Ibabao vs. People of the Phil.

The failure to lend aid on the spot to an injured party under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a qualifying circumstance that must be alleged in the Information; absent such allegation, the penalty next higher in degree cannot be imposed. An affidavit of recantation executed by a witness who previously testified in court does not constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.

Aniceto Ibabao was charged before the City Court of Davao, in Criminal Case No. 3091C, with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence arising from a vehicular incident. The Information did not allege that the accused had failed to lend on the spot to the injured person such help as was in his hands to give. The case reached the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12784-CR, which had increased the penalty imposed on petitioner for his failure to lend aid to the victim.

Before the City Court of Davao, in Criminal Case No. 3091C, Aniceto Ibabao was charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. The Information did not allege that the accused had failed to lend on the spot to the injured person such help as was in his hands to give.

Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Jose Patalinghog, Jr., a bystander, who testified that on April 30, 1967, at about 11:00 p.m., while he was at the Bankerohan terminal, he clearly saw an owner-type jeep bump a person. According to Patalinghog, the jeep did not stop; upon the request of a security guard, he gave chase, wrote down plate No. 57675, overtook the vehicle, and recognized the driver as the petitioner, and thereafter reported the incident to the Matina Police Sub-Station. For his part, petitioner presented two witnesses in support of his defense of alibi.

After trial, the City Court rendered a verdict of conviction, finding no cogent or sufficient reason for the accused not to lend aid on the spot to the fatally injured victim of the accident, and applying the penalty next higher in degree, prision correccional in its medium and maximum period. The accused was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one year eight months and twenty days of prision correccional as minimum to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as maximum, to pay the costs with accessories prescribed by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000 plus P2,000 moral damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon appeal, the then Court of Appeals modified the Decision by increasing the indemnity to P12,000, following the doctrine in People vs. Pantoja and People vs. Ompad, et al., and by imposing the penalty next higher in degree on the ground that appellant failed to stop and give aid to the victim. The appellate court fixed the indeterminate penalty at three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as minimum to seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor as maximum, eliminated the P2,000 moral damages as already included in the P12,000 indemnity, and deleted subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act No. 5465.

• Inapplicability of the Last Paragraph of Article 365: Petitioner submitted that the last paragraph of Article 365, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon an offender who fails to lend aid on the spot, is not applicable to offenses under paragraph 2 of the same Article because of the opening statement that "the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable," implying that paragraph 2 is in a class by itself and is not affected by the rest of the provisions of the same Article.
• Absence of Allegation in the Information: Petitioner contended that the increased penalty is inapplicable to him because the failure to give aid to the injured on the spot was not alleged in the Information.
• Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioner sought a new trial on the ground that the recantation by prosecution eyewitness Jose Patalinghog, Jr. constituted newly discovered evidence.

• Imposition of the Higher Penalty Under Article 365: Whether the failure of petitioner to lend aid to his victim justifies the imposition of the penalty next higher in degree to that provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 365, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code even though such circumstance was not alleged in the Information.
• Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether Patalinghog's affidavit of recantation is "newly discovered evidence" warranting new trial.

• Imposition of the Higher Penalty Under Article 365: No, as to petitioner. The last paragraph of Article 365 applies to all situations envisioned in the Article whenever there is an injured party, but the failure to lend aid is a qualifying circumstance that must be alleged in the Information to apprise the accused of the charge; absent such allegation, the penalty next higher in degree cannot be imposed.
• Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence: No. At this stage of the proceeding, the affidavit of recantation cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial, recantations being taken with great caution.

• Imposition of the Higher Penalty Under Article 365: The argument that the last paragraph of Article 365 does not apply to offenses under paragraph 2 was rejected as flawed. The proviso that "the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable" clearly refers to the preceding paragraphs; paragraphs 1 and 2 are exceptions to the application of those preceding paragraphs under the circumstances mentioned, and the last paragraph on failure to lend aid on the spot necessarily applies to all situations envisioned in the Article whenever there is an injured party. Nevertheless, the increased penalty was held inapplicable to petitioner because the failure to give aid to the injured on the spot was not alleged in the Information. The Court agreed with the ruling in People vs. Beduya that the failure to render assistance constitutes a qualifying circumstance because its presence raises the penalty by one degree, like treachery which qualifies homicide to murder, and the same must be alleged in the information to apprise the defendant of the charge, unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which, even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if proved at the trial without objection. The Court was likewise not inclined to consider such failure to lend assistance as a generic aggravating circumstance that would justify the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period, since it is not an aggravating circumstance listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence: The affidavit of recantation of Jose Patalinghog, Jr. could not be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial. In the first place, the affidavit was thought of only after the petition was initially denied for lack of merit. Secondly, as has been the consistent ruling of the Court, recantations should be taken with great caution, because if a new trial should be granted whenever an interested party succeeds in inducing some of the witnesses to vary their testimony outside of court after trial, there would be no end to every litigation. The Court adopted the ruling in People vs. Saliling, et al. that affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in court will not be countenanced for the purpose of securing a new trial, since it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses later change their minds, and because retracted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.

• Failure to Lend Aid as a Qualifying Circumstance — The last paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon an offender who fails to lend on the spot to injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give, applies to all situations envisioned in the Article whenever there is an injured party. However, the failure to render assistance constitutes a qualifying circumstance because its presence raises the penalty by one degree, and as such it must be alleged in the Information to apprise the defendant of the charge. It is not a generic aggravating circumstance, since it is not listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and therefore cannot justify imposition of the penalty in its maximum period.
• Recantation as Not Newly Discovered Evidence — Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in court will not be countenanced for the purpose of securing a new trial. Courts are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted testimony because recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable, there is always the probability that it may later be repudiated, and such affidavits can be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration.

• "The argument is flawed. The proviso that 'the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable' clearly refers to the preceding paragraphs. Paragraphs '1' and '2' are exceptions to the application of the said preceding paragraphs under the circumstances mentioned. The last paragraph on failure to lend aid on the spot necessarily applies to all situations envisioned in the said Article whenever there is an injured party." — This passage rejects petitioner's reading of Article 365 and establishes that the failure-to-lend-aid provision operates across all situations covered by the Article.
• "But, we agree with the then Court of Appeals when it ruled in People vs. Beduya that 'the failure to render assistance, constitutes a qualifying circumstances because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree (like treachery which qualifies homicide to murder). The same must be alleged in the information to apprise the defendant of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if proved at the trial without objection.'" — This is the ratio decidendi on the first issue: the failure to lend aid is a qualifying circumstance that must be pleaded in the Information.
• "Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in court will not be countenanced for the purpose of securing a new trial. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Saliling, et al., states the controlling rule on recantation as a ground for new trial.
• "Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it may later be repudiated. So courts are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted testimony." — This excerpt supplies the rationale for the Court's refusal to treat the recantation as newly discovered evidence.

• People vs. Beduya, 4 C.A. Rep. 145; 60 O.G. 2668-2669 — Adopted by the Court for the rule that the failure to render assistance is a qualifying circumstance that raises the penalty by one degree and must be alleged in the Information, unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Saliling, et al., 69 SCRA 427 (1976) — Quoted at length for the rule that affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who previously testified in court will not be countenanced to secure a new trial, and that recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.
• People vs. Delasa, 115 SCRA 74 (1982), citing Reyes vs. People, 71 Phil. 598 (1941) — Cited for the consistent ruling that recantations should be taken with great caution.
• People vs. Pantoja, L-19793, October 11, 1968 — Cited by the Court of Appeals as basis for increasing the indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
• People vs. Ompad, et al., L-23513, January 31, 1969 — Cited by the Court of Appeals alongside People vs. Pantoja for the increase of the indemnity.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1790 — Governs imprudence and negligence, prescribing the penalties for reckless imprudence resulting in grave, less grave, or light felonies, and providing in its last paragraph that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give. The Court held that this last paragraph applies to all situations envisioned in the Article, but that the increased penalty could not be imposed on petitioner because the circumstance was not alleged in the Information.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the aggravating circumstances. The Court held that the failure to lend assistance is not among those listed and therefore cannot be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance justifying imposition of the penalty in its maximum period.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Contains the rules for the application of penalties. The Court sentenced petitioner without regard to these rules, as mandated by Article 365.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code — Governs subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The City Court imposed subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to this provision, but the Court of Appeals deleted it.
• Republic Act No. 1790 — The amendment to Article 365 that added the penalty next higher in degree for failure to lend aid on the spot.
• Republic Act No. 5465 — Cited by the Court of Appeals as basis for deleting subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred.