Hilvano vs. Fernandez

The Court held that a criminal judgment becomes final and executory once the accused voluntarily commences service of the imposed penalty. Because the petitioner expressly requested and began serving his sentence on April 3, 1954, the judgment attained finality on that date, thereby stripping the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain his subsequent appeal.

Eduardo Hilvano faced prosecution for malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 2585 before the Court of First Instance of Samar. After initially pleading not guilty, Hilvano moved to withdraw that plea and substitute it with a plea of guilty. The trial court granted the motion, rendered judgment, and imposed an indeterminate penalty of eight years to ten years and eight months of prision mayor, alongside perpetual disqualification, a P12,000 fine, and P12,644.50 in government indemnity. While on bail, Hilvano petitioned the Department of Justice to authorize the Director of Prisons to read the sentence to him in Muntinlupa, waiving his appearance in Samar for promulgation. The trial court complied, the sentence was read in Muntinlupa, and Hilvano commenced serving his term on April 3, 1954.

• Petitioner Eduardo Hilvano was charged with malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 2585 of the Court of First Instance of Samar.
• Upon arraignment, Hilvano entered a plea of not guilty and obtained a continuance. On January 16, 1953, he petitioned the trial court to withdraw his plea and substitute it with a plea of guilty. The court granted the motion and rendered judgment on the same day.
• The trial court sentenced Hilvano to an indeterminate penalty of eight years to ten years and eight months of prision mayor, perpetual disqualification, a fine of P12,000, and indemnity of P12,644.50 in favor of the government, plus costs.
• While released on bail, Hilvano requested through the Department of Justice that he be permitted to serve his sentence in Muntinlupa Prison, waiving the reading of the sentence in Samar. The trial court authorized the request. The sentence was read to him at the New Bilibid Prisons on April 3, 1954, and he commenced serving his term on that date.
• On April 12, 1954, Hilvano filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the imposed penalty was excessive. The trial court denied the motion, and Hilvano received the denial order on May 24, 1954.
• On May 27, 1954, Hilvano filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the Director of Prisons and moved to reduce his personal bail bond to enable him to post an appeal bond. He submitted the notice to the trial court on June 1, 1954.
• The trial court refused to give due course to the appeal and denied the motion for bail reduction, prompting Hilvano to institute the present mandamus action before the Supreme Court.

• Petitioner maintained that his commitment to prison on April 3, 1954, was solely due to his inability to procure a bond for provisional release, and not for the purpose of commencing service of sentence.
• Petitioner argued that because his confinement lacked his express assent or conformity to the judgment, the decision did not attain finality on that date.
• Petitioner contended that the trial court retained jurisdiction to entertain his appeal and prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to give due course to the notice of appeal and to fix the appeal bond at P10,000.

• Respondent maintained that the trial court correctly denied due course to the appeal because the judgment had already become final and executory upon petitioner’s voluntary commencement of service of sentence.
• Respondent argued that the petitioner’s express request to serve his penalty in Muntinlupa and his actual confinement thereon constituted unequivocal acceptance of the judgment, thereby divesting the lower court of jurisdiction to entertain any subsequent appellate remedy.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal after he had already commenced serving his sentence.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the voluntary commencement of service of sentence renders a criminal judgment final and executory, thereby precluding an appeal and divesting the trial court of jurisdiction.

• Procedural: The Court denied the petition for mandamus. The trial court did not err in disallowing the appeal because it had already lost jurisdiction over the case once the judgment attained finality. The lower court’s refusal to give due course to the notice of appeal and to reduce the bail bond was legally justified.
• Substantive: The Court held that a criminal judgment becomes final and executory when the accused voluntarily begins serving the imposed penalty. Petitioner’s prior request to have the sentence read in Muntinlupa, coupled with his actual confinement thereon starting April 3, 1954, manifested his knowledge of and willingness to abide by the trial court’s decision. This voluntary compliance triggered the finality of the judgment, rendering the subsequent appeal legally infirm and unnecessary to evaluate for timeliness.

• Finality by Commencement of Sentence — A criminal judgment becomes final and executory once the accused voluntarily begins serving the penalty. This act operates as an implied acceptance of the decision and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the judgment or entertain an appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to establish that petitioner’s actual confinement and prior authorization to serve sentence in Muntinlupa constituted voluntary execution, thereby barring his subsequent appeal.
• Loss of Jurisdiction upon Finality — Once a judgment attains finality, the trial court is stripped of jurisdiction over the case, and any subsequent motions for reconsideration or appeals filed thereafter cannot be entertained. The Court invoked this principle to affirm the respondent judge’s denial of due course to the petitioner’s notice of appeal.

• "Considering that petitioner himself expressed his desire to serve sentence meted upon him, and that such desire necessarily imports knowledge of the willingness to abide by the penalty meted by the trial Court, the judgment against petitioner became final and executory on April 3, 1954 when he started serving sentence thereon." — The Court utilized this passage to articulate the legal consequence of voluntary compliance with a criminal penalty, establishing that actual service of sentence constitutes unequivocal acceptance and triggers finality.

• Gregorio v. Director of Prisons, 43 Phil. 650 — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that voluntary commencement of service of sentence renders a criminal judgment final and non-appealable.
• People v. Quebral, 76 Phil. 294 — Cited to reinforce the rule that execution of a penalty by the accused divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the case.
• People v. Feliciano, 89 Phil. 664 — Cited to affirm the settled doctrine that actual service of sentence constitutes finality of judgment, precluding further appellate remedies.

• Rule 116, Section 7 [of the Rules of Court] — Cited as the procedural foundation for the rule that a criminal judgment becomes final and executory when the accused voluntarily commences service of the sentence, thereby terminating the trial court’s jurisdiction.