Primary Holding
Under Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, a person who already has an adopted child may still adopt another; the disqualification covers only legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, and adopted children are not included in that enumeration.
Background
Dr. Fernando P. Hofileña and Corazon de Guia-Hofileña are spouses; Dr. Hofileña is a physician and professor of Pediatrics and Mental Hygiene at the University of Santo Tomas, and the spouses own their Manila residence and residential and agricultural lands in Occidental Negros. The governing statute is Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, which provides that “[t]he following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction.” The legal question is whether that enumeration bars adoption by a person who already has an adopted child.
History
1966 – 1970-
Mar 23, 1966
Original Filing
On March 23, 1966, Dr. Fernando P. Hofileña and Corazon de Guia-Hofileña filed a petition for adoption of Santiago Señeres with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-00100.
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2 mos 9 days later
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Jun 1, 1966
Lower Court Decision
On June 1, 1966, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila dismissed the petition on the ground that Article 335(1) of the Civil Code prohibited the adoption because the petitioners had already adopted two minors.
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Appeal
Appellants appealed the dismissal to the SC; the case was docketed as G.R. No. L-26476.
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Aug 31, 1970
SC Action
On August 31, 1970, the SC reversed and set aside the appealed decision and allowed the adoption of Santiago Señeres.
Facts
Dr. Fernando P. Hofileña and Corazon de Guia-Hofileña, husband and wife, were childless. Dr. Hofileña was a physician and a professor of Pediatrics and Mental Hygiene at the University of Santo Tomas, had been engaged in the practice of medicine since 1948, and he and his wife had an annual income of around P18,000.00. They owned the house where they lived in Manila and residential and agricultural lands in Occidental Negros.
Santiago Señeres was born on May 11, 1961 to the spouses’ housemaid, Veronica E. Señeres, and a certain Felix Lisondra. Since birth, Santiago had been and remained in the care of the spouses, who became so attached to him that they decided to adopt him in accordance with law, with the full consent of the minor’s mother.
On September 6, 1962, the spouses filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a petition for the adoption of the minors Lourdes and Reynaldo Yusay, children of Dr. Eduardo G. Yusay and Eva Hofileña-Yusay. On November 14, 1962, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted the petition in a decision that had long become executory.
On March 23, 1966, the spouses filed with the same court a petition for Santiago’s adoption. After the required publication had been accomplished and notices served in accordance with law to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Chief, Office of Child Welfare, Social Welfare Administration, the case was set for hearing and evidence was presented. The lower court dismissed the petition, and appellants appealed.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Adoption by a person with an adopted child: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it deemed it unnecessary to file a brief and, after considering appellants’ brief and the cited commentators, agreed that a person who already has an adopted child may still adopt another.
Issues
- Adoption by a person with an adopted child: Whether a person who already has an adopted child may still legally adopt another under Article 335(1) of the Civil Code.
Ruling
- Adoption by a person with an adopted child: Yes. Article 335(1) of the Civil Code disqualifies only persons with legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction; adopted children are not included, so a person with an adopted child may adopt another.
Ruling Rationale
- Adoption by a person with an adopted child: Article 335(1) of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction.” The SC applied the plain meaning rule: a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted, and only ambiguous or doubtful statutes are subject to statutory interpretation. It also applied the rule that words and phrases with a precise legal meaning are understood in their technical sense unless the legislature plainly used them otherwise. The SC then defined the enumerated classes under the Civil Code: legitimate children are those conceived during marriage and, in certain cases, those conceived before but born during marriage (Article 255); legitimated children are originally natural children later considered legitimate by recognition by both parents and their subsequent marriage (Article 271); natural children are those born outside wedlock of parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry at conception (Article 269); acknowledged natural children are natural children duly acknowledged or recognized by the father and mother jointly, or by only one (Article 276); and natural children by legal fiction are children conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning (Article 289). Adopted children do not fall within any of these classes. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the commentators that a person with an adopted child may still adopt. The SC further reasoned that the disqualification is tied to blood relationship and the protection of successional or hereditary rights of living blood children, while adoption does not create or establish blood relationship between adopter and adopted child; the adopted child does not become legitimate, legitimated, natural, or natural by legal fiction, and the adopted child’s successional rights are not based on blood relationship. Adoption is a mere act of generosity and should not prevent another act of generosity. The SC therefore reversed the dismissal and allowed the adoption.
Doctrines
- Plain Meaning Rule — A statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory interpretation. The SC applied this to Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, finding its enumeration clear and unambiguous.
- Technical Meaning of Legal Terms — Words and phrases that have acquired a precise legal meaning are understood in their proper technical sense unless the legislature plainly used them otherwise. The SC defined “legitimate,” “legitimated,” “natural,” “acknowledged natural,” and “natural by legal fiction” under the Civil Code and held that “adopted children” fall under none.
- Article 335(1) Disqualification Is Limited to Enumerated Blood Descendants — Under Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, only persons with legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction cannot adopt. A person who already has an adopted child may still adopt another because an adopted child is not among the enumerated disqualifications.
- Adoption Does Not Create Blood Relationship — Adoption is a mere act of generosity; it does not create or establish blood relationship between adopter and adopted child, and the adopted child does not become legitimate, legitimated, natural, or natural by legal fiction. The successional rights of an adopted child are not based on blood relationship, unlike those of the enumerated children. This supported allowing another adoption.
Key Excerpts
- “Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory interpretation (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Section 4502, p. 316).” — The SC used this rule to avoid interpreting Article 335(1) beyond its clear terms.
- “The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code in enumerating the persons who “cannot adopt” appear to be clear and unambiguous and have a clearly defined meaning in law.” — The SC found the statutory enumeration clear and applied the terms in their legal sense.
- “That “adopted children” do not fall within the meaning of anyone of the above kinds of descendants seems to be clear.” — The SC concluded that adopted children are not covered by the Article 335(1) disqualification.
- “adoption is, undoubtedly, a mere act of generosity on the part of the adopter and should not prevent the adopting parent or parents from carrying out another act of generosity by adopting another child.” — The SC explained why adoption by a person who already has an adopted child should not be barred.
Provisions
- Article 335(1), Civil Code — Provides that persons who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction cannot adopt. The SC held adopted children are not included, so it did not bar the Hofileñas from adopting Santiago.
- Article 255, Civil Code — Defines legitimate children as those conceived during marriage and, in certain cases, those conceived before but born during marriage. The SC used this to distinguish adopted children.
- Article 271, Civil Code — Defines legitimated children as originally natural children later considered legitimate by recognition by both parents and their subsequent marriage. The SC used this in the enumeration.
- Article 269, Civil Code — Defines natural children as those born outside wedlock of parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry at conception. The SC used this in the enumeration.
- Article 276, Civil Code — Defines acknowledged natural children as natural children duly acknowledged or recognized by the father and mother jointly, or by only one. The SC used this in the enumeration.
- Article 289, Civil Code — Defines natural children by legal fiction as children conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning. The SC used this in the enumeration.