal is the proper remedy to obtain the reversal of judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA. The Court cited the elementary rule that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. While the Court has previously granted a petition for certiorari despite the availability of an appeal, it only applies (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The case at bar does not fall under any of the exceptions.
• Timeliness of Filing: The Court noted that petitioner received the Resolution of the CA denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 3, 2013. Thus, he had 15 days or until October 18, 2013 to file its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. However, the present petition was only filed on November 15, 2013, way beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The Court observed that a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed to make up for the loss of petitioner's right to an ordinary appeal. The Court cited the rule that for the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
• Permanent Total Disability: The Court held that the CA correctly concluded that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when (1) the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or (2) when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such declaration. Citing Mawanay vs. Philippines Transmarine Carriers Inc., the Court explained that the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. In this case, the medical reports issued by Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan reveal that Idul was examined, treated, and rehabilitated for about seven months. Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of Idul's disability grading was issued on July 6, 2009, or on the 207th day from December 11, 2008, and therefore, well within the 240-day period. Clearly, Idul's condition did not become a permanent total disability just by the mere lapse of the 120-day period, especially since the extension was necessary for his rehabilitation.
• Conflicting Medical Assessments: The Court held that under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The Court stressed that the employee seeking disability benefits carries the responsibility to secure the opinion of a third doctor, and must actively or expressly request for it. The referral to a third doctor has been recognized by the Court to be a mandatory procedure. Failure to comply therewith is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, and renders the assessment by the company-designated physician binding on the parties. Considering the foregoing circumstances, Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of a Grade 10 disability, which was a result of months of consultations, examinations, and treatments, prevails. It certainly bears more weight than the findings of Dr. Garduce who only examined Idul once and based his medical assessment on the latter's previous medical history.

• Certiorari not a substitute for appeal — The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. For the writ to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where the issues raised pertain to the wisdom or soundness of the decision rather than errors of jurisdiction, certiorari is beyond its province. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition, as appeal under Rule 45 was available and adequate.
• Permanent total disability of seafarers — A seafarer's temporary total disability becomes permanent only when (1) the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or (2) when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such declaration. The Court applied this doctrine to find that Idul's condition did not become a permanent total disability, as Dr. Chuasuan's assessment was issued on the 207th day, well within the 240-day period.
• Third doctor referral as mandatory procedure — Under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The employee seeking disability benefits carries the responsibility to secure the opinion of a third doctor and must actively or expressly request for it. Failure to comply therewith is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, and renders the assessment by the company-designated physician binding on the parties.

• "Since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction." — This passage articulates the doctrine that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal and that errors of judgment are reviewable only by timely appeal.
• "For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered 'plain, speedy and adequate' if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency." — This passage defines the requisites for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and the meaning of "plain, speedy and adequate remedy."
• "If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists." — This passage from Mawanay v. Philippines Transmarine Carriers Inc. states the rule on the extension of the temporary total disability period and the employer's right to declare permanent disability within the 240-day period.

• Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 620 (2006) — Cited for the rule that where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
• Butuan Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 808 Phil. 443 (2017) — Cited for the elementary rule that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available.
• Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 521 Phil. 224 (2006) — Cited for the exceptions when a petition for certiorari may be granted despite the availability of an appeal.
• Asian Transmission Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 496 (2004) — Cited for the rule that appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65.
• Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155 (1997) — Cited for the requisites for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65.
• Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime Services Inc., 588 Phil. 895 (2008) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. Lobusta, 680 Phil. 137 (2012) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• Santiago vs. Pacbasin Shipmanagement Inc., 686 Phil. 255 (2012) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. vs. Penales, 694 Phil. 239 (2012) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• PhilAsia Shipping Agency Corp. vs. Tomacruz, 692 Phil. 632 (2012) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Munar, 702 Phil. 717 (2013) — Cited by the CA for the rule on when temporary total disability becomes permanent.
• Mawanay vs. Philippines Transmarine Carriers Inc., G.R. No. 228684, March 6, 2019 — Cited for the rule on the 120-day and 240-day periods for temporary total disability and the employer's right to declare permanent disability within the extended period.
• Hernandez vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 226103, January 24, 2018 — Cited for the rule that the employee seeking disability benefits carries the responsibility to secure the opinion of a third doctor.
• Multinational Ship Management, Inc. vs. Briones, G.R. No. 239793, January 27, 2020 — Cited for the rule that the referral to a third doctor is a mandatory procedure.
• Pacific Ocean Manning Inc. vs. Solacito, G.R. No. 217431, February 19, 2020 — Cited for the rule that failure to comply with the third doctor referral is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, rendering the assessment by the company-designated physician binding.
• Magsaysay Maritime Corp. et al. vs. Verga, G.R. No. 221250, October 10, 2018 — Cited for the rule that the company-designated physician's assessment prevails over the seafarer's doctor who examined him only once.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari, raising only questions of law. The Court applied this provision to determine that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.
• Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that the petition shall be filed within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court applied this provision to find that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
• Section 5, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Cited by the petitioner in manifesting that the Court of Appeals was impleaded as public respondent, indicating reliance on the special civil action of certiorari. The Court held that this remedy was improper because appeal was available.
• Section 20 (A) (3), 2010 POEA-SEC — Provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The Court applied this provision to hold that the seafarer's failure to secure a third doctor's opinion rendered the company-designated physician's assessment binding.
• Section 32, POEA SEC — Enumerates Grade 1 disabilities. The respondent pointed out that Idul's condition did not fall under this section, which the Court considered in affirming the Grade 10 disability assessment.

Justices Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez concurred. Justice Leonen was on wellness leave.