Hernandez vs. Ocampo

The exception to the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure — that a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor — applies only where the third party's possession is certain and undisputed; where possession is uncertain and disputed, the writ remains a ministerial, ex parte issuance that may not be enjoined, the claimant having failed to establish the clear and unmistakable right required for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Milagros Hernandez, then residing in the United States, purchased two parcels of land in Biñan, Laguna from Romeo Uy An in 1985 and entrusted the registration of the titles to her son-in-law, Ricardo San Andres. The lots were later covered by transfer certificates of title in the names of Edwina Ocampo and Felicitas Mendoza, who mortgaged them to Philippine Savings Bank and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, respectively. Both mortgages were extrajudicially foreclosed under Act No. 3135, as amended, the statutory framework governing the sale of property under special powers inserted in or annexed to real estate mortgages and the consequent ex parte application for a writ of possession. The case turns on the interplay between that summary possessory remedy and the due process protection extended to third persons in possession who claim a right adverse to the mortgagor.

In 1985, Milagros Hernandez bought from Romeo Uy An two parcels of land, Lot 8 Block 3 and Lot 6 Block 3, both located in Biñan, Laguna, as evidenced by a deed of sale. From that year onward she was in continuous, open, and adverse possession of the lots, which her daughter Fe Hernandez-Arceo and her family continue to occupy. Hernandez entrusted the registration of the lots in her name to her son-in-law, Ricardo San Andres, but he died in 1991 without transferring the titles to her name. By then Hernandez was already residing in the United States and was unaware that the lots had not been registered in her name; owing to her advanced age, she had also not returned to the Philippines for a long time.

Sometime in 2002, Hernandez and her family were surprised to receive a letter from Atty. Agapito Carait, writing on behalf of Felicitas R. Mendoza, demanding that they vacate Lot 8. Upon investigation, they discovered that the titles to the lots had been registered in the names of Mendoza and Edwina Ocampo by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated April 13, 1989 executed by An, with Lot 8 then covered by TCT No. T-193772 in Mendoza's name and Lot 6 by TCT No. T-193773 in Ocampo's name. They also discovered that the lots had been mortgaged, Lot 8 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company and Lot 6 with Philippine Savings Bank.

The mortgages were eventually extrajudicially foreclosed and the lots were separately sold at public auctions, with the two banks emerging as the highest bidders. Corresponding Certificates of Sale for Lot 6 and Lot 8 were issued to PSB and Metrobank, respectively. PSB registered Lot 6 on November 9, 2001, and TCT No. T-518364 was issued in its name; Metrobank registered Lot 8 on May 6, 2003, and TCT No. T-550116 was issued in its name.

On January 18, 2002, PSB filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, docketed as LRC Case No. B-3071, before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, which granted the writ in an Order dated December 22, 2002. Meanwhile, Hernandez filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title, raffled to the same branch and docketed as Civil Case No. B-6191, against Mendoza, Ocampo, Metrobank, PSB, and the Register of Deeds of Calamba; the summonses were served upon Metrobank and PSB on November 25, 2002. On March 24, 2004, the RTC in LRC Case No. B-3071 issued a Writ of Possession in favor of PSB over the six lots subject of the petition, one of which was Lot 6, and a Notice to Vacate followed on August 9, 2005; both were addressed to Ocampo and her husband, Ricardo Ocampo, as mortgagors. Hernandez then filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint with Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction in Civil Case No. B-6191 to stop PSB and the Sheriff from enforcing the writ.

On May 20, 2004, Metrobank filed its own petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, docketed as LRC Case No. B-3389, before the same branch. The petition was granted on May 16, 2005, and a Writ of Possession dated July 20, 2005 over Lot 8 was issued, followed by a Notice to Vacate dated August 9, 2005; both were addressed to Mendoza. Although Metrobank was not originally impleaded in Hernandez's motion for a temporary restraining order, it was later included as a party respondent in the Compliance dated October 2, 2008.

On the factual question of possession, Hernandez claimed actual possession of the lots involved since 1985 through her daughter. Both banks, in their comments, alleged that they are mortgagees in good faith; that they conducted ocular inspection on the lots and found both lots unoccupied; and that they made verifications with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, the Municipal Assessor, and the Treasurer's office, and found that the TCTs and tax declarations were still registered in the name of Ocampo and Mendoza, without any annotations as to the existence of any encumbrances or liens, including adverse claims.

• Non-Privy to the Foreclosure: Hernandez argued that she is not questioning the propriety of the issuance of the writs of possession against Ocampo and Mendoza, but insisted that the writs cannot be enforced against her because she was not privy to the foreclosure proceedings; otherwise, her right to due process of law would be violated.
• Writs Addressed to Specific Persons: Hernandez claimed that the writs of possession, being addressed to specific persons, cannot be enforced against her, who is in actual possession of the property and who has filed a case for annulment of titles based on a right independent of and adverse to the right of those to whom the writs were directed.
• Exception to the Ministerial Rule: Hernandez invoked the settled rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor.

• Ministerial Duty of the Court: Both respondent banks argued that a preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy because the issuance and enforcement of the writs of possession are ministerial duties of the court.
• Absence of Requisites for Injunctive Relief: The banks argued that the legal requisites that have to be complied with in issuing an injunctive writ were not met, since Hernandez does not have any clear and positive right over the properties.
• Non-Interference of a Coordinate Court: PSB and Metrobank argued that the RTC, Branch 24, cannot enjoin itself from enforcing the writ of possession it earlier issued.

• Entitlement to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction: Whether Hernandez is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Third Party in Adverse Possession: Whether Hernandez is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor, such that the issuance of the writs of possession ceases to be ministerial.

• Entitlement to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction: No. Hernandez failed to discharge the burden of showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper, and the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
• Third Party in Adverse Possession: No. Who holds actual possession of the property is uncertain and disputed, and under Gopiao vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. there must be certainty of possession before the exception to the general rule in issuing writs of possession may be applied; hence, the issuance of the writs of possession continues to be ministerial.

• Entitlement to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction: Hernandez's entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on her prima facie right to the properties subject of Civil Case No. B-6191, but her claims of possession and ownership are belied by the banks' own claims. From these alone, it is clear that she failed to discharge the burden of showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper, and the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. The RTC was likewise correct in denying the motion to enjoin the implementation of the writs of possession because courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which, in effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. The ground relied upon by the trial court in not issuing the writ was its doubt over Hernandez's allegations of bad faith on the part of Mendoza and Ocampo in the acquisition and titling of the properties, and on the part of the banks for allowing the mortgage of the properties; had the RTC granted the motion on these grounds, it would have virtually recognized Hernandez's claim that the deeds of conveyance and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents. As stated in Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation, there would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof, since the courts would be assuming propositions which claimants are inceptively duty bound to prove. On the procedural objection that the RTC could not enjoin itself, the Court observed that while the Court of Appeals' reasoning may not be technically correct, as there was only one court involved, the more relevant principle behind an injunctive writ was upheld.

• Third Party in Adverse Possession: A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, and it may be issued in (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales. In extrajudicial foreclosure sales under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the purchaser may apply for a writ of possession either within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. As explained in Nagtalon vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, during the redemption period the purchaser may apply by ex parte motion under oath in the registration or cadastral proceedings, and a bond is required; upon the lapse of the redemption period, no bond is necessary, the mortgagor being considered to have lost any interest over the foreclosed property, and the purchaser becomes the owner who can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of the corresponding TCT in his name. It is at this point that the right of possession of the purchaser can be considered to have ripened into the absolute right of a confirmed owner, and the issuance of the writ, upon proper application, is a ministerial function that effectively forbids the exercise by the court of any discretion. The duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale; any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135, and cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, since the proceeding is ex parte. This rule, however, admits of an exception. Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court relative to an execution sale applies to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by virtue of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, and provides that possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property, and it is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 be applied also to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. Possession, however, will not be given to the purchaser, redemptioner or third-party-purchaser when a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor, in which case the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex parte and non-adversarial; where the property levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of said possession, that is, whether or not he is in possession of the subject property under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor. In Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Royal Savings Bank vs. Asia, the Court held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor, because a third party who is not privy to the debtor is protected by law and can only be ejected from the premises after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, in compliance with the time-honored principle of due process. This protection finds its basis in Article 433 of the Civil Code, under which actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property; the term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. An ex parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated therein; even if it may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It should be emphasized that an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended; unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68, any property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor will have no opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature; it stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process. Under the law, the third party's possession of the property is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just title, which may only be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property; it is only through such a judicial proceeding that the nature of the adverse possession by the third party is determined, according such third party due process and the opportunity to be heard. The question then is whether Hernandez is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor, and the Court ruled in the negative, because who holds actual possession of the property in this case is uncertain and disputed. In Gopiao vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., the Court ruled that there should be certainty of possession before applying the exception to the general rule in issuing writs of possession; while the facts of the earlier rulings are similar, there remains one crucial difference, which is the certainty of possession, and in all three cases cited by the petitioner therein the fact that the subject property was actually in the possession of the adverse third party was undisputed. Hernandez claims actual possession of the lots involved since 1985 through her daughter, but both banks alleged that they are mortgagees in good faith, that they conducted ocular inspection on the lots and found both lots unoccupied, and that they made verifications with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, the Municipal Assessor, and the Treasurer's office, and found that the TCTs and tax declarations were still registered in the name of Ocampo and Mendoza, without any annotations as to the existence of any encumbrances or liens, including adverse claims. Following Gopiao, the exception to the general rule does not apply in this case; hence, the issuance of the writs of possession continues to be ministerial. Hernandez is not, however, without any remedy: a third person who is not the judgment debtor, or his agent, can vindicate his claim to a property levied through the remedies of (1) terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, and (2) an independent "separate action," by which the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages, and by which the third-party claimant may seek the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention despite the third-party claim; if a separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute, in a forum of competent jurisdiction, an action distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. In this case, Hernandez has already filed a separate action of annulment of title, which was a separate and distinct action from the ex parte petitions for issuance of writ of possession filed by PSB and Metrobank, and it is in this action that she filed her urgent motion for issuance of a writ of temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

• Ministerial Nature of the Writ of Possession — The duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function that cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. The writ may be issued in (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, must be determined in a subsequent proceeding under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, the proceeding being ex parte.
• Two Modes of Applying for a Writ of Possession in Extrajudicial Foreclosure — Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. In the first instance, the purchaser files an ex parte motion under oath in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings if registered under the Mortgage Law, and a bond equivalent to the use of the property for twelve months is required. In the second, no bond is necessary because the mortgagor is considered to have lost any interest over the foreclosed property; the purchaser becomes the owner and can demand possession at any time following consolidation of ownership and issuance of the corresponding TCT in his name, at which point the right of possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.
• Exception to the Ministerial Rule — Third Party in Adverse Possession — Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure by virtue of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides that possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. Where such a third party exists, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex parte and non-adversarial, and the court must conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the possession, that is, whether the occupant is in possession under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor. A third party who is not privy to the debtor is protected by law and can only be ejected after being given an opportunity to be heard, in compliance with due process.
• Certainty of Possession Requirement — Following Gopiao vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., there must be certainty of possession before the exception to the general rule in issuing writs of possession may be applied. Where the fact of actual possession by the adverse third party is undisputed, the exception applies; where possession is questionable or unsubstantiated, the exception does not apply and the issuance of the writ remains ministerial. In this case, because who held actual possession was uncertain and disputed, the exception was held inapplicable.
• Due Process Protection of Third-Party Possessors — An ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is a non-litigious proceeding, not an ordinary suit filed in court, and is not strictly a "judicial process" by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right. A third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty claiming a right superior to that of the original mortgagor has no opportunity to be heard in such a proceeding; hence, such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ, as doing so would amount to summary ejectment in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
• Disputable Presumption of Ownership from Actual Possession — Under Article 433 of the Civil Code, actual possession under a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. The term "judicial process" means no less than an ejectment suit or a reinvindicatory action in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. The third party's possession is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just title, which may only be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property.
• Requisites of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction — Clear and Unmistakable Right — Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper, and the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. The applicant must discharge the burden of showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected.
• Injunction Must Not Dispose of the Main Case — Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which, in effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. Granting injunctive relief on the ground of alleged bad faith in the acquisition and titling of properties would virtually recognize the claim that the deeds of conveyance and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents, and would amount to a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof.
• Remedies of a Third-Party Claimant — A third person who is not the judgment debtor, or his agent, can vindicate his claim to a property levied through (1) terceria under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, and (2) an independent "separate action" for the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other.

• "The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor." — The Court quotes Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the statutory text that supplies the sole exception to the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure, made applicable to such foreclosures through Section 6 of Act No. 3135.
• "we held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor." — This is the canonical formulation of the exception, drawn from Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Royal Savings Bank vs. Asia, and it frames the entire analysis of whether Hernandez's motion for injunctive relief could succeed.
• "It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex-parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process." — This passage states the due process rationale underlying the exception and explains why a third-party possessor must first be accorded a hearing before being ejected under a writ of possession.
• "In Gopiao v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., we ruled that there should be certainty of possession before applying the exception to the general rule in issuing writs of possession." — This is the decisive ratio of the case: the exception is unavailable where the fact of the third party's actual possession is disputed, which is why Hernandez's claim failed.
• "Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction." — This passage supplies the controlling standard for the injunctive relief sought and explains the denial of Hernandez's motion independent of the writ-of-possession analysis.

• Nagtalon vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 172504, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA 615 — Cited as the controlling exposition of the two instances when a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure may apply for a writ of possession — during the redemption period with a bond, and after its lapse without a bond — and of the rule that the issuance of the writ is a ministerial function forbidding the exercise of discretion.
• Gopiao vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 188931, July 28, 2014, 731 SCRA 131 — The decisive precedent. Cited for the requirement of certainty of possession before the exception to the ministerial rule may be applied; the Court found the case squarely applicable because Hernandez's possession, like the petitioner's in Gopiao, was questionable and unsubstantiated.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135219, January 17, 2002, 374 SCRA 22 — Cited, together with Royal Savings Bank vs. Asia, for the holding that the obligation to issue an ex parte writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that a third party is in possession claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor, and for the due process rationale protecting such third parties.
• Royal Savings Bank vs. Asia, G.R. No. 183658, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 511 — Cited for the same exception and for the proposition that a third party not privy to the debtor is protected by law and may be ejected only after an opportunity to be heard; also cited in connection with the observation that only one court was involved in this case.
• Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 150 — Cited for the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect would dispose of the main case without trial, and that granting the motion would prejudge the main case and reverse the burden of proof.
• China Banking Corporation vs. Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, March 24, 2003, 399 SCRA 430 — Cited for the enumeration of the cumulative remedies available to a third-party claimant: terceria and an independent separate action for recovery of ownership or possession and damages.
• Okabe vs. Saturnino, G.R. No. 196040, August 26, 2014, 733 SCRA 652 — Cited for the propositions that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by virtue of Section 6 of Act No. 3135, and that the procedure where a third party occupies the levied property is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the possession.
• LZK Holdings and Development Corp. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 731 — Cited for the rule that questions regarding the regularity and validity of the sale cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ of possession, the proceeding being ex parte.
• Tolosa vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 138 — Cited for the two modes of applying for a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood Association, G.R. Nos. 175728 & 178914, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 582 — Cited for the principle that a third party's possession is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just title, which may only be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property.
• Chailease Finance Corporation vs. Spouses Ma, G.R. No. 151941, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 250 — Cited for the general definition of a writ of possession as an order commanding the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property.
• Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-79906, June 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 358 and Unchuan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710 — Cited in support of the rule that a third party not privy to the debtor is protected by law and may be ejected only after an opportunity to be heard.

• Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 — Governs the purchaser's application for a writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. It authorizes a petition under oath, filed as an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under Section 194 of the Administrative Code; during the redemption period a bond equivalent to the use of the property for twelve months is required to indemnify the debtor. The Court relied on this provision to establish that the proceeding is ex parte and non-litigious and that the issuance of the writ is ministerial.
• Section 6, Act No. 3135 — Governs redemption in extrajudicial foreclosure, allowing the debtor, his successors-in-interest, judicial or judgment creditors, or any person having a lien subsequent to the mortgage to redeem within one year from the date of the sale, with redemption governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as not inconsistent. The Court used this provision as the bridge making Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures.
• Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that upon expiration of the right of redemption the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property, and that possession shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor." This clause is the textual source of the exception applied and construed in the case.
• Section 16, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Governs proceedings where property levied on is claimed by a third person, requiring an affidavit of title or right to possession served upon the levying officer and the judgment obligee, and providing that the officer shall not be bound to keep the property unless a bond is filed. It also preserves the third-party claimant's right to vindicate his claim in a separate action. Cited as the basis of the terceria remedy available to Hernandez.
• Article 433, Civil Code — Provides that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and that the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Cited to explain why a third-party possessor may not be summarily ejected through an ex parte possessory writ.
• Section 17, Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) — Identified as one of the proceedings in which a writ of possession may be issued, in the Court's enumeration of the four settings for the remedy.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the Petition for Review on Certiorari by which the case reached the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90050.
• Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction that Hernandez filed with the Court of Appeals after the RTC denied her motion for injunctive relief.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.