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Herrera vs. L.P. Leviste & Co., Inc.

The Supreme Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that petitioner Herrera was not entitled to relief after losing the subject property due to his own failure to comply with the conditions of his Contract to Sell with respondent Leviste. The Court found that petitioner's loss was attributable to his own fault in failing to substitute collateral, pay off the mortgage debt, or redeem the property, and that no unjust enrichment resulted to the other parties.

Primary Holding

The Court held that where a party to a conditional sale contract fails to perform his obligations—specifically, to assume the seller's mortgage obligation and substitute collateral—and the property is subsequently foreclosed and redeemed by a third party, the automatic forfeiture clause in the contract is enforceable. The loss is attributable to the buyer's own non-performance, and no unjust enrichment arises from the seller retaining payments made under the forfeited contract.

Background

On June 10, 1969, L.P. Leviste & Co., Inc. (Leviste) obtained a loan from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by a mortgage on two properties: one in Parañaque and another on Buendia Avenue, Makati. On November 3, 1971, Leviste sold the Buendia property to petitioner Jose V. Herrera under a Contract to Sell for P3,750,000.00. The conditions required Herrera to: (1) pay Leviste P1,895,688.50; (2) assume Leviste's P1,854,311.50 GSIS mortgage; and (3) substitute the Parañaque property with his own as collateral within six months. Leviste undertook to secure GSIS's conformity to Herrera's assumption of the obligation. The contract contained an automatic cancellation and forfeiture clause for failure to comply with any condition.

History

  1. On May 13, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction, Damages, and Cancellation of Annotation against Leviste before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

  2. On December 20, 1977, the Trial Court dismissed petitioner's complaint and ordered all payments made by petitioner forfeited in favor of Leviste.

  3. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision in toto.

  4. The Supreme Court initially denied due course to the Petition for Review on certiorari in a minute resolution dated April 1, 1981.

  5. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was set for oral argument, after which the Court required memoranda before issuing this Resolution denying reconsideration.

Facts

Petitioner took possession of the Buendia property in December 1971 and collected rentals of approximately P800,000.00 until March 1975. He remitted only P300,000.00 to GSIS. In April 1973, petitioner requested GSIS to restructure the mortgage due to his arrearages, but GSIS required property substitution and account updating first. On June 2, 1974, GSIS notified Leviste of its intent to foreclose due to default. The properties were sold at public auction on February 15, 1975, with GSIS as the highest bidder. On March 3, 1975, Leviste assigned its right of redemption to respondent Jose Marcelo, Jr., who redeemed the properties from GSIS on November 20, 1975, for P3,232,766.94. The Parañaque property was returned to Leviste. Petitioner's subsequent lawsuit was dismissed, and all his payments were ordered forfeited.

Arguments of the Petitioners

Petitioner argued that affirmance of the lower courts' decisions would result in patent injustice and unjust enrichment of Leviste, GSIS, and Marcelo at his expense. He contended he would lose both the property and the substantial payments he made. He essentially claimed that Leviste's failure to secure GSIS's conformity and to execute a final deed of sale prevented him from fulfilling his obligation to assume the mortgage.

Arguments of the Respondents

Respondents countered that petitioner failed to comply with the contract's conditions, triggering the automatic forfeiture clause. They maintained that petitioner's own default—failure to substitute collateral and properly assume the mortgage—led to the foreclosure and subsequent loss of the property. They argued no unjust enrichment occurred as the payments received were commensurate with the property's value and the costs incurred.

Issues

  • Procedural Issues: N/A
  • Substantive Issues:
    1. Whether petitioner was entitled to the relief sought despite his failure to comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell.
    2. Whether the automatic forfeiture of payments constituted unjust enrichment for the respondents.

Ruling

  • Procedural: N/A
  • Substantive: The Court denied the motion for reconsideration. It held that petitioner's loss was "attributable to his fault" for not substituting the Parañaque property, not paying off the mortgage debt upon foreclosure, and not making an earnest effort to redeem the property. The Court found no unjust enrichment, as GSIS received only the loan amount plus charges, Marcelo paid a sum close to the contract price, and Leviste received a total substantially equivalent to the property's reasonable value. The Court further noted petitioner did not fully comply with the contract, as he failed to substitute the collateral, and that GSIS's requirement for a final deed of sale was not proven.

Doctrines

  • Automatic Rescission/Forfeiture Clause — The Court upheld the contractual stipulation that failure to comply with any condition, particularly payment, would render the contract automatically cancelled and all payments forfeited as liquidated damages. The Court applied this clause because petitioner's own non-performance triggered it.
  • Fault of the Obligor — The Court grounded its decision on the principle that a party's loss resulting from its own failure to perform its obligations cannot be the basis for a claim of injustice against the other party.

Key Excerpts

  • "That loss is attributable to his fault in: (a) Not having been able to submit collateral to GSIS in substitution of the Paranaque Property; (b) Not paying off the mortgage debt when GSIS decided to foreclose; and (c) Not making an earnest effort to redeem the property as a possible redemptioner." — This passage succinctly captures the Court's rationale for attributing the loss to petitioner.
  • "It cannot be validly said that petitioner had fully complied with all the conditions of his contract with Leviste." — This statement underscores the factual basis for enforcing the forfeiture clause.

Notable Dissenting Opinions

  • Justice Claudio Teehankee — The dissent argued that Leviste acted in bad faith and violated the contract by refusing to execute a final deed of sale, which was necessary for Herrera to assume the GSIS mortgage. Justice Teehankee applied Article 1186 of the Civil Code (constructive fulfillment), reasoning that Leviste voluntarily prevented Herrera's performance. The dissent emphasized that Leviste's unjustifiable refusal barred it from invoking rescission and that the result constituted unjust enrichment, as Leviste retained all payments while being relieved of its mortgage debt. The dissent also criticized GSIS and Marcelo for not acting in good faith.