Ibañez vs. Hernandez

A petition for certiorari originally commenced in the Supreme Court must be dismissed when no majority of justices concurs in the opinion and the voting remains the same after rehearing, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 2, in relation to Rule 58, Section 1, notwithstanding a plurality view that non-political judgments of ordinary courts during the Japanese occupation are valid and enforceable under the Co Kim Cham doctrine.

Ciríaco Ibañez was a public official prosecuted before the Court of First Instance of Leyte for offenses under the Revised Penal Code. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines occurred during the pendency of his appeal, during which a Japanese-sponsored government functioned, including a Court of Appeals that heard his case. The validity of judgments rendered by courts during the occupation had been addressed by the Supreme Court in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, which held that non-political judgments of ordinary courts during the occupation are valid.

Ciríaco Ibañez was a public official facing seventeen cases for violation of Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code and four cases for malversation of public funds under Article 217, all tried jointly before the Court of First Instance of Leyte by agreement of the parties. On May 22, 1941, the trial court found him guilty in all cases but convicted him only in three of the seventeen Article 213 cases and three of the four Article 217 cases, applying Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ibañez appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's sentence with modification. He did not elevate the case further by certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals decision became final after fifteen days from promulgation. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance for execution pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53, made applicable to criminal cases by Section 17 of Rule 120. Execution could not proceed, however, because Ibañez had been hiding in the mountains of Leyte.

On June 8, 1945, after liberation, Ibañez filed a motion with the Court of First Instance seeking to suspend the reading of the Court of Appeals decision. He argued that the Court of Appeals, being a creation of the Japanese-sponsored government, had rendered null and void all its acts, and that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to read the decision because a constitutionally constituted Court of Appeals had not yet ruled on the case. The provincial fiscal of Leyte opposed the motion, and the court denied it on the strength of the doctrine in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. Ibañez then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 67, raising six grounds: his inability to attend to his cases or appeal due to hiding in the mountains to preserve loyalty to the Commonwealth; the Japanese government's attempt to arrest him; the alleged setting aside of his sentence by virtue of an amnesty; the alleged acquisition of international law status by his cases; the multiplicity of charges for the same act contrary to an Attorney General's circular; and the respondents' alleged excess of jurisdiction in ordering execution.

• Nullity of Japanese Occupation Courts: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals, being a creation of the Japanese-sponsored government, rendered all its acts null and void, including the decision affirming his conviction.
• Inability to Appeal: Petitioner maintained that he was prevented from attending to his cases on appeal, filing a motion for new trial, or appealing by certiorari to the Supreme Court because he had been hiding in the mountains to preserve his loyalty to the Commonwealth and avoid serving the invader.
• Amnesty: Petitioner argued that the sentence had been set aside by judicial authorities of Leyte by virtue of an amnesty granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
• International Law Status: Petitioner contended that the cases against him, having been decided by the Court of Appeals under the Japanese government, had acquired international law status.
• Multiplicity of Charges: Petitioner maintained that three of the seventeen cases and three of the four cases referred to the same subject matter, charging him with several offenses based on one and the same act, contrary to a circular of the Attorney General issued in October 1941.
• Excess of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that respondents had issued orders and taken steps to execute the Court of Appeals decision in excess of their powers and jurisdiction.

• Validity of Japanese Occupation Judgments: Whether judgments rendered by the Court of Appeals during the Japanese occupation are valid and enforceable, such that the respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering execution.
• Effect of Petitioner's Abscondment: Whether the petitioner's absence during the occupation, allegedly to preserve loyalty to the Commonwealth, affects the validity of the final judgment or entitles him to additional remedies.
• Disposition for Lack of Majority: Whether the petition must be dismissed when only five justices concur in the opinion and the voting remains the same after rehearing.

• Validity of Japanese Occupation Judgments: Yes (plurality). Non-political judgments of ordinary courts during the Japanese occupation are valid under Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, and the respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering execution.
• Effect of Petitioner's Abscondment: No (plurality). The petitioner's voluntary absence to avoid serving sentence did not affect the validity of the final judgment.
• Disposition for Lack of Majority: The petition was dismissed. Under Rule 56, Section 2, in relation to Rule 58, Section 1, when no majority is obtained in a case originally commenced in the Supreme Court and the voting remains the same after rehearing, the action is dismissed.

• Validity of Japanese Occupation Judgments: The plurality relied on the doctrine in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, which held that judgments and sentences of ordinary courts during the Japanese occupation, not of political complexion, are good and valid. The petitioner's convictions under Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code were not political in nature; they were ordinary criminal cases. Accordingly, the respondent judge acted within jurisdiction in ordering the petitioner to appear and serve the sentence. The plurality further reinforced this by distinguishing the dissenters' reliance on Jones vs. United States, arguing that the question of whether a government is de facto does not necessarily involve the question of sovereignty as a political question. The plurality identified three classes of de facto governments from Co Kim Cham: (1) a government that usurps by force or majority the rightful legal government; (2) a government established by military forces occupying enemy territory during war (government of paramount force); and (3) a government established by inhabitants rising in insurrection against the parent state. The Japanese occupation government fell under the second class, and its courts' non-political judgments were valid. US Supreme Court cases recognizing de facto governments in occupied territories — United States vs. Rice (Castine, Maine), Fleming vs. Page (Tampico, Mexico), Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Baldy vs. Hunter (Confederate States), and McCleod vs. United States (Filipino insurgents in Cebu) — were cited to support this conclusion.

• Effect of Petitioner's Abscondment: The plurality found that the petitioner, having submitted his appeal to the Court of Appeals without objection, had absconded into the mountains to avoid serving the sentence rather than for the reasons alleged in his petition. His self-imposed absence, which prevented him from filing a motion for new trial or an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, did not affect the validity of the sentence, which had already become final.

• Disposition for Lack of Majority: Only five justices concurred in the opinion, and after a rehearing the voting remained the same. Pursuant to Rule 56, Section 2, in relation to Rule 58, Section 1, a case originally commenced in the Supreme Court that fails to obtain a majority vote, with the voting unchanged after rehearing, must be dismissed. The petition was accordingly dismissed, without a majority ruling on the merits.

• Validity of Japanese Occupation Court Judgments — Judgments and sentences, not of political complexion, rendered by ordinary courts during the Japanese occupation are good and valid. This doctrine was established in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and reaffirmed in Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons. The plurality applied it to hold that the respondent judge acted within jurisdiction in ordering execution of the petitioner's non-political criminal convictions.

• Three Classes of De Facto Governments — As set forth in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon: (1) a government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; (2) a government established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, denominated a government of paramount force; and (3) a government established as an independent government by inhabitants who rise in insurrection against the parent state. The plurality classified the Japanese occupation government under the second class.

• Dismissal for Lack of Majority in Original Actions — Under Rule 56, Section 2, in relation to Rule 58, Section 1, when a case originally commenced in the Supreme Court fails to obtain a majority vote and the voting remains the same after rehearing, the action is dismissed. The plurality's legal reasoning, though representing the view of five justices, did not constitute a binding majority holding.

• "In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, as well as in that of Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 494), this Court has laid down the doctrine that the judgments and sentences, not of political complexion, of the ordinary court in these Islands during the Japanese occupation are good and valid." — This passage states the plurality's ratio decidendi on the validity of Japanese occupation court judgments, applying the Co Kim Cham doctrine to the petitioner's non-political criminal convictions.

• "The fact that after submitting, without objection, his appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner had absconded himself in the mountains to avoid serving the sentence rather than for the reason stated or alleged in his petition, and for that reason he was prevented, according to his allegation, from filing a motion for new trial, or an appeal by certiorari to this Court, did not affect the validity of the said sentence." — This passage articulates the plurality's rejection of the petitioner's claim that his absence during the occupation entitled him to additional remedies, holding that voluntary abscondment does not impair the finality of a judgment.

• "In view of the fact that there are only five Justices concurring in this opinion, and after a rehearing the voting remained the same, the petition for certiorari is dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 56 section 2, in relation with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court." — This is the dispositive passage explaining the procedural basis for dismissal, significant because it reveals that the plurality's reasoning on the merits did not command a majority and thus the case was resolved on procedural grounds.

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 113 — Controlling precedent establishing the doctrine that non-political judgments of ordinary courts during the Japanese occupation are valid. The plurality relied on this case as the primary authority for denying the petition on the merits.
• Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 494 — Followed the same doctrine as Co Kim Cham; cited by the plurality as additional authority for the validity of Japanese occupation court judgments.
• Jones vs. United States, 137 U.S. 202 — Cited by the dissenters for the proposition that sovereignty is a political question; the plurality distinguished and criticized this citation, arguing that de facto governments can exist under the same de jure sovereign without implicating the political question doctrine.
• United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton 258; Fleming vs. Page, 9 How. 614; Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Williams vs. Bruffy, 95 U.S. 176; Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388; McCleod vs. United States, 229 U.S. 416 — US Supreme Court cases cited by the plurality to demonstrate that governments established in temporarily occupied enemy territory or by insurgents have been recognized as de facto governments, supporting the validity of the Japanese occupation courts' non-political judgments.

• Article 213, Revised Penal Code — Defined the offense for which the petitioner was prosecuted in seventeen cases; the CFI convicted him in three of these cases.
• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Defined malversation of public funds; the CFI convicted the petitioner in three of four cases under this article.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Governed the imposition of penalty when two or more offenses are committed; applied by the CFI in convicting the petitioner in only three of each set of cases.
• Rule 56, Section 2, in relation to Rule 58, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provided the procedural basis for dismissal when no majority is obtained in a case originally commenced in the Supreme Court and the voting remains unchanged after rehearing.
• Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court — Authorized the petition for certiorari as a special civil action, the remedy invoked by the petitioner.
• Rule 53, Sections 8 and 9, made applicable to criminal cases by Rule 120, Section 17, Rules of Court — Governed the remand of the case to the lower court with a certified copy of the judgment for execution after the Court of Appeals decision became final.

Moran, Bengzon, Paras, and Pablo, JJ., concurred.

• Hilado, J. — Dissented on the ground that the doctrine in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, from which he had also dissented, was erroneously applied. He relied on Jones vs. United States for the proposition that the question of who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is a political, not a judicial, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments conclusively binds the courts. He argued that this principle had been consistently upheld by the US Supreme Court and English courts. He also referenced his prior dissents and concurring opinions in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, People vs. Jose, Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, and Castro vs. Court of Appeals, and indicated a more extended dissent would be registered in Etorma vs. Ravelo and Director of Prisons.

• Perfecto, J. — Concurred in Justice Hilado's dissent.

• Briones, M. — Dissented separately, arguing that the petitioner's retreat to the mountains of Leyte to escape the de facto government established by the Japanese was a legitimate exercise of his right not to render vassalage to a government of force. Because his absence prevented him from exhausting available remedies, justice required that he be given the opportunity to pursue his appeal now that liberation had restored the legitimate government. Briones voted to grant the petition.