Hipos vs. Bay

Mandamus will not issue to compel a trial court to grant a motion to withdraw informations, as this directs the exercise of judicial discretion in a particular way; the proper remedy to challenge a denial of such a motion is certiorari, and the trial court must independently assess the merits of the prosecution's recommendation rather than defer to it.

Informations for rape and acts of lasciviousness were filed against Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel, and others before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86. Private complainants moved for reinvestigation, which the court granted. The City Prosecutor initially affirmed the informations, but the 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor subsequently reversed the finding, citing lack of probable cause, and filed a motion to withdraw the informations.

• The Charges: Informations for rape and acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners' sons and co-accused on 15 December 2003 before Branch 86 of the RTC of Quezon City.
• Reinvestigation: Private complainants sought and secured an order for reinvestigation. Petitioners filed a Joint Memorandum to Dismiss, claiming lack of probable cause.
• Prosecutorial Reversal: On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the charges. On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera reversed this affirmation, finding no probable cause, and filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations.
• Trial Court Denial: On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the motion. The body of the order detailed a finding of probable cause, explaining that the victims' failure to resist did not negate the crime given their age and relationship with the accused. However, the dispositive portion erroneously stated "finding no probable cause."

• Propriety of Mandamus: Petitioners argued that mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the dismissal of the case, relying on an isolated excerpt from Sanchez v. Demetriou.
• Deference to Prosecutor: Petitioners maintained that having granted the motion for reinvestigation, Judge Bay was duty-bound to defer to the 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor's resolution withdrawing the case, citing People v. Montesa, Jr.
• Grave Abuse Requirement: Petitioners asserted that a judge may deny a motion to withdraw information only upon a finding of grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutor, misquoting Ledesma v. Court of Appeals to claim that a bare denial without such finding is void.
• Clerical Error as Finding: Petitioners pointed to the dispositive portion of the assailed order, which stated "finding no probable cause," to argue that the judge himself found no probable cause and should have granted the motion.

• Improper Remedy: The Solicitor General countered that mandamus is improper because it cannot control the exercise of judicial discretion; certiorari is the correct remedy to challenge an order denying a motion to withdraw informations.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a trial judge to grant a motion to withdraw informations.
• Duty of Independent Assessment: Whether a trial judge must simply defer to the prosecutor's resolution recommending the withdrawal of informations.
• Validity of the Denial: Whether the trial judge validly denied the motion to withdraw informations despite the prosecutor's finding of no probable cause.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not to control the exercise of discretion. While mandamus can compel a judge to act on a pending motion, it cannot compel the judge to act in a particular way. Because Judge Bay had already acted by denying the motion, the proper remedy to allege grave abuse of discretion was certiorari, not mandamus.
• Duty of Independent Assessment: A trial court is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government regarding probable cause. Upon acquiring jurisdiction, the trial court must make an independent assessment of the merits of a motion to withdraw information. Refusal to evaluate the recommendation and merely insisting on trial constitutes reversible error or grave abuse of discretion.
• Validity of the Denial: The denial was valid. Judge Bay made an independent assessment of the complainants' sworn statements and found probable cause. The phrase "finding no probable cause" in the fallo was a clerical error, contradicted by the body of the order which explicitly found probable cause. When the body of the decision clearly shows a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body prevails.

• Doctrine of Independent Assessment of Probable Cause — When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice or prosecutor finding lack of probable cause, the trial court must make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. The court is not bound by the executive resolution but must evaluate it. Refusal or neglect to evaluate the recommendation and simply insisting on trial based merely on acquired jurisdiction constitutes reversible error or grave abuse of discretion.
• Mandamus Does Not Lie to Control Discretion — Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. It may be issued to compel action when refused, but never to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract an action already taken in the exercise of either.
• Conflict Between Fallo and Body of the Decision — The general rule is that the fallo controls in case of conflict with the body of the decision. However, where the body of the decision inevitably and clearly shows a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.

• "As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court."
• "In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion."
• "When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion."

• Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987 — Controlling precedent. Established that once a criminal information is filed in court, any disposition rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
• Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207 (1997) — Followed/Distinguished. Established the duty of independent assessment. Petitioners' counsel misquoted this case to claim that a bare denial of a motion to withdraw is void absent grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutor; the Court clarified that grave abuse of discretion is committed by the judge who denies the motion without independent assessment.
• Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993 — Distinguished. Petitioners misinterpreted this case to support mandamus against a trial court; the Court clarified that Sanchez suggested mandamus to compel the prosecution of persons excluded from the information, not to compel a court to grant a motion to withdraw.
• People v. Montesa, Jr., G.R. No. 114302, 29 September 1995 — Distinguished. Petitioners misquoted this case to argue for automatic deference to the prosecutor; the Court clarified that Montesa reinforces that disposition rests in the sound discretion of the court and that the judge therein erred by acting on a non-final resolution.

• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines mandamus. Applied to demonstrate that mandamus only compels ministerial duties, not discretionary acts like ruling on a motion to withdraw informations.
• Rule 10.02, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits knowingly misquoting or misrepresenting the text of a decision or authority. Applied to order petitioners' counsel to show cause for disciplinary action for fabricating a quote from Ledesma.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Diosdado M. Peralta