Hubilla vs. People

Imprisonment of a child in conflict with the law is not prohibited by Republic Act No. 9344, provided it is imposed as a disposition of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period; probation remains unavailable for an offender sentenced to a maximum term exceeding six years, and the suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344 cannot extend beyond the child’s twenty-first birthday.

On March 30, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m. in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, the petitioner, then aged 17 years, 4 months, and 28 days, stabbed Jayson Espinola. The victim was hospitalized for over a month, was discharged, but later developed complications from the stab wound, underwent a second operation, and died the following day. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide.

• Prosecution’s Version: On the evening of March 30, 2000, eyewitness Alejandro Dequito was watching a high school graduation at the Dalupaon Elementary School gate with his companion Nicasio Ligadia when the victim, Jayson Espinola, arrived. Petitioner approached Espinola, placed his left arm around the victim’s neck, and stabbed him with a bladed weapon. Dequito assisted the wounded victim and brought him to the hospital. The victim’s mother, Marlyn Espinosa, testified that her son was confined at the Bicol Medical Center for over a month, was discharged, but later suffered complications from the stab wound, underwent a second operation, and died the day after. The medico-legal expert confirmed that the cause of death was organ failure due to overwhelming infection, with the stab wound as the underlying cause.

• Defense’s Version: Petitioner claimed that while walking home from the graduation rites, he was ganged up on and boxed by four men, causing him to fall and feel dizzy. Shortly after leaving the campus, he encountered a person he believed to be one of his attackers and stabbed that person with a knife he was carrying for food preparation. He went home, was later taken by barangay officials, and only then learned that he had stabbed Jayson Espinola.

• Reduction of Penalty: Petitioner argued that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence should be reduced to six years of prision correccional in order to render him eligible for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

• Suspension of Sentence: Petitioner maintained that, as a juvenile in conflict with the law, he was entitled to the suspension of his sentence under Republic Act No. 9344.

• Violation of RA 9344 and International Agreements: Petitioner contended that imposing a prison sentence on him violated the rights of a child in conflict with the law under Republic Act No. 9344 and relevant international instruments.

• Correctness of Penalty: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the penalty imposed complied with the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and could not be further reduced.

• Ineligibility for Probation and Suspension: Respondent countered that the petitioner was statutorily disqualified from probation because his maximum term of imprisonment exceeded six years, and that suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344 was no longer available because he was already over 21 years of age at the time of conviction.

• Correctness of Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

• Probation and Suspension of Sentence: Whether petitioner was entitled to the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 and to the suspension of his sentence under Republic Act No. 9344.

• Legality of Imprisonment: Whether imposing the penalty of imprisonment on a child in conflict with the law contravened Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.

• Correctness of Penalty: The penalty imposed was correct and represented the minimum legally imposable. Homicide is penalized by reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner’s minority at the time of the crime operated as a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68, paragraph 2, reducing the penalty by one degree to prision mayor. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should fall within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty — prision correccional (six months and one day to six years) — while the maximum term was properly set in the medium period of prision mayor (eight years and one day to ten years) because no ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present. The indeterminate sentence of six months and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor was thus the ultimate minimum allowed by law; any further reduction would amount to an illegal penalty.

• Probation and Suspension of Sentence: Probation was unavailable. Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree No. 968 expressly disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding six years; the maximum here was eight years and one day of prision mayor. Consequently, the directive to remand the case for probation was annulled. Suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344 was likewise inapplicable. While Section 38 of the law allows suspension, Section 40 restricts the availability of that benefit only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the age of 21. Petitioner was already over 23 years old when convicted by the RTC, making suspension legally impermissible.

• Legality of Imprisonment: Imprisonment of a child in conflict with the law is not prohibited by Republic Act No. 9344 or international agreements. Section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 9344 recognizes imprisonment as a proper disposition, subject to two restrictions: it must be a disposition of last resort, and it must be for the shortest appropriate period. Both conditions were satisfied because probation and suspension were unavailable, and the penalty imposed was the minimum duration permitted by law. This approach is consistent with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines), and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty, all of which allow imprisonment as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.

• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority — Under Article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. The Court applied this to reduce the penalty for homicide from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.

• Probation Disqualification Based on Maximum Penalty — Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree No. 968 disqualifies from probation any offender sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding six years. The Court applied this to bar petitioner from probation.

• Temporal Limit on Suspension of Sentence under RA 9344 — Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 limits the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law only until the child reaches 21 years of age. Once the child exceeds that age, suspension is no longer legally feasible, and execution of sentence may proceed.

• Imprisonment as a Disposition of Last Resort for Children in Conflict with the Law — Republic Act No. 9344 and international instruments (Beijing Guidelines, Riyadh Guidelines, and UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty) do not prohibit imprisonment; they require that imprisonment be imposed only as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period. The imposition of the minimum indeterminate penalty, after excluding probation and suspension of sentence, satisfies this standard.

• “The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law. The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.”

• “While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.”

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide; served as the base penalty before modification due to minority.

• Article 68, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when the offender is a minor under 18 years of age; applied to reduce the penalty from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) — Governed the fixing of the minimum and maximum terms; the minimum was taken from the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty (prision correccional), while the maximum was set within the proper period of the imposable penalty (prision mayor in its medium period).

• Section 9(a), Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law) — Disqualifies from probation an offender whose maximum term of imprisonment exceeds six years; barred petitioner’s application for probation.

• Sections 38 and 40, Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) — Section 38 allows the suspension of sentence for a child in conflict with the law; Section 40 limits such suspension only until the child reaches 21 years of age, making it inapplicable to petitioner.

• Section 5(c), Republic Act No. 9344 — Recognizes imprisonment as a valid disposition but mandates that it be a disposition of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period; provided the basis for upholding the sentence.

• Section 46(2), A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) — Requires that restrictions on the personal liberty of the child be limited to the minimum; supported the imposition of the lowest possible indeterminate penalty.

• United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines), United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty — Incorporated into Republic Act No. 9344 through Section 5; consistently recognize imprisonment as valid if used as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Chief Justice; TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice; MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Associate Justice (vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Special Order No. 1885, dated November 24, 2014); JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ, Associate Justice.