Hunnob vs. People

Where barangay officials whose positions are below Salary Grade 27 are convicted by the RTC of violating RA 3019, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over their appeal; a CA decision rendered on such an appeal is void and the case must be remanded for transmission to the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners Roy Hunnob and Salvador Galeon were the barangay captain and barangay treasurer, respectively, of Barangay Dulao, Lagawe, Ifugao. Caroline Hunnob, the supplier paid in the transaction, is Roy Hunnob’s sister. The charge was under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, while the jurisdictional question turns on Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, which defines the Sandiganbayan’s original and appellate jurisdiction.

Roy Hunnob and Salvador Galeon were the barangay captain and barangay treasurer, respectively, of Barangay Dulao, Lagawe, Ifugao. Roy Hunnob’s sister, Caroline Hunnob, supplied a motor engine to the barangay. The information charged both petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, alleging that on or about July 30, 2007, they conspired and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the government and giving Caroline Hunnob unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality and evident bad faith by facilitating payment to her of P67,200.00 for the fictitious delivery of a 25 horsepower speedboat. Only petitioner Roy Hunnob got arrested; Salvador Galeon was then at large.

According to the prosecution, Edwin Dulnuan testified that in 2007 he was a barangay kagawad of Barangay Dulao and that the barangay received from the Provincial Government of Ifugao a grant of P70,000.00 for the purchase of a Johnson 25-HP motor engine for a speed boat. Roy Hunnob, then barangay captain, kept the grant secret from the other barangay officials, and Dulnuan learned of it from the barangay treasurer and the vice-governor’s men only on October 25, 2007. Instead of buying a Johnson 25-HP motor engine, Roy Hunnob bought an old Evinrude 25-HP motor engine from his sister Caroline Hunnob for P67,200.00. The Commission on Audit later disallowed the purchase, and the P67,200.00 was returned to the barangay’s coffers.

COA State Auditor III Juanita Bautista testified that she had the original documents pertaining to the purchase of the motor engine for the speed boat; when the purchase was disallowed, it was Caroline Hunnob who returned the amount, and insofar as her office was concerned the problem had already been resolved. Barangay kagawad Peter Maugao confirmed that Roy Hunnob purchased a motor engine different from what the grant was intended for. Barangay health worker Mercy Bahiwag denied ever signing the documents which led to the procurement of the wrong motor engine; she was never elected as a barangay kagawad nor was she ever a member of Barangay Dulao’s BBAC.

Roy Hunnob, for his part, testified that during his term as barangay captain from 2005 to 2010, the BBAC was formed and led by Ricardo Gatic; he was not a member of the BBAC and never interfered with its proceedings. He never falsified the signatures of Edwin Dulnuan, Peter Maugao, and Mercy Bahiwag, and their signatures were already on the procurement papers when the same were presented for his signature. He never conspired with Salvador Galeon to declare his sister Caroline Hunnob as the sole eligible supplier for the motor engine. A few days after Roy Hunnob testified, Salvador Galeon was arrested; on arraignment he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution called Edwin Dulnuan, Peter Maugao, Mercy Bahiwag, and Juanita Bautista to the witness stand, and both the prosecution and the defense manifested that they were adopting the previous testimonies of said witnesses.

Salvador Galeon, for his part, testified that he was the barangay treasurer of Barangay Dulao in 2007; he did not participate in the procurement process of the motor engine and did not conspire with Roy Hunnob in giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Caroline Hunnob. He prepared the check for P67,200.00 for Caroline Hunnob but was not aware of the delivery of the wrong motor engine; his only participation in the transaction was the issuance of the check. Elmer Bahiwag confirmed that he was a member of the Barangay Council of Dulao from 2004 to 2007 and also a member of the BBAC; on June 12, 2007 and July 13, 2007, the BBAC held meetings to discuss the purchase of the motor engine, and his fellow barangay officials Ricardo Gatic, Toribio Naupoc, Peter Maugao, and Edwin Dulnuan attended the meetings. Both petitioners were not present during the meetings, and he was not aware of what happened to the purchased motor engine because he was no longer in office at the time. The trial court’s factual findings included that Caroline Hunnob was Roy Hunnob’s sister, that only one canvass result from her was used, and that petitioners’ signatures appeared on the documents for the award, purchase, delivery, acceptance, and payment of the motor engine.

• Sufficiency of Sister Relationship: Petitioners argued that the fact alone that it was Roy Hunnob’s sister who supplied the motor engine does not suffice to hold them liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
• Absence of Alternative Supplier: Petitioners argued that there were no other suppliers and the barangay would have been deprived of the chance to own a motor engine if not for Caroline Hunnob.
• Good Faith and Mistake of Law: Petitioners argued that they were not educated enough to know the law, and that a mistake involving a difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith and excuses a person from liability.
• No Injury Due to Restitution: Petitioners argued that the amount paid to Caroline Hunnob had already been returned to the barangay’s coffers, so there is no injury to speak of.
• Intent to Acquire Motor Engine: In the present petition, petitioners invoked good faith anew and asserted that their only intention was to acquire the needed motor engine for the barangay, and it turned out that Caroline Hunnob was the only available supplier.

• Evident Bad Faith: Respondent, through the OSG, submitted that petitioners’ failure to comply with the requirements of the alternative mode of procurement amounted to evident bad faith.
• Manifest Partiality: Respondent, through the OSG, submitted that manifest partiality in favor of Caroline Hunnob was evident because only one canvass was sent out.
• Restitution Not Extinguishing Criminal Liability: Respondent, through the OSG, submitted that restitution of the amount is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Whether the CA had appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC’s verdict of conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: No. Under Section 4 of PD 1606, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs in RA 3019 cases; the CA’s Decision and Resolution were void.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Section 4 of PD 1606 provides that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 where one or more accused occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, and that where none of the accused occupy such positions, exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, or MCTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The same provision gives the Sandiganbayan exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs, whether the RTC exercised original or appellate jurisdiction. Petitioners were barangay captain and barangay treasurer. Under Executive Order No. 332, Series of 1996, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 63 dated October 22, 1996, which provides that a punong barangay shall not receive honorarium exceeding Salary Grade 14, while other barangay officials, including the barangay treasurer, shall not receive honorarium exceeding Salary Grade 10. Their positions therefore corresponded to Salary Grades below 27. They were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for acts committed in relation to their offices, and the offense carries a penalty of more than six years, placing it within the original jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC convicted them and sentenced them to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one month, as minimum, to nine years and eight months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Under Section 4 of PD 1606, it was the Sandiganbayan that had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over their appeal. The records were erroneously transmitted to the CA, and the CA’s Decision dated November 22, 2018 and Resolution dated July 4, 2019 were rendered without jurisdiction and are void. Petitioners are not responsible for the error in transmitting the case; that duty rests on the clerk of court under Rule 122, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the clerk to transmit the complete record to the appellate court within five days from the filing of the notice of appeal. Petitioners should not be prejudiced by the clerk’s mistake. In Dizon vs. People, the SC ruled that an appeal from a conviction that fell within the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction but was erroneously taken to the CA should have the CA dispositions set aside and the case remanded to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan. On the strength of Dizon and in the higher interest of substantial justice, the SC vacated the CA dispositions and remanded the case to the RTC for transmission of the records to the Sandiganbayan.

• Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over RA 3019 cases — Section 4 of PD 1606 vests in the Sandiganbayan exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs in cases involving violations of RA 3019, whether the RTC exercised original or appellate jurisdiction. The SC applied this to hold that the CA had no jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal from their RTC conviction, making the CA’s decision and resolution void.
• Salary Grade 27 jurisdictional threshold — For RA 3019 violations, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction where one or more accused occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; where none do, exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, or MCTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The SC applied this by noting that a punong barangay’s honorarium cannot exceed Salary Grade 14 and other barangay officials, including the barangay treasurer, cannot exceed Salary Grade 10, so petitioners’ positions were below Salary Grade 27 and the RTC had original jurisdiction.
• Clerk of court’s duty to transmit the record on appeal — Rule 122, Section 8 of the Rules of Court requires the clerk of court with whom the notice of appeal is filed to transmit the complete record to the clerk of court of the appellate court within five days from filing. The SC applied this to hold that petitioners should not be prejudiced by the clerk’s error in transmitting the records to the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan.
• Substantial justice and life and liberty — The SC invoked the higher interest of substantial justice and the fact that what is at stake is no less than the life and liberty of the accused to remand the case for transmission to the Sandiganbayan rather than leave the void CA dispositions standing.

• “The Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts pertaining to violations of RA 3019. The assailed rulings should, therefore, be vacated and the case, remanded to the court of origin for referral to the proper forum -- the Sandiganbayan.” — This is the SC’s threshold ruling, holding that the CA lacked appellate jurisdiction and ordering remand to the proper forum.
• “The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.” — This is the statutory basis under Section 4 of PD 1606 for the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
• “Petitioners are not responsible for the error in transmitting the case. For such duty rests on the shoulders of the clerk of court.” — The SC places the responsibility for the erroneous transmission on the clerk of court, preventing prejudice to petitioners.
• “Indeed, petitioners here should not be prejudiced by the shortcoming or fault caused by the clerk of court concerned. For what is at stake is no less than the life and liberty of the accused.” — The SC invokes substantial justice and the accused’s life and liberty in ordering the remand.

• Dizon vs. People, G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018 — Controlling precedent; followed. The SC relied on it to set aside the CA’s dispositions and remand the case to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan where the appeal was erroneously taken to the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines the corrupt practice of causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Petitioners were charged and convicted under this provision, which triggered the jurisdictional question.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606 (as amended) — Defines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. It gives the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over RA 3019 violations where one or more accused occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; where none do, exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, or MCTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and it gives the Sandiganbayan exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs. The SC applied it to hold that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, had appellate jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal.
• Executive Order No. 332, Series of 1996 — Directed the DBM, as administrator of the unified Position Classification and Compensation System, to issue rules and regulations on position classification and compensation of barangay personnel. The SC used it as the basis for DBM Local Budget Circular No. 63.
• DBM Local Budget Circular No. 63 dated October 22, 1996 — Provides that a punong barangay shall not receive honorarium exceeding Salary Grade 14, while other barangay officials, including the barangay treasurer, shall not receive honorarium exceeding Salary Grade 10. The SC applied it to conclude that petitioners’ positions were below Salary Grade 27.
• Section 8, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Requires the clerk of court with whom the notice of appeal is filed to transmit the complete record of the case to the clerk of court of the appellate court within five days from the filing of the notice of appeal. The SC applied it to hold that the erroneous transmission to the CA was the clerk’s responsibility and should not prejudice petitioners.